United States v. Spencer Peters , 843 F.3d 572 ( 2016 )

PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-7442
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SPENCER PETERS, a/k/a Smoke,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, Senior
District Judge. (3:08-cr-00186-REP-RCY-2)
Argued: September 23, 2016 Decided: December 12, 2016
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and WILKINSON and DIAZ, Circuit
Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the
majority opinion, in which Judge Diaz joined. Chief Judge
Gregory wrote a dissenting opinion.
ARGUED: Caroline Swift Platt, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC
DEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Peter Sinclair
Duffey, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond,
Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Geremy C. Kamens, Federal
Public Defender, Alexandria, Virginia, Robert J. Wagner,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC
DEFENDER, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Dana J. Boente,
United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:
Spencer Peters appeals the district court’s denial of his
motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). A
jury convicted Peters of both conspiracy to distribute 50 grams
or more of cocaine base, or “crack,” and a related firearms
conspiracy. Given the quantity of cocaine base attributable to
Peters, the district court applied the maximum base offense
level for drug-trafficking crimes under the Sentencing
Guidelines. Peters ultimately received 480 months of
imprisonment.
After Guidelines Amendment 782 increased the minimum
quantity of cocaine base associated with the maximum base
offense level to 25.2 kilograms, Peters moved for a sentence
reduction under § 3582(c)(2). The district court denied the
motion, concluding that “the quantity of controlled substance in
the offense of conviction renders the defendant ineligible for a
reduction of sentence.” J.A. 748. On appeal, Peters argues that
the district court erred by failing to explain its eligibility
determination in sufficient detail and by finding him
responsible for at least 25.2 kilograms of cocaine base. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm.
I.
A.
2
We first set forth the general statutory framework for
deciding sentence reductions. Ordinarily, of course, a sentence
is final. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) (2012). Recognizing a discrete
exception to the general rule of sentencing finality, section
3582(c)(2) allows reductions to a defendant’s term of
imprisonment to give the defendant “the benefit of later enacted
adjustments to the judgments reflected in the Guidelines.”
Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 828 (2010); see
§ 3582(c)(2). Section 3582(c)(2), the Supreme Court has
explained, permits “only a limited adjustment to an otherwise
final sentence and not a plenary resentencing proceeding.”
Dillon, 560 U.S. at 826. This court has noted that § 3582(c)(2)
does not allow “a do-over of an original sentencing proceeding,”
in which the defendant is “cloaked in rights mandated by
statutory law and the Constitution.” United States v. Legree,
205 F.3d 724, 730 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v.
Tidwell, 178 F.3d 946, 949 (7th Cir. 1999)).
To decide whether to reduce a defendant’s sentence under
§ 3582(c)(2), courts conduct a “two-step inquiry.” Dillon, 560
U.S. at 826; United States v. Williams, 808 F.3d 253, 257 (4th
Cir. 2015). First, a court must determine the defendant’s
eligibility. Section 3582(c)(2) permits a reduction only if (1)
the defendant’s “term of imprisonment [was] based on a
sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the
3
Sentencing Commission,” and (2) the reduction “is consistent
with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission.” § 3582(c)(2). Second, the court may grant the
authorized reduction “after considering the factors set forth in
section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable.” Id.;
see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012). The ultimate decision of
“[w]hether to reduce a sentence and to what extent” is committed
to the district court’s discretion. United States v. Smalls, 720
F.3d 193, 195 (4th Cir. 2013); see Legree, 205 F.3d at 727.
The Guidelines policy statement implementing the statute,
Guidelines § 1B1.10, spells out the process for determining
whether an amendment lowers a defendant’s sentencing range. See
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“U.S.S.G.”) § 1B1.10 (2014).
Courts “shall substitute . . . the amendments . . . for the
corresponding guideline provisions that were applied when the
defendant was sentenced and shall leave all other guideline
application decisions unaffected.” Id. § 1B1.10(b)(1). Section
1B1.10 also functions as a gatekeeper, specifying which
Guidelines amendments apply retroactively and thus may give rise
to a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2). Id.
