Renlong Qiu v. Eric Holder, Jr. , 513 F. App'x 354 ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-2168
RENLONG QIU,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals.
Submitted: February 15, 2013 Decided: March 12, 2013
Before DAVIS, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Gang Zhou, New York, New York, for Petitioner. Stuart F.
Delery, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Douglas E.
Ginsburg, Assistant Director, Zoe J. Heller, Office of
Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Renlong Qiu, a native and citizen of the People’s
Republic of China, petitions for review of an order of the Board
of Immigration Appeals (“Board”), dismissing his appeal from the
immigration judge’s order denying his applications for asylum,
withholding of removal and withholding under the Convention
Against Torture (“CAT”) and denying his motion to remand. We
deny the petition for review. *
The current state of the law regarding this court’s
review of final orders denying asylum, withholding of removal
and relief under the CAT was summarized in Djadjou v. Holder,
662 F.3d 265, 272-74 (4th Cir. 2011). According to the court,
the Immigration and Naturalization Act (“INA”) vests in the
Attorney General the discretionary power to grant asylum to
aliens who qualify as refugees. Id. at 272. A refugee is
someone “who is unable or unwilling to return to” his native
country “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of . . . political opinion” or other
protected grounds. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006). Asylum
*
Qiu does not challenge the denial of relief under the CAT.
He has therefore waived review of this claim. See Ngarurih v.
Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182, 189 n.7 (4th Cir. 2004) (finding that
failure to raise a challenge in an opening brief results in
abandonment of that challenge); Edwards v. City of Goldsboro,
178 F.3d 231, 241 n.6 (4th Cir. 1999) (same).
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applicants have the burden of proving that they satisfy the
definition of a refugee to qualify for relief. Djadjou, 662
F.3d at 272. They may satisfy this burden by showing that they
were subjected to past persecution or that they have a well
founded fear of persecution on account of a protected ground
such as religion. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (2012). If the
applicant establishes past persecution, he has the benefit of a
rebuttable presumption of a well founded fear of persecution.
Djadjou, 662 F.3d at 272.
Aliens face a heightened burden of proof to qualify
for withholding of removal to a particular country under the
INA. They must show a clear probability of persecution on
account of a protected ground. If they meet this heightened
burden, withholding of removal is mandatory. However, if
applicants cannot demonstrate asylum eligibility, their
applications for withholding of removal will necessarily fail as
well. Djadjou, 662 F.3d at 272-73.
When the Board adopts the immigration judge’s decision
and includes its own reasons for affirming, this court reviews
both decisions. Djadjou, 662 F.3d at 273. This court will
uphold the Board’s decision unless it is manifestly contrary to
the law and an abuse of discretion. The standard of review of
the agency’s findings is narrow and deferential. Factual
findings are affirmed if supported by substantial evidence.
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Substantial evidence exists to support a finding unless the
evidence was such that any reasonable adjudicator would have
been compelled to conclude to the contrary. Id.Qiu claims that despite the finding that he testified
credibly, neither the immigration judge nor the Board gave
appropriate weight to his testimony or his corroborating
evidence. He claims that it was implicit in the immigration
judge’s findings that he was not credible. We conclude that
there is no support for Qiu’s claim that his evidence was not
considered as if he testified credibly.
We have reviewed the evidence and conclude that
substantial evidence supports the finding that Qiu did not show
that he suffered past persecution. Persecution is an “extreme
concept” and may include actions less severe than threats to
life or freedom but must rise above mere harassment. Qiao Hua
Li v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 171, 177 (4th Cir. 2005). “A key
difference between persecution and less-severe mistreatment is
that the former is ‘systematic’ while the latter consists of
isolated incidents.” Baharon v. Holder, 588 F.3d 228, 232 (4th
Cir. 2009). The Board is instructed to look at all incidents in
the aggregate, including violence or threats to family members,
to determine if there is past persecution, rather than looking
at each incident in isolation. Id. Substantial evidence
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supports the finding that the incidents described by Qiu do not
rise to the level of persecution.
We further conclude that substantial evidence supports
the finding that Qiu failed to show he had a well founded fear
of persecution. The well founded fear standard contains both a
subjective and an objective component. The objective element
requires a showing of specific, concrete facts that would lead a
reasonable person in like circumstances to fear persecution.
Gandziami-Mickhou v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 351, 353 (4th Cir.
2006). “The subjective component can be met through the
presentation of candid, credible, and sincere testimony
demonstrating a genuine fear of persecution . . . . [It] must
have some basis in the reality of the circumstances and be
validated with specific, concrete facts . . . and it cannot be
mere irrational apprehension.” Qiao Hua Li, 405 F.3d at 176(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We have
reviewed the evidence and conclude that the record does not
compel a finding that reasonable persons in Qiu’s situation
would fear persecution. Because substantial evidence supports
the finding the Qiu was not eligible for asylum, he did not
establish eligibility for withholding of removal. Djadjou, 662
F.3d at 272.
We further conclude that the Board did not abuse its
discretion in denying Qiu’s motion to remand. See Hussain v.
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Gonzales, 477 F.3d 153, 155 (4th Cir. 2007). Substantial
evidence supports the finding that Qiu failed to show that his
new evidence would likely change the result. See Matter of
Coelho, 20 I. & N. Dec. 464, 473 (B.I.A. 1992).
Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
PETITION DENIED
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