Jeffrey Pennington v. Kershaw County ( 2013 )


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  •                               UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 12-2442
    JEFFREY PENNINGTON,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    v.
    KERSHAW COUNTY, South Carolina; STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA;
    KESHAW COUNTY SOUTH CAROLINA DETENTION CENTER; PENNSYLVANIA
    DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION; LIEUTENANT MYERS; DARRELL
    DRAKEFORD; JOHN DOES, 1-10; JACKSON; LAWSON; MCLEOD;
    CORRECTIONAL OFFICER ALSTON; R. EUGENE HARTIS,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
    South Carolina, at Columbia. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., District
    Judge. (3:12-cv-01509-JFA-SVH)
    Submitted:   March 26, 2013                 Decided:   March 28, 2013
    Before DUNCAN, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
    Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Jeffrey Pennington, Appellant Pro Se.     H. Thomas Morgan, Jr.,
    John Kennedy DuBose, III, Jonathan McLean Robinson, DUBOSE-
    ROBINSON, P.C., Camden, South Carolina, for Appellees.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Jeffrey       Pennington     seeks         to   appeal       the        district
    court’s order adopting the magistrate judge’s recommendation and
    denying relief on his requests for a temporary restraining order
    and   preliminary       injunctive   relief.          This      court    may       exercise
    jurisdiction only over final orders, 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
     (2006),
    and   certain    interlocutory       and       collateral       orders,       
    28 U.S.C. § 1292
     (2006); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus.
    Loan Corp., 
    337 U.S. 541
    , 545-46 (1949).                        The portion of the
    district court’s order denying a temporary restraining order is
    neither   a     final    order    nor   an      appealable           interlocutory        or
    collateral order.         Accordingly, we dismiss this aspect of the
    appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
    The    district       court’s       denial      of    a    request       for    a
    preliminary      injunction,      however,       is     immediately        appealable.
    
    28 U.S.C. § 1292
    (a)(1).           Nevertheless, we dismiss this portion
    of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of
    appeal was not timely filed.
    Parties are accorded thirty days after the entry of
    the district court’s final judgment or order to note an appeal,
    Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the district court extends
    the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), or reopens the
    appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6).                            “[T]he timely
    2
    filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional
    requirement.”   Bowles v. Russell, 
    551 U.S. 205
    , 214 (2007).
    The district court’s order was entered on the docket
    on June 25, 2012.     The notice of appeal was filed on November
    19, 2012.    Because Pennington failed to file a timely notice of
    appeal or to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal
    period, we deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss
    this portion of the appeal.      We dispense with oral argument
    because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
    in the materials before this court and argument would not aid
    the decisional process.
    DISMISSED
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 12-2442

Judges: Duncan, Floyd, Per Curiam, Thacker

Filed Date: 3/28/2013

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024