§ 1B1.10(a)(2)(A), (d).
B.
Motions under § 3582(c)(2) must be based on an amendment to
the Guidelines. See id. § 1B1.10(a)(1). Following the Fair
4
Sentencing Act of 2010, the Sentencing Commission amended the
Guidelines with respect to cocaine base offenses.
For drug-trafficking crimes in general, a defendant’s base
offense level depends on the type of drug and the amount
attributable to the defendant. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(5), (c)
(2015). The Drug Quantity Table specifies particular base
offense levels for quantity ranges of various drugs, with a
maximum of 38 levels. Id. § 2D1.1(c).
The Sentencing Commission revised the Drug Quantity Table
after Congress enacted the Fair Sentencing Act. To alleviate the
severe sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine,
the Act reduced the statutory penalties for cocaine base
offenses. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 § 2, Pub. L. No. 111-220,
124 Stat. 2372, 2372 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2012)).
Accordingly, Guidelines Amendments 750 and 782 lowered the base
offense levels assigned to different amounts of cocaine base.
The Commission made both amendments retroactive. See U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.10(d).
Amendment 750 increased the minimum quantity of cocaine
base necessary to trigger the maximum base offense level from
4.5 to 8.4 kilograms. U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 750 (effective
Nov. 1, 2011). Amendment 782 again raised the requisite amount
of cocaine base from 8.4 to 25.2 kilograms. U.S.S.G. supp. app.
C, amend. 782 (effective Nov. 1, 2014).
5
For defendants responsible for at least 25.2 kilograms of
cocaine base, Amendment 782 has no effect; the maximum base
offense level (38 levels) still applies. Defendants accountable
for more than 8.4 but less than 25.2 kilograms of the drug,
however, will receive a base offense level of 36 levels.
II.
The appellant Spencer Peters was indicted in 2008 along
with his brother Terrence Peters and their associate Clifford
Noel. 1 The two-count superseding indictment charged them with
conspiring to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base (Count
One) as well as conspiring to possess firearms in furtherance of
a drug-trafficking offense (Count Two). The indictment alleged
that these conspiracies lasted nearly a decade, beginning around
January 2000 and ending around February 2008.
At trial, the government presented numerous witnesses,
including former confederates, law enforcement officials, and
individuals who purchased cocaine base from Peters and members
of his organization. The evidence indicated that Peters was
second only to his brother, Terrence, in the conspiracy’s multi-
layer hierarchy and led the group when Terrence was absent.
Although Peters was incarcerated for a period in 2003 and again
from May 2005 onward, witnesses explained that Peters stayed in
1We refer to the appellant Spencer Peters as “Peters.” When
discussing his brother, we use “Terrence” or “Terrence Peters.”
6
contact with members of the conspiracy while in prison and
attempted to recruit a fellow inmate.
According to the government’s witnesses, members of the
crack-distribution ring, including Peters, regularly traveled
from Richmond, Virginia to New York to purchase cocaine
hydrochloride, or “powder cocaine.” They usually bought one to
two kilograms per trip. The group used two vehicles for these
missions. Peters transported the drugs back to Richmond in his
car, which was specially outfitted with hidden compartments.
Terrence drove ahead in a separate vehicle to look out for
police and warn his brother. Upon returning to Richmond,
Terrence converted the powder cocaine into crack.
The group distributed crack through multiple channels,
using a dedicated house as home base. Witnesses testified that
the traffickers, including Peters, sold cocaine base to
individual users and drug dealers, mostly for money but
sometimes for firearms. One witness estimated that he had
purchased a total of 1 to 1.5 kilograms of crack from the group.
Peters also supplied his subordinates with cocaine base to sell
on consignment. At one point, the conspirators began working in
shifts, retailing crack 24/7 from their house and serving 40 to
50 customers on an average day. The group later shifted to a
wholesale model in which it primarily sold cocaine base to mid-
level dealers.
