Quillin v. C.B. Fleet Holding Company, Inc. ( 2009 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 08-1814
    JOHN H. QUILLIN; EVELYN M. QUILLIN,
    Plaintiffs - Appellants,
    v.
    C.B. FLEET HOLDING COMPANY, INCORPORATED; C.B. FLEET
    COMPANY, INCORPORATED; WAL-MART STORES, INCORPORATED; WAL-
    MART STORES EAST, INCORPORATED; WAL-MART STORES EAST, LP,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
    Maryland, at Baltimore.    Catherine C. Blake, District Judge.
    (1:07-cv-00503-CCB)
    Argued:   March 26, 2009                      Decided:   May 14, 2009
    Before GREGORY and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and Jackson L. KISER,
    Senior United States District Judge for the Western District of
    Virginia, sitting by designation.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    ARGUED: D. Michelle Douglas, KALBIAN & HAGERTY, LLP, Washington,
    D.C., for Appellants.    Richard Matthew Barnes, GOODELL DEVRIES
    LEECH & DANN, LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees. ON BRIEF:
    Haig V. Kalbian, Aaron W. Knights, KALBIAN & HAGERTY, LLP,
    Washington, D.C., for Appellants.     Thomas J. S. Waxter, III,
    Paula Krahn Merkle, Derek M. Stikeleather, GOODELL DEVRIES LEECH
    & DANN, LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    2
    PER CURIAM:
    At    his   doctor’s          instruction,       plaintiff        John   H.      Quillin
    (“Quillin”) ingested twice the recommended amount of the over-
    the-counter oral saline laxative Fleet Phospho-soda (“FPS”) the
    day before he underwent a routine colonoscopy.                             Following the
    procedure, he suffered severe complications and long-term renal
    failure.     He sued C.B. Fleet Holding Co., Inc., the maker of
    FPS, and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, and
    Wal-Mart    Stores     East,       Inc.,    where     he      purchased    the     product,
    (collectively         “Fleet”)        under       both        strict     liability         and
    negligence    theories        of    products      liability       relating       to    design
    defects and failure to warn, and for breach of warranty and loss
    of consortium.         The district court dismissed all of Quillin’s
    claims,    finding     that    it     was    barred      by    the     relevant    Maryland
    statute of limitations.              This conclusion was premised upon the
    application      of     Maryland’s          discovery         rule,     which      gives     a
    potential plaintiff three years to file suit from the date that
    he knows or should have known that he had a cause of action.
    Finding that Quillin was on inquiry notice in March 2003, the
    district court found his January 2007 filing untimely.                                For the
    reasons that follow, we affirm.
    3
    I.
    On    February        24,    2003,      in    preparation   for     a   routine
    colonoscopy the next day, Quillin took two packets of FPS, an
    over-the-counter sodium phosphate solution sold as a laxative.
    Each packet contained 45 milliliters (mL) of FPS.                        In the dosage
    instruction      on     the    back    of      the   packaging,   the    product   label
    instructs adult users “[NOT TO] TAKE MORE THAN THIS AMOUNT [20
    TO 45 ML] IN A 24-HOUR PERIOD.”                         J.A. at 211. 1      Relying on
    instructions from his doctor, Quillin took twice the recommended
    dose.        At the time of his colonoscopy, Quillin suffered from
    diabetes, hypertension, hyperlipidemia, arthritis, and coronary
    artery       disease.     He        took   a   number    of   medications   for    those
    conditions.
    Following the colonoscopy procedure, Quillin became quite
    ill.        Upon the instruction of his doctor, he checked himself
    into the hospital on February 27, 2003, where he was diagnosed
    with and treated for acute renal failure and remained for two
    weeks.       He told doctors on his admission that he “had taken a
    significant amount of laxatives prior to his colonoscopy” and
    1
    In the same area of the label, the product also contains
    the instructions: “SINGLE DAILY DOSAGE: DO NOT TAKE MORE UNLESS
    DIRECTED BY A DOCTOR.      SEE WARNINGS.”    J.A. at 211.    The
    instructions given to Quillin by his physician are not in the
    record, but it is undisputed that Quillin was instructed to take
    two packets of FPS, each containing 45 mL. See Appellant’s Br.
    at 3; Appellee’s Br. at 2-3, 23-24 (“Mr. Quillin purchased two
    45 mL bottles of [FPS], as directed by his physician.”).
