United States v. Latoya Jones , 514 F. App'x 280 ( 2013 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 12-4714
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff – Appellee,
    v.
    LATOYA EVETTE JONES, a/k/a Toy,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
    District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg.     Gina M. Groh,
    District Judge. (3:11-cr-00066-GMG-DJJ-1)
    Submitted:   February 28, 2013            Decided:   March 13, 2013
    Before KING, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam
    opinion.
    Nicholas   J.  Compton,   Assistant   Federal  Public Defender,
    Kristen M. Leddy, Research and Writing Specialist, Martinsburg,
    West Virginia, for Appellant. William J. Ihlenfeld, II, United
    States Attorney, Thomas O. Mucklow, Assistant United States
    Attorney, Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Latoya    Evette     Jones       appeals     her      conviction      and
    114-month     sentence     entered   pursuant     to     her    guilty    plea    to
    distribution of cocaine base within 1000 feet of a school.                        On
    appeal, counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California,
    
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967), asserting that there are no meritorious
    grounds for appeal but questioning whether Jones’ sentence was
    unreasonably high.         The Government contends that the appellate
    waiver   provision    in   Jones’    plea     agreement     bars    any   claim   of
    sentencing error.      We affirm in part and dismiss in part.
    A defendant may, in a valid plea agreement, waive the
    right to appeal under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3742
     (2006).                 United States v.
    Wiggins, 
    905 F.2d 51
    , 53 (4th Cir. 1990).                   An appellate waiver
    must be “the result of a knowing and intelligent decision to
    forgo the right to appeal.”            United States v. Broughton-Jones,
    
    71 F.3d 1143
    , 1146 (4th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks and
    citation omitted).         We review de novo whether a defendant has
    effectively waived her right to appeal.                United States v. Marin,
    
    961 F.2d 493
    , 496 (4th Cir. 1992).
    To   determine      whether       a   waiver       is    knowing      and
    intelligent,     we   examine   “the     totality      of   the     circumstances,
    including the experience and conduct of the accused, as well as
    the accused’s educational background and familiarity with the
    terms of the plea agreement.”                United States v. General, 278
    
    2 F.3d 389
    ,      400       (4th    Cir.    2002)       (internal          quotation     marks      and
    citation        omitted).           Generally,         if    a    court     fully      questions     a
    defendant regarding the waiver of her right to appeal during the
    Rule   11   colloquy,             the   waiver     is       both    valid       and   enforceable.
    United States v. Johnson, 
    410 F.3d 137
    , 151 (4th Cir. 2005).
    However, we will “refuse to enforce an otherwise valid waiver if
    to    do   so    would        result      in   a    miscarriage           of     justice.”         
    Id.
    (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
    In     the       plea   agreement,          Jones     agreed      to    waive      all
    appellate rights relating to her sentence except for claims that
    her    sentence        exceeded         the    maximum           statutory      sentence.          Our
    review of the record convinces us that Jones’ waiver was knowing
    and intelligent, and she does not contend otherwise.                                    We further
    conclude        that       the    sentencing       issue      raised       by    counsel      in   the
    Anders briefs falls within the scope of the appellate waiver
    provision,           and     we    therefore       dismiss          the     appeal      of     Jones’
    sentence.
    In accordance with Anders, we have thoroughly examined
    the entire record for any other potentially meritorious issues
    outside the scope of Jones’ appeal waiver and have found none.
    Therefore we affirm Jones’ conviction.                             This court requires that
    counsel inform Jones, in writing, of the right to petition the
    Supreme Court of the United States for further review.                                       If Jones
    requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that
    3
    such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in
    this court for leave to withdraw from representation.             Counsel’s
    motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Jones.                We
    dispense   with     oral   argument   because     the    facts   and   legal
    contentions   are   adequately   presented   in    the   materials     before
    this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED IN PART;
    DISMISSED IN PART
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 12-4714

Citation Numbers: 514 F. App'x 280

Judges: King, Shedd, Duncan

Filed Date: 3/13/2013

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024