United States v. Curtis ( 2010 )


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  •                                 UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 08-5095
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    BARRY LLOYD CURTIS,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
    District of North Carolina, at Bryson City. Lacy H. Thornburg,
    District Judge. (2:08-cr-00016-LHT-1)
    Submitted:    August 20, 2009                 Decided:   January 6, 2010
    Before WILKINSON, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished
    per curiam opinion.
    Claire J. Rauscher, Ross H. Richardson, Erin K. Taylor, FEDERAL
    DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, Charlotte, North Carolina,
    for Appellant.   Edward R. Ryan, Acting United States Attorney,
    Charlotte, North Carolina, Amy E. Ray, Assistant United States
    Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Barry Lloyd Curtis timely appeals from the fifty-seven
    month sentence imposed after his guilty plea to one count of
    possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1) (2006).              On appeal, Curtis contends, and the
    Government       concedes,      that    trial      counsel       was    ineffective        for
    failing    to    object    to    the    erroneous            Guidelines      range   in    the
    Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”).                          We affirm Curtis’s
    conviction, but vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing.
    A    defendant       may     raise          a     claim    of     ineffective
    assistance       of   counsel    “on     direct         appeal    if   and    only    if    it
    conclusively appears from the record that his counsel did not
    provide effective assistance.”                    United States v. Martinez, 
    136 F.3d 972
    , 979 (4th Cir. 1998).                To prove ineffective assistance,
    the   defendant       must      show    two       things:        (1)   “that     counsel’s
    representation         fell       below           an     objective           standard       of
    reasonableness” and (2) “that there is a reasonable probability
    that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
    proceeding       would     have        been       different.”             Strickland        v.
    Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 688, 694 (1984).
    We find that Curtis has conclusively shown he received
    ineffective assistance of counsel.                       In the PSR, the probation
    officer incorrectly stated that the applicable Guidelines range
    for   an   adjusted       offense      level       of    23     and    criminal      history
    2
    category    II    was    fifty-seven         to   seventy-one          months,     when    the
    correct    Guidelines         range    is    fifty-one      to     sixty-three      months.
    U.S.   Sentencing       Guidelines          Manual,   ch.     5,      pt.   A   (sentencing
    table) (2007).          At sentencing, the district court accepted the
    Guidelines range as calculated in the PSR and sentenced Curtis
    to   fifty-seven        months’       imprisonment.           Counsel’s         failure     to
    object     to    the     erroneous          Guidelines      range       was     objectively
    unreasonable,      given       the    ease    with    which      counsel        should    have
    spotted the error.             Further, there is a reasonable possibility
    that, had counsel objected to the erroneous Guidelines range,
    the district court would have sentenced Curtis at the low end of
    the proper Guidelines range, which was six months less than his
    current sentence.
    For        the     foregoing       reasons,          we    affirm      Curtis’s
    conviction, but vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing.
    We   dispense     with       oral    argument     because        the   facts     and     legal
    conclusions are adequately presented in the materials before the
    court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED IN PART,
    VACATED IN PART,
    AND REMANDED
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 08-5095

Judges: Wilkinson, King, Agee

Filed Date: 1/6/2010

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024