    4
    that he thought they “may have dried him out.”                              J.A. at 138.        A
    March 11, 2003 renal biopsy revealed interstitial fibrosis and
    tubular injury.                His discharge summary, dated March 12, 2003,
    contained a diagnosis of “acute renal failure, probably related
    again to dehydration with insult from ACE inhibitors and NSAIDs,
    and    also    from       hydrochlorothiazide             causing     ATN    or    even     acute
    interstitial nephritis.”                   J.A. at 145.          A follow-up examination
    noted    that       the    renal        biopsy      “confirmed      some    type     of     drug-
    associated      diagnosis.”                J.A.     at    215.      Since    2003,       he   has
    continued to suffer renal problems, which have resulted in the
    insertion      of     a    stent       and    now-daily         dialysis,   and     which     may
    necessitate a kidney transplant.                         After his discharge from the
    hospital,       there          is     no   evidence       that     Quillin        pursued     any
    investigation into the cause of his injury.
    There has been a growing consensus that the use of FPS
    prior     to     certain             procedures          could     cause     kidney-related
    complications.            Medical articles from as early as 1996 posited a
    correlation between oral sodium phosphate solutions and renal
    problems.       In June 2004, a study was published by Dr. Glen S.
    Markowitz in the journal Human Pathology (“the Markowitz study”)
    that     claimed          to        support    “a       novel     association       of      acute
    nephrocalcinosis and acute renal failure (ARF) with colonoscopy
    preceded by a bowel-cleansing regimen consisting of oral sodium
    phosphate solution.”                 J.A. at 279.
    5
    In June 2006, Quillin learned from a newspaper article that
    there might be an association between FPS and kidney failure.
    Quillin       filed   his    Complaint       against     Fleet   in    Maryland     state
    court on January 17, 2007, alleging both strict liability and
    negligence      theories       of    products      liability     relating   to    design
    defects and failure to warn, breach of warranty claims, and loss
    of consortium.        Fleet filed for and was granted removal.                    In the
    Maryland District Court, Fleet moved for summary judgment on the
    ground of untimeliness.               The district court granted the motion
    on October 11, 2007.                The court found that Quillin’s cause of
    action accrued against Fleet on March 11, 2003, the date of the
    renal biopsy, and that his filing was therefore untimely under
    Maryland’s       statute        of     limitations.            Quillin      moved     for
    reconsideration         on    the    basis   of    new   evidence.       The   district
    court denied Quillin’s motion for reconsideration on July 18,
    2008.
    II.
    The   district       court    exercised     diversity     jurisdiction      over
    this case under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1332
    , and we now have jurisdiction
    over    the    appeal    under       
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    .     A   federal      court
    exercising diversity jurisdiction must apply the substantive law
    of the state in which it sits.                    See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,
    
    204 U.S. 64
    , 79 (1938); see also Volvo Const. Equip. N. Am.,
    6
    Inc. v. CLM Equip. Co., Inc., 
    386 F.3d 581
    , 599–600 (4th Cir.
    2004).       Because this appeal is taken from a federal district
    court in Maryland, we apply Maryland state law.
    We review a grant of summary judgment de novo with the
    facts taken in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
    Meson v. GATX Tech. Servs. Corp., 
    507 F.3d 803
    , 806 (4th Cir.
    2007).    Summary judgment is properly granted only when there is
    no genuine issue of material fact.               Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
    
    477 U.S. 317
    , 322 (1986); see also Meson, 
    507 F.3d at 806
    .                      The
    party    seeking     summary   judgment      “bears   an   initial    burden”    to
    demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
    Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc., 
    346 F.3d 514
    ,
    522   (4th    Cir.   2003).     Where   the    non-moving     party    bears    the
    burden of proving an issue at trial, however, that party must
    “go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the
    depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
    designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
    for trial.”      Celotex, 
    477 U.S. at 324
     (quotations and citations
    omitted).
    A.
