United States v. Roberto Chay-Chay ( 2016 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-7491
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Petitioner - Appellee,
v.
ROBERTO CHAY-CHAY,
Respondent - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior
District Judge. (5:15-hc-02064-BR)
Submitted: August 19, 2016 Decided: August 24, 2016
Before DUNCAN, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Joseph Bart
Gilbert, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellant. John Stuart Bruce, Acting United
States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Jennifer D. Dannels,
Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
The district court committed Roberto Chay-Chay, a
Guatemalan national, to the custody and care of the Attorney
General pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246 (2012). The court found
that Chay-Chay, who was being detained at the Federal Medical
Center in Butner, North Carolina (“FMC-Butner”) for a mental
health evaluation following his illegal reentry into the United
States after deportation, was suffering from a mental disease or
defect as a result of which his release would create a
substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious
damage to the property of another.
A person may be committed to the custody of the Attorney
General for “medical, psychiatric, or psychological care or
treatment” “[i]f, after [a] hearing, the [district] court finds
by clear and convincing evidence that the person is presently
suffering from a mental disease or defect as a result of which
his release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to
another person or serious damage to property of another.”
18 U.S.C. § 4246(d). The district court’s finding that such
dangerousness exists is a factual determination we will not
overturn unless it is clearly erroneous. United States v.
LeClair, 338 F.3d 882, 885 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v.
Cox, 964 F.2d 1431, 1433 (4th Cir. 1992). We review issues of
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statutory interpretation de novo. United States v. Joshua, 607
F.3d 379, 382 (4th Cir. 2010).
On appeal, Chay-Chay does not argue that the Government
failed to establish his dangerousness by clear and convincing
evidence. Rather, he first challenges the district court’s
statutory interpretation of § 4246, arguing that the civil
commitment involved improper extraterritorial application
because the district court found that the requirement of
“substantial risk of bodily injury to another person” includes
risk to persons anywhere in the world.
In this case, the district court did not expressly find
that Chay-Chay’s release would create a substantial risk of
bodily injury to, or serious damage to the property of, a person
outside of the United States. In fact, if Chay-Chay were
released, he would be released in the United States, and there
is no proceeding or detainer pending against him that would
preclude his presence in the United States upon release.
Having concluded that the district court did not give § 4246
extraterritorial effect, we need not reach the issue of whether
§ 4246 applies extraterritorially.
Chay-Chay also posits constitutional challenges to allowing
a court in the United States to civilly commit “mentally ill
undocumented noncitizens . . . to serve de facto life sentences
at the expense of American taxpayers.” However, § 4246 provides
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numerous avenues by which a person in Chay-Chay’s situation can
be released after commitment. See 18 U.S.C. § 4246(d)(2), (e),
(g) (2012). With respect to Chay-Chay’s due process rights,
“civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant
deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.”
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979). Furthermore,
Chay-Chay does not argue that he was denied due process through
the commitment hearing.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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