7
The jury convicted Peters, his brother, and Noel in 2009.
At sentencing, the government argued that “a highly conservative
estimate of the attributable drug weight in this case exceeds
150 kilograms.” J.A. 596. At Terrence’s sentencing hearing,
which directly preceded Spencer’s, the district court observed:
“The Government’s estimate of 150 kilograms is not off the mark
. . . based on the evidence in the case of which there was ample
amount and corroborated in every respect.” J.A. 630.
Under the Drug Quantity Table in effect when Peters was
sentenced, defendants responsible for 4.5 or more kilograms of
cocaine base received the maximum, 38-level base offense level.
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) (2008). Peters’s presentence investigation
report (PSR) attributed at least 4.5 kilograms of crack to him.
The PSR summarized the key facts supporting this finding:
Testimony showed that the members were bringing 1 to 2
kilograms of cocaine hydrochloride from New York to
Richmond on a weekly basis. While there were time
periods that no drugs were brought from New York due
to members being jailed or out of town, the extended
period of the conspiracy makes it clear that the total
amount of cocaine base trafficked by the conspiracy
members would be well in excess of 4.5 kilograms.
J.A. 756. The district court adopted the PSR.
The PSR also recommended that Peters receive a 2-level
enhancement for possessing a firearm and a 3-level enhancement
as a manager or supervisor of a drug conspiracy involving at
least five participants. At Peters’s sentencing hearing, the
8
district court characterized Peters as the “acting CEO when the
CEO was gone.” J.A. 644. The court noted that Peters “supervised
the business [and] the subordinates” and “helped recruit new
members to the organization.” Id.
Peters’s adjusted offense level of 43 and his criminal
history category of I yielded an advisory Guidelines sentencing
range of life in prison. Because of a prior drug offense, his
statutory mandatory minimum sentence was 20 years.
Attuned to Peters’s individual role in the offense, the
district court concluded that “[a] sentence of life imprisonment
is greater than necessary to effectuate the goals set forth in
Sec. 3553(a).” J.A. 787. The court varied downward and
ultimately sentenced Peters to 480 months of imprisonment for
Count One and 240 months of imprisonment for Count Two, to run
concurrently. This court upheld the conviction and sentence.
United States v. Peters, 392 F. App’x 161 (4th Cir. 2010).
In 2013, Peters filed his first motion for a sentence
reduction under § 3582(c)(2). He argued that Amendment 750
lowered his sentencing range by raising the crack quantity
threshold for the maximum base offense level to 8.4 kilograms.
The district court denied Peters’s motion, stating: “The
quantity of controlled substance in the offense of conviction
renders the defendant ineligible for a sentence reduction, but,
even if he were eligible, the Court would decline to [reduce his
9
sentence] because . . . the originally imposed sentence is
appropriate.” J.A. 717-18. This court affirmed. United States v.
Peters, 576 F. App’x 209 (4th Cir. 2014).
In 2015, Peters again sought a sentence reduction under
§ 3582(c)(2), this time relying on Amendment 782. The Probation
Office recommended that the district court find Peters
ineligible because Peters was responsible for more than 25.2
kilograms of cocaine base. As before, the district court denied
the motion:
Having considered the defendant’s [motion], the
Government’s response thereto and the reply, the
record, the presentence report, the [recommendation
of] the Probation Office and all other applicable
requirements of law, it is hereby ORDERED that the
defendant’s [motion] is denied because the quantity of
controlled substance in the offense of conviction
renders the defendant ineligible for a reduction of
sentence under the retroactive crack amendment,
Amendment 782.
J.A. 748. Because the district court found Peters ineligible at
the first step of the § 3582(c)(2) inquiry, the court did not
reach the discretionary second step.
This appeal followed.
III.