    The questions in this case arise concerning what Quillin
    knew, what he should have known, and when he knew or should have
    known it.      Maryland has a three-year statute of limitations for
    7
    tort actions.        Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 5-101; Hartnett
    v.   Schering    Corp.,     
    2 F.3d 90
    ,    92   (4th    Cir.    1993).      Under
    Maryland’s general discovery rule, the statute of limitations
    begins to run when the allegedly tortious conduct is discovered-
    -that is, when the plaintiff “in fact knew or reasonably should
    have known of the wrong.”               Pennwalt Corp. v. Nasios, 
    550 A.2d 1155
    , 1160 (Md. 1988) (quoting Poffenberger v. Risser, 
    431 A.2d 677
    , 680 (Md. 1981) (applying the discovery rule to all tort
    claims)).       Actual      knowledge,     either     express       or    implied,   is
    required to find that a tort was discovered within the meaning
    of the rule.         Poffenberger, 431 A.2d at 681.                 Because implied
    actual knowledge is sufficient to start the limitations period,
    courts consider the three years to begin when a plaintiff is on
    inquiry notice.         Inquiry notice arises “when a plaintiff gains
    knowledge sufficient to prompt a reasonable person to inquire
    further.”     Pennwalt, 550 A.2d at 1163.
    The district court concluded that Quillin was on inquiry
    notice   in     March    2003     and    that    a    reasonable         investigation
    undertaken      at    the       time    would    have       revealed      information
    sufficient      to    support      a    claim.       Quillin        challenges   both
    conclusions, which we address in turn.
    8
    1.
    In    medical       products      liability         cases,      Maryland         employs   a
    three-part test to determine whether a plaintiff had sufficient
    notice to start the statute of limitations period.                                 A court asks
    whether the plaintiff knew or had reason to know that: (1) he
    had    suffered      an     injury;       (2)      the    injury       was    caused       by    the
    defendant;         and     (3)        there     was      either        wrongdoing         by     the
    manufacturer or a product defect.                         Pennwalt, 550 A.2d at 1161-
    62, 1165; Hartnett, 
    2 F.3d at
    92 n.1; see also Hartnett, 
    2 F.3d at 92
     (holding that plaintiff must have been able to obtain
    “knowledge of the alleged tort”).                        Because the standard includes
    all of the facts an individual should have known, the plaintiff
    is    charged       with    knowledge         of       everything      that    a        reasonable
    investigation would have disclosed.                        Baysinger v. Schmid Prods.
    Co., 
    514 A.2d 1
    , 3 (Md. 1986).                     This includes, at a minimum, the
    facts that would have been disclosed by the relevant medical
    records.         Harnett, 
    2 F.3d at 93
    .
    The district court found that the latest date Quillin’s
    cause       of   action    could       have     accrued,        putting      him    on    inquiry
    notice, was March 11, 2003, the date of his renal biopsy.                                      Thus,
    the three-year statute of limitations began to run on that date
    and    expired      before       he    filed       his    case    on    January         17,    2007.
    Because of “the proximity in time” of Quillin’s kidney failure
    to    the    colonoscopy         procedure         and    his    ingestion         of    FPS,   the
    9
    district court found that he “was on notice that he had suffered
    an injury and possible wrongdoing.”                J.A. at 240.        Thus, he was
    charged       with    any   knowledge     that    a   reasonable    investigation
    undertaken at the time of the biopsy would have uncovered.
    Quillin argues that the district court’s finding that he
    was on inquiry notice of a possible cause of action based upon
    the temporal proximity of his FPS ingestion, his colonoscopy,
    and his renal problems was incorrect as a matter of law.                             He
    claims that the facts available as of March 2003 were not such
    that they would have caused a reasonable person to investigate
    further.         In    support     of    this    claim,   he   cites    the    “drug-
    associated diagnosis” in his discharge report, which is given as
    “acute renal failure probably related to dehydration.”                        J.A. at
    145.     The specific drugs that are mentioned as possibly being
    related to that failure are Quillin’s “ACE inhibitor, NSAID,
    hydrocholothlazide [sic], and the aspirin.”                    Appellee’s Br. at
    4.     FPS is nowhere mentioned; and the only drugs named are those
    he was prescribed for pre-existing conditions.                    Quillin asserts
    that    his    extensive    list    of    co-morbid    diseases    means      that   he
    could reasonably have assumed those disease and their associate
    drugs--not the combination of FPS and the colonoscopy--were the
    cause of his renal problems. Therefore, he had no knowledge that
    FPS could have been a cause of his injury.
