United States v. Omar Baskerville , 514 F. App'x 278 ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4446
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
OMAR SHAHEED BASKERVILLE, a/k/a O, a/k/a Omar Dunson, a/k/a
Omar Shahid Baskerville, a/k/a Jerrell Jones,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Gerald Bruce Lee, District
Judge. (1:12-cr-00036-GBL-1)
Submitted: March 8, 2013 Decided: March 13, 2013
Before WILKINSON, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Cordell A. Hull, PATTON BOGGS LLP, Washington, D.C., for
Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney, Scott I.
Fitzgerald, Special Assistant United States Attorney,
Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Omar Shaheed Baskerville pled guilty pursuant to a
plea agreement to one count of distributing oxycodone, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006); and one count of
possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking
crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2006).
Baskerville’s sole argument is that the district court erred
when it denied his request for new counsel. Finding no
reversible error, we affirm.
We review a district court’s ruling on a motion to
substitute counsel for abuse of discretion. United States v.
Horton, 693 F.3d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 2012). While a criminal
defendant has a right to counsel of his own choosing, that right
is not absolute. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 52-53 (1932);
Sampley v. Attorney Gen. of N.C., 786 F.2d 610, 612 (4th Cir.
1986). In particular, a defendant’s right to choose his own
counsel is limited so as not to “deprive courts of the exercise
of their inherent power to control the administration of
justice.” United States v. Gallop, 838 F.2d 105, 108 (4th Cir.
1988); see United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 152
(2006) (“[A] trial court[] [has] wide latitude in balancing the
right to counsel of choice against the needs of fairness and
against demands of its calendar[.]”) (internal citations
omitted).
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A defendant’s right to receive substitute counsel
after the court’s initial appointment is similarly limited.
Thus, a defendant must show good cause as to why he should
receive substitute counsel. Gallop, 838 F.2d at 108. In
general, good cause exists when denying substitute counsel would
deny the defendant a constitutionally adequate defense. United
States v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 435, 443 (4th Cir. 1997) (“A total
lack of communication is not required. Rather an examination of
whether the extent of the breakdown prevents the ability to
conduct an adequate defense is the necessary inquiry.”); United
States v. Mullen, 32 F.3d 891, 897 (4th Cir. 1994).
A district court has discretion to decide whether
substitution of counsel is proper. Gallop, 838 F.2d at 108. In
making its decision, the district court must consider both the
defendant’s reason for seeking substitution and the government’s
interest in proceeding without a continuance. Morris v. Slappy,
461 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1983); United States v. Reevey, 364 F.3d 151,
157 (4th Cir. 2004). In reviewing the district court’s decision
on a motion for substitution, this court looks at three factors:
the “[t]imeliness of the motion; [the] adequacy of the court’s
inquiry into the defendant’s complaint; and whether the
attorney/client conflict was so great that it had resulted in
total lack of communication preventing an adequate defense.”
Gallop, 838 F.2d at 108. With these principles in mind, we have
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reviewed the record and have considered the parties’ arguments
and discern no reversible error.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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