Peters’s eligibility for a sentence reduction turns solely
on whether he is responsible for at least 25.2 kilograms of
cocaine base. If so, he still receives the maximum base offense
level, and Amendment 782 does not alter his Guidelines
10
sentencing range--thus precluding him from a sentence reduction
under § 3582(c)(2).
Peters challenges the district court’s denial of his motion
on two grounds. First, Peters asserts that the district court
did not adequately explain why it found him ineligible. Second,
he argues that any finding attributing 25.2 or more kilograms of
cocaine base to him is clearly erroneous.
We review a district court’s decision to grant or deny a
sentence-reduction motion under § 3582(c)(2) for abuse of
discretion. Smalls, 720 F.3d at 195. We review the district
court’s ruling as to the scope of its legal authority under
§ 3582(c)(2) de novo. United States v. Mann, 709 F.3d 301, 304
(4th Cir. 2013). Finally, we review factual determinations,
including the attributable drug quantity, for clear error. Id.A.
At the outset, we note that district courts may make
additional findings on the drug quantities attributable to
defendants in § 3582(c)(2) proceedings. Such findings must be
supported by the record and consistent with earlier findings.
The eligibility inquiry contemplated by § 3582(c)(2) may
even require the court to supplement its findings in some
circumstances. Section 3582(c)(2) instructs courts to determine
whether a retroactive Guidelines amendment lowers a defendant’s
sentencing range. For an amendment to the Drug Quantity Table,
11
this analysis hinges on whether the drug quantity attributable
to the defendant exceeds or falls below the revised quantity
threshold. This inquiry is straightforward where the sentencing
court found the defendant responsible for a precise amount (such
as “X kilograms”). But sentencing courts sometimes attribute a
range of quantities (such as “at least X kilograms”) to
defendants. In these circumstances, a court deciding a
§ 3582(c)(2) motion may need to identify the attributable drug
quantity with more precision to compare it against the new
quantity threshold.
In United States v. Mann, we declined to address the
question of whether district courts may supplement their
findings on attributable drug quantities. Id. at 306. We noted,
however, that “our sister circuits agree that additional
findings lie within a sentencing court’s discretion.” Id. The
Seventh Circuit, for example, held that
nothing prevents the court from making new findings
that are supported by the record and not inconsistent
with the findings made in the original sentencing
determination. Indeed, new findings may be necessary
where, as here, the retroactive amendment to the
guidelines altered the relevant drug-quantity
thresholds for determining the defendant's base
offense level.
United States v. Hall, 600 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 2010). The
Eleventh Circuit also elaborated on the power of courts to make
additional findings consistent with earlier ones: “[I]f a
12
district court found during the original sentence proceeding
that ‘at least X kilograms’ were attributable to the defendant,
it may not find . . . that ‘less than X kilograms’ were
attributable; it may, however, find attributable X kilograms, or
2X kilograms, or 10X kilograms.” United States v. Hamilton, 715
F.3d 328, 340 (11th Cir. 2013).
Other courts of appeals have reached the same conclusion.
See United States v. Wyche, 741 F.3d 1284, 1293 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(“If the original sentencing court failed to make a specific
drug-quantity calculation, the resentencing court may have to
make its own quantity finding in order to determine the
defendant’s guideline range.”); United States v. Battle, 706
F.3d 1313, 1319 (10th Cir. 2013) (“[A] district court may look
to its previous findings . . . to make supplemental calculations
of drug quantity at resentencing if such calculations are
necessary . . . .”); United States v. Moore, 706 F.3d 926, 929
(8th Cir. 2013) (“[Section] 1B1.10(b)(1) not only permits, but
may often require, district courts to make findings necessary to
resolve § 3582(c)(2) motions.”); United States v. Moore, 582
F.3d 641, 646 (6th Cir. 2009) (“We do not agree . . . that the
district court’s previous determination of ‘more than 1.5
kilograms’ means that it cannot also find more than 4.5
kilograms.”).