    10
    Fleet argues that Quillin had sufficient facts in March
    2003    to    have   led     a   reasonable         person   to    inquire      further,
    including knowledge that the dose of FPS he took was twice the
    daily       limit,   that    the      injury      that   occurred        following    his
    colonoscopy was unusual, and that a connection existed between
    the laxatives he took and the dehydration that was cited as the
    cause of his injury.             In particular, Fleet emphasizes Quillin’s
    suspicions       that    his     dehydration         prior   to     the     colonoscopy
    contributed to his complications.                  The hospital discharge report
    cites dehydration as Quillin’s diagnosis, and he made statements
    to doctors that taking the FPS may have “dried him out.”                             J.A.
    at   138.      The   packaging        for   FPS     indicated     that    users    should
    “[s]top using this product and consult a doctor if you . . .
    [h]ave no bowel movement after use as dehydration may occur.”
    J.A. at 211 (emphasis added).
    In     this   case,       we   find        that   Quillin     had     sufficient
    information to know that he had suffered an injury and that
    Fleet’s       product    may      have      been     a   cause     of     the     injury.
    Complications from his colonoscopy led him to check himself into
    the hospital, where he remained for two weeks.                       While there, he
    was given a diagnosis of renal failure, and he has continued to
    suffer health problems as a result of the procedure in the years
    that followed.          The injury in this case was thus clear, and a
    reasonable person would have undertaken an investigation into
    11
    its cause.       See Hartnett, 
    2 F.3d at 92
     (it is the knowledge of
    injury, not the knowledge of its cause that gives rise to the
    duty to investigate).
    The fact that Quillin may not have been certain that his
    injury was a result of his ingestion of FPS did not free him
    from the obligation to investigate the cause of his injury if he
    was reasonably on notice that some wrongdoing may have occurred.
    In an analogous case, a patient was deemed to be on notice of
    the improper medical care she received following a visit to her
    doctor    from       which   she   “came     away   .   .    .    with   a   belief    that
    something wrong had been done.”                   Lutheran Hosp. of Md. v. Levy,
    
    482 A.2d 23
    , 27 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984) (quotations omitted).
    Under Maryland law, it was immaterial that “the wrong she then
    thought existed . . . was not the wrong ultimately established.”
    
    Id.
          Some uncertainty about the cause of an injury does not
    alleviate       an    individual        of   the    responsibility           to    inquire.
    Holding     otherwise        would      eviscerate          the    requirement        of   a
    reasonable investigation.               To be on inquiry notice, a potential
    plaintiff must only know or have reason to know of an injury,
    its cause, and the wrongdoing which gave rise to it.
    2.
    For limitations purposes, once a plaintiff has knowledge of
    an    injury,    he     or   she   is    charged     with        knowledge    of    what   a
    12
    reasonably            diligent           investigation          would     have        uncovered.
    Pennwalt,        550      A.2d.       at    452    (the     discovery     rule    starts    the
    limitations period running based upon what the plaintiff “knows
    or through the exercise of due diligence should know”); Harnett,
    
    2 F.3d at 92
     (A plaintiff “should have known of a cause of
    action      if    .       .    .    an     investigation        pursued   with        reasonable
    diligence would have led to knowledge of the alleged tort.”)
    (quotations and citations omitted).                            Given that Quillin was on
    inquiry notice in March 2003, there remains the question of what
    information           a       reasonably         diligent      investigation      would    have
    revealed.
    In    order            for   the     statute       of    limitations      to     commence
    running, an investigation undertaken at the time Quillin was on
    notice--March             11,       2003    at     the     latest--must        have     revealed
    sufficient        information               to     begin       the   limitations        period,
    including        that          information         there       was   “either     manufacturer
    wrongdoing or product defect.”                      Pennwalt, 550 A.2d at 1165.              The
    district court found that a reasonable investigation in March
    2003 would have revealed evidence to support Quillin’s intuition
    that the dehydration he suffered was related to his ingestion of
    FPS.     J.A. at 244.                Further, medical literature was available
    that linked the ingestion of oral sodium phosphate solutions
    with renal problems.                     J.A. at 244 n.3 (citing several of the
    studies, whose titles alone indicate such a connection).
