United States v. Tarrant Counts , 500 F. App'x 220 ( 2012 )


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  •                               UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 12-7266
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    TARRANT COUNTS,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
    District of North Carolina, at Charlotte.   Frank D. Whitney,
    District Judge. (3:96-cr-00155-FDW-3)
    Submitted:   December 13, 2012              Decided:   December 18, 2012
    Before MOTZ, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Tarrant Counts, Appellant Pro Se. Robert J. Higdon, Jr., OFFICE
    OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina; Amy
    Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville,
    North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Tarrant         Counts       appeals         the    district       court’s       order
    granting his motion seeking a reduction of sentence under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2) (2006). 1                This court reviews the denial of a
    § 3582(c)(2) motion for abuse of discretion.                                United States v.
    Munn, 
    595 F.3d 183
    , 186 (4th Cir. 2010).
    Although         the    core       of    Counts’         assertions      on     appeal
    takes issue        with    the    district         court’s      failure      to     reduce    his
    sentence     to    the     full       extent       that   Counts       requested,          Counts
    misapprehends the application of the Guidelines to his case.
    Although   Counts         was    designated         a   career       offender       under    U.S.
    Sentencing        Guidelines          (“USSG”)          § 4B1.1        at     his       original
    sentencing,       Counts’       initial      sentence         was    based    on     the    crack
    Guidelines        provisions       in       USSG    § 2D1.1         because       the    § 2D1.1
    provisions        resulted       in     a     higher      offense       level        than    the
    § 4B1.1(b) provisions.                See USSG § 4B1.1(b) (providing that the
    offense level calculated under the career offender guidelines
    applies only if it is “greater than the offense level otherwise
    applicable”).
    Amendment 750, however, reduced Counts’ offense level
    as calculated under the crack guidelines to a level that is
    1
    Although the district court granted Counts’ motion, the
    reduction granted by the court did not reduce Counts’ sentence
    to the full extent that he had requested.
    lower    than    his    offense       level   as    calculated     under      the   career
    offender guidelines.                Compare USSG § 2D1.1(c)(3) & (b)(1) with
    USSG § 4B1.1(b)(1).            As a result, the career offender guidelines
    now control.      See USSG § 4B1.1(b).
    Under       the    Guidelines         provisions      now   applicable     to
    Counts, the district court gave Counts the greatest possible
    deduction        that     he         could    have         received.          See    USSG
    § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A).             We discern no abuse of discretion in the
    district court’s refusal to reduce Counts’ sentence to a degree
    larger than the Guidelines permit.                     See also Dillon v. United
    States, 
    130 S. Ct. 2683
    , 2690-92 (2010) (court may not revisit
    any Guidelines application decisions other than those affected
    by the applicable amendment); United States v. Stewart, 
    595 F.3d 197
    , 201 (4th Cir. 2010) (same). 2
    Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
    court.     We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
    legal    contentions      are        adequately      presented     in   the    materials
    before    this    court       and    argument      would    not   aid   the   decisional
    process.
    AFFIRMED
    2
    To the extent that Counts claims that the counsel who
    moved for § 3582(c)(2) relief on his behalf deprived him of
    effective assistance of counsel, we decline to reach Counts’
    claim because the record does not conclusively show any such
    ineffectiveness. See United States v. Baldovinos, 
    434 F.3d 233
    ,
    239 (4th Cir. 2006).
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 12-7266

Citation Numbers: 500 F. App'x 220

Judges: Floyd, Motz, Per Curiam, Wynn

Filed Date: 12/18/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024