13
We now join our sister circuits in holding that a district
court may make additional findings on the drug quantity
attributable to a defendant. Such findings cannot contradict
earlier ones and must be supported by the record.
Here, the district court properly supplemented its earlier
findings on the quantity of cocaine base attributable to Peters.
The court initially attributed at least 4.5 kilograms of cocaine
base to Peters. The court later found Peters ineligible for a
sentence reduction based on Amendment 750, which benefited only
defendants responsible for less than 8.4 kilograms of crack.
Amendment 782 would lower Peters’s base offense level (and thus
his sentencing range) only if he were accountable for less than
25.2 kilograms of cocaine base. It would have been impossible
for the district court to determine Peters’s eligibility for a
reduction without supplementing its previous attribution of at
least 8.4 kilograms of cocaine base. In denying Peters’s motion
on eligibility grounds, the court implicitly found him
responsible for at least 25.2 kilograms of cocaine base. This
finding was consistent with the earlier ones and, for the
reasons that follow, was not clearly erroneous.
B.
The question of “whether a court ruling on a § 3582(c)(2)
motion must provide an individualized explanation is one of law
that we consider de novo.” Smalls, 720 F.3d at 195. Peters
14
argues that the district court did not adequately explain why he
was ineligible. Specifically, Peters contends that the court
erred by failing to make “specific findings of fact showing how
it concluded that [he] [wa]s ineligible due to drug quantity,”
Br. of Appellant at 8, and by failing to specify “the scope of
the relevant conduct for which he can be held accountable,” id.
at 21.
As a threshold matter, there can be no dispute that the
district court found Peters ineligible because he was
responsible for at least 25.2 kilograms of cocaine base. The
court explained that “the quantity of controlled substance in
the offense of conviction renders the defendant ineligible.”
J.A. 748. Although the court did not expressly attribute 25.2
kilograms of cocaine base to Peters, his eligibility turned
solely on whether he was responsible for at least that amount.
See Br. of Appellant at 8. Contrary to Peters’s assertion, logic
and common sense indicate the “basis [on which] the district
court concluded that Mr. Peters was ineligible.” Reply Br. of
Appellant at 6-7.
Moreover the “limited nature of § 3582(c)(2) proceedings,”
Dillon, 560 U.S. at 827, contrasted with plenary sentencing or
resentencing proceedings, gives district courts more leeway in
articulating reasons for granting or denying motions under
§ 3582(c)(2). In an ordinary sentencing proceeding, the district
15
court “must place on the record an ‘individualized assessment’
based on the particular facts of the case before it.” United
States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007)). The court must
“adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful
appellate review and to promote the perception of fair
sentencing.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 50.
For motions under § 3582(c)(2), however, “we presume a
district court . . . has considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
factors [under the discretionary step] and other pertinent
matters before it.” Smalls, 720 F.3d at 195-96. As we explained
in Legree, “[a] court need not engage in ritualistic incantation
in order to establish its consideration of a legal issue. It is
sufficient if . . . the district court rules on issues that have
been fully presented for determination. Consideration is
implicit in the court’s ultimate ruling.” Legree, 205 F.3d at
728 (quoting United States v. Davis, 53 F.3d 638, 642 (4th Cir.
1995)). “[I]n the absence of evidence a court neglected to
consider relevant factors,” we confirmed in Smalls, “the court
does not err in failing to provide a full explanation for its
§ 3582(c)(2) decision.” Smalls, 720 F.3d at 196.
Like our precedents, the text of § 3582(c)(2) reflects the
“fundamental differences between sentencing and sentence-
modification proceedings.” Dillon, 560 U.S. at 830. Section
16
3582(c)(2) directs courts to § 3553(a) but not § 3553(c), which
requires courts to give reasons for imposing particular
sentences “at the time of sentencing.” § 3553(c).