    13
    The district court distinguished its ruling that Quillin
    was on inquiry notice from other cases by relying on Quillin’s
    failure to make any investigation into the cause of his kidney
    failure, as well as the close temporal proximity of the kidney
    failure    to    “defendant’s         [Fleet’s]         alleged       improper       conduct,”
    which “indicate[d] wrongdoing.”                   J.A. at 242.            As of March 11,
    2003,    there    was    “sufficient         information          .   .   .    to    support   a
    possible claim,” J.A. at 243, including: medical records stating
    dehydration       as    the    likely    cause         of   his       renal    failure;     and
    medical     literature        establishing          “a      connection         between     oral
    sodium phosphate laxatives . . ., dehydration, and acute renal
    failure.”        J.A.    at    244.         Based      upon    this       information,      the
    district     court       concluded       that       a       reasonable         investigation
    performed at the time Quillin was placed on inquiry notice, in
    March 2003, would have revealed enough evidence to support a
    cause of action.              His January 17, 2007 filing was therefore
    untimely because the three-year statute of limitations period
    expired in March 2006.
    Under       the    standard      for    granting         summary         judgment,    once
    Fleet had met its “initial burden of demonstrating the absence
    of any material issue of fact,” Ruffin v. Shaw Inds., Inc., 
    149 F.3d 294
    , 301 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing Celotex 
    477 U.S. at 323
    ),
    by citing the evidence available to Quillin in March 2003, it
    became    Quillin’s      responsibility           to     demonstrate          that   an   issue
    14
    remained for trial.          The Supreme Court has cautioned that the
    party moving for summary judgment does not have to definitively
    prove the absence of an issue of material fact.                          Celotex, 
    477 U.S. at 322
     (finding a Court of Appeals holding to the contrary
    “inconsistent with the standard . . . set forth in Rule 56(c)”);
    
    id. at 323
     (no requirement that the moving party “negat[e] the
    opponent’s claim”).       Instead,
    the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of
    summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery
    and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a
    showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
    element essential to that party's case, and on which
    that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.
    
    Id.
    We    are   mindful    of     the    fact    that     the    running     of    the
    limitations period is an affirmative defense, which Fleet would
    bear the burden of proving at trial.                      See Ver Brycke v. Ver
    Brycke, 
    843 A.2d 758
    , 775 (Md. 2004) (citing Newell v. Richards,
    
    594 A.2d 1152
    , 1156 (Md. 1991) (“[T]he party raising the defense
    of the statute of limitations has the burden of showing that the
    defense has merit.”)).         However, where a party asserts that the
    discovery     rule    applies       to     vitiate     or     delay      the   normal
    limitations period, that party bears the burden of proving that
    the   discovery    rule     applies.       Newell,     594    at   1156;     Finch    v.
    Hughes     Aircraft   Co.,    
    469 A.2d 867
    ,     893    (Md.   Ct.    Spec.     App.
    15
    1984).      Quillin therefore had the burden to show that his filing
    was timely.
    Once Fleet made a motion for summary judgment accompanied
    by    the   kind   of   support    required      by   Rule    56(c),   it    fell   to
    Quillin to show that a factual dispute remained as to whether he
    was   on    inquiry     notice.    Thus,    it    was   his    responsibility       to
    provide evidentiary support for his opposition to the summary
    judgment     motion.       Fleet   provided       all   that    was    required     to
    support its allegation that no genuine issue of material fact
    existed as to this element.                Quillin had the opportunity to
    refute this claim but the evidence he entered into the record
    failed to prove that a genuine issue of material fact continued
    to exist.      Because Quillin failed to meet this burden under the
    summary judgment standard, the district court did not err in
    granting Fleet’s motion.
    B.
    Quillin also argues that the question of whether he was on
    inquiry notice could only properly be determined by a jury, not
    by the district court at the summary judgment phase of trial.
    In most instances, disputes about when a plaintiff is on inquiry
    notice      are    factual    questions       best      left    to     the    jury’s
    determination.          Baysinger, 514 A.2d at 4 (“That ultimate fact
    [of when the plaintiffs were on notice] is ordinarily a question
    16
    for the trier of facts going to the merits.”) (quotations and
    citations omitted); see also Pennwalt, 550 A.2d at 450 (noting
    with approval the reversal of a grant of summary judgment where
    the     factual      question       of      inquiry      notice        was     in     dispute).
