Carlos Woods v. Attorney General of MD ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-7317
CARLOS WOODS,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND,
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. William D. Quarles, Jr., District
Judge. (1:12-cv-01260-WDQ)
Submitted: January 24, 2013 Decided: March 7, 2013
Before KING, DUNCAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Carlos Woods, Appellant Pro Se. Edward John Kelley, OFFICE OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Carlos Woods seeks to appeal the district court’s
August 1, 2012 order denying without prejudice his self-styled
“Motion for [T]ranscript of Post Conviction [H]earing” and
denying his self-styled “Motion Requesting Judge Change.” Woods
filed his notice of appeal prior to the entry on December 3,
2012, of final judgment in the district court.
We may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders,
28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006), and certain interlocutory and
collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2006); Fed. R. Civ. P.
54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541,
545-47 (1949). When a notice of appeal is premature, the
jurisdictional defect can be cured if the district court enters
a final judgment prior to our consideration of the appeal under
the doctrine of cumulative finality. Equip. Fin. Grp., Inc. v.
Traverse Computer Brokers, 973 F.2d 345, 347-48 (4th Cir. 1992).
Not all premature notices of appeal, however, are subject to the
cumulative finality rule. Instead, this doctrine applies only
if the appellant appeals from an order the district court could
have certified for immediate appeal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
In re Bryson, 406 F.3d 284, 287-89 (4th Cir. 2005). Appeals
from “clearly interlocutory decision[s]” cannot be saved under
cumulative finality. Id. at 288 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
2
The August 1 order is not a final order of the
district court and is not appealable under the collateral order
exception to the final judgment rule. The order also is not one
of the orders subject to appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292.
Further, because the district court could not have certified the
order for immediate appeal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), the
cumulative finality rule cannot apply. Accordingly, we dismiss
the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED
3