In short, Legree and Smalls control here. The defendants in
those cases argued that the district courts erred by failing to
“articulate on the record the precise reasons” for their
conclusions. Legree, 205 F.3d at 727. So did the defendant in
United States v. Stewart. 595 F.3d 197, 199 n.2 (4th Cir. 2010).
But “[w]e held directly to the contrary” in Legree and Smalls,
id., and we must do so here.
The district court’s order denying Peters’s motion
contained more detail than the ones we upheld in Legree and
Smalls. The district court in Legree “provided no individualized
explanation in support of its decision.” Smalls, 720 F.3d at
196. Its order stated: “[The] Amendment . . . does not create a
mandatory right to reduction of sentence for defendant. On
consideration of the matter, this court concludes that
defendant’s sentence was correct and that no reduction is
appropriate.” Order, United States v. Legree, No. 5:93-cr-92-PMD
(D.S.C. Sept. 30, 1997). The defendant in Smalls unsuccessfully
appealed the district court’s decision to grant a limited
reduction. Smalls, 720 F.3d at 194-95. That court’s order
declared, “In granting this motion, the court has considered the
17
factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Id. at 195 (quoting
the district court).
Here the district court clarified that it denied Peters’s
motion because he was ineligible. The court also noted the
factual and legal sources on which it relied: “the defendant’s
[motion], the Government’s response thereto and the reply, the
record, the presentence report, the [recommendation of] the
Probation Office and all other applicable requirements of law.”
J.A. 748.
Peters argues that the presumption we endorsed in Legree
and reiterated in Smalls applies only to the second,
discretionary step of the § 3582(c)(2) inquiry. We can discern
in Legree and Smalls no such limitation. These decisions were
grounded in the nature of a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding, not in some
supposed distinction between the first and second steps of the
inquiry. See Smalls, 720 F.3d at 198.
Peters offers no evidence to rebut the presumption that the
district court considered the relevant facts and legal
principles. Where a full sentencing has been held and the
defendants’ objections raised and entertained, there is simply
no reason to replay the ground. Though it is not required, it
will often be the case that the judge hearing the § 3582(c)(2)
motion will have prior familiarity with the defendant and may
even have conducted the original sentencing. See Smalls, 720
18
F.3d at 196; Legree, 205 F.3d at 729. Here, for example, the
district court was “intimate[ly] familiar[] with [Peters’s]
case.” Legree, 205 F.3d at 729. The court oversaw the trial, the
sentencing, and Peter’s prior motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and
§ 3582(c)(2). It cannot be claimed that Peters was procedurally
shortchanged or his motion decided by a court unfamiliar with
the depth of his involvement in the conspiracy.
Of course, it is always permissible for district courts, in
resolving motions under § 3582(c)(2), to offer whatever
explanation they find fitting. A fuller explanation is generally
preferable to an abbreviated one. But, under this court’s clear
precedents, “[n]o greater specificity was required.” Id. at 729
n.3.
C.
Finally, the district court’s finding that Peters was
responsible for at least 25.2 kilograms of cocaine base was not
clearly erroneous. See Mann, 709 F.3d at 304. Under Guidelines
§ 1B1.3, a defendant’s relevant conduct determines which base
offense level applies when the Guidelines specify more than one.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a) (2015). Courts must assess relevant conduct
on an individual basis. Id. For drug conspiracies, a defendant
is accountable for
all quantities of contraband with which he was
directly involved and . . . all quantities of
contraband that were involved in transactions carried
19
out by other participants, if those transactions were
within the scope of, and in furtherance of, the
jointly undertaken criminal activity and were
reasonably foreseeable in connection with that
criminal activity.
§ 1B1.3 cmt. n.3(D) (describing how Guidelines § 1B1.3(a)(1)
applies to “offenses involving contraband (including controlled
substances)”).
The district court did not commit clear error in finding
Peters responsible for at least 25.2 kilograms of cocaine base
under Guidelines § 1B1.3. Peters helped lead a criminal
enterprise that manufactured and sold high volumes of crack for
the better part of a decade. The district court’s finding was
not a close call.