    However, where a reasonable trier of fact could reach only one
    conclusion concerning the point at which the limitations period
    began to run, summary judgment is appropriate.                                 Pennwalt, 550
    A.2d    at    450    (stating        that      summary        judgment       on     limitations
    grounds      is   appropriate        where      “reasonable          men    could     not    find
    otherwise”        than    that      plaintiff’s         cause     of       action    is     time-
    barred);      see    also      Levy,     
    482 A.2d at 27
         (upholding      summary
    judgment where “a reasonable fact finder could only conclude”
    that    plaintiff        was   on    inquiry         notice    more     than      three     years
    before filing her claim); Hartnett, 
    2 F.3d at 93
     (affirming a
    grant of summary judgment where the district court found as a
    matter of law that plaintiff was on inquiry notice more than
    three years before the filing of the suit).
    In the instant case, the district court correctly found as
    a matter of law that Quillin was on inquiry notice in March
    2003.     Unlike the Baysinger case, which Quillin cites to support
    his     claim,      Quillin      did     not     have    medical           information       that
    contradicted        his     theory     of      his    injury.          In    Baysinger,       the
    plaintiff brought a products liability action against the maker
    of her intrauterine contraceptive device (“IUD”) more than three
    17
    years after she suffered injury.              She had pursued an initial
    investigation    into     the    cause      of   her     injury    within     the
    limitations period and specifically asked her physicians whether
    the IUD could have been the cause of the injury.                  At that time,
    her doctors informed her that they did not know whether the IUD
    was related to the injury and could not determine the injury’s
    cause.   The    court    therefore    found      that,   under    those   facts,
    “[w]hether a reasonably prudent person should have undertaken a
    further investigation is a matter about which reasonable minds
    could differ, and it was therefore inappropriate for resolution
    by summary judgment.”       514 A.2d at 4.        Based upon the record in
    this case, no such factual disputes remain.                   Quillin had no
    information that contradicted his theory of his injury; in fact,
    he failed to make any inquiry at all into its cause.                        He is
    therefore charged with the knowledge that would have resulted
    from a reasonable inquiry; and it is undisputed that, as of
    March 11, 2003, such an inquiry would have revealed sufficient
    facts to inform him of the existence of a cause of action.
    III.
    Quillin    also    claims   infirmities      in   the   district     court’s
    disposition of his motion for reconsideration, filed after the
    grant of summary judgment.        We address each of his objections in
    turn.
    18
    A.
    Quillin     first   asserts    that   the   district          court    erred   by
    denying   his    motion    for   reconsideration      on       the    basis    that   he
    presented new evidence to the court.               Fed. R. Civ. P. 59.                We
    review a denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of
    discretion.        Boryan v. United States, 
    884 F.2d 767
    , 771 (4th
    Cir.   1989).       New    evidence    is    a   ground    for       reconsideration
    recognized    in    this   circuit.      Hutchinson       v.    Staton,       
    994 F.2d 1076
    , 1081 (4th Cir. 1993).           The standard for granting a Rule 59
    motion based on newly discovered evidence is high.                           The moving
    party must show:
    (1) the evidence is newly discovered since the
    judgment was entered; (2) due diligence on the part of
    the movant to discover the new evidence has been
    exercised; (3) the evidence is not merely cumulative
    or impeaching; (4) the evidence is material; and (5)
    the evidence is such that is likely to produce a new
    outcome if the case were retried, or is such that
    would require the judgment to be amended.
    Boryan, 
    884 F.2d at
    771 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 60).
    In this case, Quillin made his motion on the basis of an
    affidavit filed by Fleet in another proceeding in a different
    jurisdiction (“the Holzka Affidavit”).              The affidavit, submitted
    by Denise Holzka, who Quillin alleges is “a member of Fleet’s
    national legal team,” Appellant’s Br. at 6, contains information
    relating to the date at which Fleet learned of the connection
    between   FPS      and   nephrocalcinosis.         Specifically,         the     Holzka
    19
    Affidavit purports to show that Fleet itself had no knowledge of
    the link between FPS and nephrocalcinosis before 2004, when Dr.
    Markowitz       informed       the    company          of    a    study        he    had   conducted
    showing    evidence       of       such    a     link.           Quillin       argues      that   this
    information      meets       the     standard          for       new    evidence       because    the
    Holzka Affidavit demonstrates that no one was aware of the link
    between    FPS    and     renal       problems         until       2004,       at    the    earliest.
