United States v. Timmie Issac , 510 F. App'x 234 ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4766
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TIMMIE ISSAC,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. Terry L. Wooten, District Judge.
(4:11-cr-02161-TLW-6)
Submitted: January 29, 2013 Decided: February 14, 2013
Before NIEMEYER and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON,
Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
T. Kirk Truslow, TRUSLOW LAW FIRM, LLC, North Myrtle Beach,
South Carolina, for Appellant. Alfred William Walker Bethea,
Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Timmie Issac appeals his conviction and ninety-month
sentence imposed following his guilty plea to possession with
intent to distribute and distribution of cocaine base, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (2006). On appeal,
Issac’s counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that there are no meritorious
grounds for appeal but questioning whether the district court
complied with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 (“Rule 11”)
during the plea hearing and whether Issac’s sentence was
procedurally and substantively reasonable. Issac was advised of
his right to file a pro se supplemental brief but did not file
one. Finding no meritorious grounds for appeal, we affirm
Issac’s conviction. We dismiss Issac’s appeal of his sentence
for lack of jurisdiction.
Counsel questions whether the district court fully
complied with Rule 11 in accepting Issac’s guilty plea. Our
review of the plea hearing reveals that the district court
substantially complied with Rule 11 in conducting the plea
colloquy, and committed no error warranting correction on plain
error review. See United States v. General, 278 F.3d 389, 393
(4th Cir. 2002) (providing standard of review); United States v.
Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (detailing plain error
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standard). Thus, the district court did not err in finding
Issac’s guilty plea knowing and voluntary.
Counsel also questions the procedural and substantive
reasonableness of Issac’s sentence. Issac entered his guilty
plea pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(C); therefore, we conclude that
we lack jurisdiction to review the sentence imposed by the
district court. The federal statute governing appellate review
of a sentence limits the circumstances under which a defendant
may appeal a sentence to which he stipulated in a Rule
11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement to claims that the district court
imposed the sentence “in violation of law . . . [or] as a result
of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines.” 18
U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1)-(2), (c) (2006); United States v. Sanchez,
146 F.3d 796, 797 & n.1 (10th Cir. 1998) (concerning Rule
11(e)(1)(C), predecessor provision to 11(c)(1)(C). Here,
Issac’s sentence was less than the applicable statutory maximum,
see 18 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), and, due to a downward departure,
was less than the sentence for which he had bargained. Thus,
review of his sentence is precluded by § 3742(c).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm Issac’s conviction and dismiss his appeal of
the sentence. This court requires that counsel inform Issac, in
writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the
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United States for further review. If Issac requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, counsel may move in this court for leave to
withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that
a copy thereof was served on Issac. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal conclusions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
DISMISSED IN PART
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