Peters received a 3-level enhancement for serving in the
organization as his brother’s second-in-command. The record
indicates that Peters was intimately familiar with the group’s
business model and deeply involved in its day-to-day operations.
He was responsible for transporting the cocaine hydrochloride
from New York back to Richmond. Peters dispensed crack to his
fellow coconspirators, or “what he called his soldiers,” J.A.
393, for them to sell on consignment. He sold crack himself. He
also helped ensure the business’s security by procuring
firearms. And while Terrence was incarcerated, Peters took up
the mantle of leadership, making major decisions and managing
the group’s affairs.
20
The PSR captured the full sweep of the conspiracy’s
trafficking, which lasted from January 2000 to February 2008:
“Testimony showed that the members were bringing 1 to 2
kilograms of cocaine hydrochloride from New York to Richmond on
a weekly basis.” J.A. 756. At Terrence’s sentencing hearing, the
district court noted that evidence of “the vastness of this
operation” was “overwhelming.” J.A. 630. The court also observed
that the government’s 150-kilogram estimate was “not off the
mark” given the “ample” evidence that was “corroborated in every
respect.” Id.
Peters argues that he is not accountable for “any drug
transactions” that occurred while he was incarcerated. Br. of
Appellant at 24. But witnesses testified that while in prison,
Peters kept in touch with members of the conspiracy and even
arranged to bring a fellow inmate into the business.
In light of Peters’s leadership role in this high-volume
crack-distribution conspiracy, it was hardly inappropriate for
the district court to find Peters responsible for at least 25.2
kilograms of cocaine base. Even excluding the periods during
which Peters was incarcerated, we still cannot say that the
district court committed clear error. Under Guidelines § 1B1.3,
Peters may be held accountable for the quantity of cocaine base
“with which he was directly involved” plus the quantity involved
in transactions carried out by his coconspirators that were
21
“within the scope of, and in furtherance of” his drug-
trafficking scheme and were “reasonably foreseeable in
connection with that criminal activity.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt.
n.3(D); see id. § 1B1.3(a)(1). Applying this standard, the
district court’s finding that the total quantity of cocaine base
attributable to Peters exceeded 25.2 kilograms did not approach
clear error. The court’s conclusion that Peters was not eligible
for a § 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction is accordingly affirmed. 2
AFFIRMED
2 Our distinguished colleague in dissent does not discuss or
dispute any of the above facts or explain what purpose a remand
here could possibly serve.
22
GREGORY, Chief Judge, dissenting:
I agree with the majority holding that a district court
considering a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) may make
additional findings on the drug quantity attributable to a
defendant so long as the findings do not contradict earlier ones
and are supported by the record. I disagree with the conclusion
that the district court’s ruling that Peters is ineligible for a
sentence reduction, without any individualized consideration of
his relevant conduct, suffices as an additional drug quantity
finding in this case.
Courts have a general duty to explain their reasoning. In
the sentencing context, the court “should set forth enough to
satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’
arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal
decisionmaking authority.” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d
325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). Citing Dillon v.
United States, the majority highlights the “limited nature of
§ 3582(c)(2) proceedings” in comparison to ordinary sentencing
proceedings. 560 U.S. 817, 825, 827 (2010) (explaining that
§ 3582(c)(2) “does not authorize a sentencing or resentencing
proceeding”). But nothing in Dillon suggests that we should
abrogate district courts’ general responsibility to provide some
individualized legal reasoning.
23
Indeed, the rationale for requiring courts to explain their
sentencing decisions applies equally to § 3582(c) proceedings.
