Manly Hook v. Carolyn Colvin , 675 F. App'x 390 ( 2017 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-2352
MANLY HOWELL HOOK,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner of Social Security
Administration,
Defendant – Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Greenville. Timothy M. Cain, District Judge.
(6:14-cv-01311-TMC)
Argued: December 6, 2016 Decided: February 8, 2017
Before KING, SHEDD, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: William Daniel Mayes, SMITH, MASSEY, BRODIE, GUYNN &
MAYES, P.A., Aiken, South Carolina, for Appellant. Jillian
Elizabeth Quick, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Nora Koch, Acting
Regional Chief Counsel, Charles Kawas, Acting Supervisory
Attorney, Office of the General Counsel, SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; William N. Nettles,
United States Attorney, Marshall Prince, Assistant United States
Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
A social security administrative law judge (ALJ) denied
Manly Howell Hook’s application for Disability Insurance
Benefits and Supplemental Security Income, finding that he is
not disabled under the Social Security Act. After the ALJ’s
decision became final, Hook filed this action seeking judicial
review. Following briefing by the parties and a recommendation
by a magistrate judge, the district court affirmed the final
decision. Hook now appeals. We affirm.
We must uphold the ALJ’s disability determination unless it
is based on legal error or, in light of the whole record, is
unsupported by substantial evidence. Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d
632, 634 (4th Cir. 2015). The substantial evidence standard
requires more than a scintilla, but may be less than a
preponderance, of evidence. Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472
(4th Cir. 2012). We do not reweigh conflicting evidence, make
credibility determinations, or substitute our judgment for that
of the ALJ. Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 653 (4th Cir.
2005). When conflicting evidence could lead reasonable minds to
differ regarding whether a claimant is disabled, we must defer
to the ALJ’s determination. Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472.
An ALJ is required to use a five-step sequential evaluation
process in determining whether a claimant is disabled. See
Mascio, 780 F.3d at 634-35 (explaining the process). If the ALJ
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finds that the claimant has been working (step one) or that the
claimant’s medical impairments do not meet the severity and
duration requirements of the social security regulations (step
two), the process ends with a finding of “not disabled.” If the
ALJ reaches step three, he must either find that the claimant is
disabled because the medical impairments meet or equal an
impairment listed in the regulations or continue the analysis,
but he cannot deny benefits at this step.
If the first three steps do not lead to a conclusive
determination, the ALJ then assesses the claimant’s residual
functional capacity (“RFC”), which is the most the claimant can
do despite physical and mental limitations that affect his
ability to work. To make this assessment, the ALJ must consider
all of the claimant’s medically determinable impairments of
which the ALJ is aware. The ALJ then moves to step four, where
the ALJ either finds the claimant not disabled because he is
able to perform past work or proceeds to step five because the
exertion required for the claimant’s past work exceeds the RFC.
The claimant bears the burden of proof at the first four
steps, but at step five the burden shifts to the Commissioner to
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the claimant can
perform other work that exists in significant numbers in the
national economy, considering the claimant’s RFC, age,
education, and work experience. The Commissioner typically
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offers this evidence through the testimony of a vocational
expert responding to a hypothetical that incorporates the
claimant’s limitations. If the Commissioner meets her burden,
the ALJ finds the claimant not disabled and denies the
application for benefits.
Conducting this analysis, the ALJ proceeded through step
five. In summary, the ALJ found that Hook suffers from the
severe impairments of degenerative joint disease and obesity,
but that he has the ability to perform sedentary work subject to
certain limitations. Based on the vocational expert’s testimony,
the ALJ further found that the Commissioner met her burden of
proving that Hook is capable of performing work that exists in
significant numbers in the national economy. For this reason,
the ALJ concluded that Hook is not disabled.
On appeal, Hook primarily contends that (1) the ALJ’s
rationale for rejecting the opinion of Dr. Vaughan Massie is not
supported by substantial evidence, (2) the ALJ improperly failed
to include certain restrictions in the RFC determination, and
(3) the ALJ failed to adequately explain his RFC findings.
Having thoroughly considered the record, oral arguments, and
controlling legal principles, we conclude that there is no basis
to disturb the ALJ’s decision. We reach our decision for
substantially the reasons articulated by the district court –
that is, the ALJ properly followed the controlling regulations
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in assessing Hook’s application, the ALJ adequately explained
the bases for his adverse disability finding, and the decision
is supported by substantial evidence. See J.A. 53-74, 93-99
(magistrate report and district court order).
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the district court
judgment.
AFFIRMED
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