    Further, Quillin claims that even if the link had been known, no
    knowledge of wrongdoing would have been revealed until the 2004
    study    upon    which       the     information            in    the    Holzka       Affidavit    is
    based.
    Quillin       bore       the     burden       of       demonstrating            that    to   the
    district court that the evidence offered by the Holzka Affidavit
    met the standard for new evidence.
    [T]o support a motion for reconsideration, the movant
    is obliged to show not only that this evidence was
    newly discovered or unknown to it until after the
    hearing, but also that it could not with reasonable
    diligence have discovered and produced such evidence
    at the hearing. . . . Evidence that is available to a
    party prior to entry of judgment, therefore, is not a
    basis for granting a motion for reconsideration as a
    matter of law.
    Boryan,    884    F.3d       at    771     (quotations            and    citations          omitted).
    Quillin    failed       to    meet        this    burden         or     even    to    meaningfully
    address the Boryan standard.                      He did not show that the Holzka
    Affidavit contained information not available prior to Fleet’s
    motion for summary judgment.                     Whether or not nephrocalcinosis is
    20
    appropriately the diagnosis under consideration, 2 Quillin did not
    carry his burden to show that the evidence in question could
    properly be considered.            The district court therefore did not
    abuse its discretion in denying his motion for reconsideration.
    B.
    Quillin also appeals the district court’s denial of his
    Rule 59 motion on the basis that he was not permitted to take
    discovery prior to the court ruling on the motion for summary
    judgment.         We review that judgment under an abuse of discretion
    standard.         Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 
    302 F.3d 214
    , 244 (4th Cir. 2002).
    Quillin claims that Fleet’s rapid filing of its motion for
    summary         judgment,   less   than   two     months    after   all   of   the
    defendants had filed their Answers, precluded him from being
    able       to    conduct    discovery.         “Generally   speaking,     ‘summary
    judgment [must] be refused where the nonmoving party has not had
    the opportunity to discover information that is essential to his
    opposition.’”         
    Id.
     (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
    2
    In their filings, the parties debate at length whether
    nephrocalcinosis, the diagnosis of kidney problems connected
    with FPS in the Markowitz study, is properly a subject of this
    litigation, since Quillin received a different diagnosis.
    Because we find that Quillin has failed to show that the Holzka
    Affidavit is new evidence under Boryan, we need not reach this
    question.
    
    21 U.S. 242
    , 250 n.5, (1986)).            However, Quillin failed to file a
    Rule 56(f) affidavit before the grant of summary judgment.                        See
    Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) (providing that the proper procedure is
    for a party opposing a motion for summary judgment to “show[] by
    affidavit that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts
    essential to justify its opposition”).                     “[T]he party opposing
    summary    judgment    cannot    complain      that        summary    judgment    was
    granted without discovery unless that party had made an attempt
    to oppose the motion on the grounds that more time was needed
    for    discovery.”        Harrods,   
    302 F.3d at 244
       (quotations     and
    citations omitted).          We have repeatedly admonished plaintiffs
    that
    we ‘place great weight on the Rule 56(f) affidavit’
    and that ‘“[a] reference to Rule 56(f) and the need
    for additional discovery in a memorandum of law in
    opposition to a motion for summary judgment is not an
    adequate substitute for a Rule 56(f) affidavit.”’
    Evans [v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 
    80 F.3d 954
    , 961 (4th Cir. 1996)] (quoting Paddington Partners
    v. Bouchard, 
    34 F.3d 1132
    , 1137 (2d Cir. 1994)).
    Indeed, ‘“the failure to file an affidavit under Rule
    56(f) is itself sufficient grounds to reject a claim
    that the opportunity for discovery was inadequate.”’
    
    Id.
    Harrods,    
    302 F.3d at 244
    .         Though        it   may   sometimes    be
    appropriate   to     overturn   a    grant    of    summary       judgment   in   the
    absence of a Rule 56(f) affidavit, see 
    id.,
     in this case we
    decline to find that the district court abused its discretion in
    denying Quillin’s motion for reconsideration.
    22
    IV.
    For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the district
    court is
    AFFIRMED.
    23