Explaining sentencing decisions “not only ‘allow[s] for
meaningful appellate review’ but it also ‘promote[s] the
perception of fair sentencing.’” Carter, 564 F.3d at 328
(citing Gall v. United States, 52 U.S. 38, 50 (2007)). This is
especially true for sentence reductions made pursuant to a
revised crack-cocaine ratio, which was enacted to correct
structural flaws in the law, rather than to inure to the benefit
of any single defendant. See, e.g., Kimbrough v. United States,
552 U.S. 85, 98 (2007) (“[T]he severe sentences required by the
[prior] 100–to–1 ratio [we]re imposed ‘primarily upon black
offenders.’”). Amendment 782 to the United States Sentencing
Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”) generally reduces by two levels the base
offense levels assigned to the drug quantities described in
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n Manual 2008). In
cases where defendants seek redress from a flawed sentencing
scheme, it would be even more valuable for the court to explain
why that defendant was not eligible.
Nevertheless, the majority holds that district courts need
not explain their reasoning with any particularity in sentencing
modifications. Relying on this Court’s holdings in United
States v. Legree, 205 F.3d 724 (4th Cir. 2000), and United
States v. Smalls, 720 F.3d 193 (4th Cir. 2013), the majority
24
presumes that the district court’s ruling that Peters is
ineligible for a sentence reduction implicitly found that he was
individually responsible for at least 25.2 kilograms of cocaine
base. * Unlike the case before us, Legree and Smalls involved
challenges to the district courts’ consideration of the 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors—the second, discretionary step of the
§ 3582(c)(2) inquiry.
The majority should be reluctant to apply such a broad
presumption in cases where the defendant challenges the district
court’s consideration of his eligibility for a sentence
reduction—the first step of the inquiry. See Dillon, 560 U.S.
at 826 (“A court must first determine that a reduction is
consistent with [U.S.S.G. §] 1B1.10 before it may consider
whether the authorized reduction is warranted . . . according to
the factors set forth in § 3553(a).”). A judge is required to
“explain his conclusion that an unusually lenient or an
unusually harsh sentence is appropriate in a particular case
with sufficient justifications.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 46. Even in
cases challenging the district court’s consideration of the
§ 3553(a) factors, like in Legree and Smalls, we cautioned that
* At the time Peters was sentenced, he received a base
offense level of 38, which applied where the offense involved at
least 4.5 kilograms of cocaine base. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(1).
Under Amendment 782, a base offense level of 38 applies where
the offense involved at least 25.2 kilograms of cocaine base.
Id.
25
“a talismanic recitation of the § 3553(a) factors without
application to the defendant being sentenced does not
demonstrate reasoned decisionmaking or provide an adequate basis
for appellate review.” Carter, 564 F.3d at 329 (citing United
States v. Stephens, 549 F.3d 459, 466–67 (6th Cir. 2008)). The
same must undoubtedly be true in cases where the district court
must evaluate the defendant’s eligibility for a reduction.
Determining a defendant’s eligibility requires the court to
calculate the drug quantity attributable to the defendant, see
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1; U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 782 (effective Nov. 1,
2014), which includes the quantities associated with the
defendant’s offense of conviction and any relevant conduct,
United States v. Flores-Alvarado, 779 F.3d 250, 255–56 (4th Cir.
2015), as amended (Mar. 11, 2015). The drug amount is “the
factual predicate necessary for sentencing.” United States v.
Collins, 415 F.3d 304, 313 (4th Cir. 2005). In Collins, we held
that a defendant found guilty of a drug conspiracy should
receive an individualized sentence, where the district court
considers the distribution of the amount of drugs “attributable
to him” as opposed to the amount distributed by the entire
conspiracy. Id. at 312. It seems axiomatic that a court
considering a § 3582(c)(2) motion—particularly in a case where
there is an obvious need for additional drug-quantity fact
finding—must provide some individualized explanation
26
demonstrating its consideration of the defendant’s relevant
conduct. To hold that the district court made such an important
factual determination by simply finding Peters ineligible for
the reduction cuts against courts’ embedded responsibility to
explain their decisions. I would therefore vacate and remand
with instructions to the district court to provide a fuller
explanation of its drug-quantity calculation.
27