United States v. Roylin Beale , 519 F. App'x 792 ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4593
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ROYLIN JUNIUS BEALE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Greenville. Louise W. Flanagan,
District Judge. (4:11-cr-00030-FL-1)
Submitted: February 26, 2013 Decided: April 2, 2013
Before SHEDD, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, G. Alan DuBois,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, James E. Todd, Jr., Research
and Writing Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-
Parker, Yvonne V. Watford-McKinney, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Roylin Junius Beale pled guilty to possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1), 924 (2006). He received an above-Guidelines
sentence of 118 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Beale argues
his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district
court misapplied the guideline for under-representation of
criminal history, and failed to address the mitigating factors
he presented. He also challenges the substantive reasonableness
of his sentence claiming it fails to reflect any meaningful
credit for pleading guilty. We affirm.
We review sentences for reasonableness “under a
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 51 (2007). This review entails
appellate consideration of both the procedural and substantive
reasonableness of the sentence. Id. at 51. In determining
procedural reasonableness, we consider whether the district
court properly calculated the defendant’s advisory Guidelines
range, gave the parties an opportunity to argue for an
appropriate sentence, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006)
factors, and sufficiently explained the selected sentence. Id.
at 49-51. If the sentence is free of significant procedural
error, we review it for substantive reasonableness, “tak[ing]
into account the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 51.
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“When rendering a sentence, the district court must
make an individualized assessment based on the facts presented,”
United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009)
(internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted), and must
“adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful
appellate review and to promote the perception of fair
sentencing.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. When a district court
imposes a sentence that falls outside of the applicable
Guidelines range, we consider “whether the sentencing court
acted reasonably both with respect to its decision to impose
such a sentence and with respect to the extent of the divergence
from the sentencing range.” United States v. Hernandez–
Villanueva, 473 F.3d 118, 123 (4th Cir. 2007). In conducting
this review, we “must give due deference to the district court’s
decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the
extent of the variance.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
In its statement of reasons attached to the judgment,
the district court stated it had granted “an upward departure
based on [U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual] § 4A1.3 [2011] and
increased the top of the guideline range by 31 months, resulting
in a sentence of 118 months which the court found to be a
sufficient sentence.” Beale first challenges the procedural
aspect of his sentence on the ground that the district court
failed to properly implement an incremental approach when
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determining the degree of its upward departure, as required by
USSG § 4A1.3(a)(4)(B). As this court has explained, however,
“[s]ection 4A1.3’s mandate to depart incrementally does not, of
course, require a sentencing judge to move only one level, or to
explain its rejection of each and every intervening level.”
United States v. Dalton, 477 F.3d 195, 199 (4th Cir. 2007)
(citations omitted). Nor must the district court “go through a
ritualistic exercise in which it mechanically discusses each
criminal history category [or offense level] it rejects en route
to the category [or offense level] that it selects.” Id.(citations omitted) (alterations in original). Nevertheless,
“[t]he farther the [sentencing] court diverges from the advisory
guideline range,” the more a reviewing court must “carefully
scrutinize the reasoning offered by the district court in
support of the sentence.” United States v. Hampton, 441 F.3d
284, 288 (4th Cir. 2006).
Here, the district court did not conduct an
incremental analysis of its upward departure under USSG § 4A1.3.
This procedural error, however, is harmless where an “upward
variance based on the § 3553(a) factors justifie[s] the sentence
imposed.” United States v. Rivera-Santana, 668 F.3d 95, 104
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 274 (2012). Even when the
district court does not formally grant a variance, the resulting
sentence may nonetheless be upheld as reasonable where “the
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district court adequately explained its sentence on alternative
grounds supporting a variance sentence, by reference to the 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Grubbs, 585 F.3d
793, 804 (4th Cir. 2009) (relying on district court’s discussion
of the § 3553(a) factors to affirm a sentence as a reasonable
variance, even though the district court had granted a departure
on a basis that turned out to be improper); United States v.
Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 164 (4th Cir. 2008) (finding that, even if
the Guidelines themselves do not sanction the deviation, the
sentence remains reasonable because it properly reflects the
§ 3553(a) considerations); see also United States v. Diosdado-
Star, 630 F.3d 359, 365-66 (4th Cir.) (“[T]he method of
deviation from the Guidelines range—whether by a departure or by
varying—is irrelevant so long as at least one rationale is
justified and reasonable.”), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2946(2011).
Our review of the record confirms that, although the
district court did not formally grant a variance, it explained
in great length the sentence it ultimately imposed upon Beale in
terms of the § 3553(a) factors. The district court’s analysis
of the § 3553(a) factors as they applied in Beale’s
circumstances serve as alternative grounds for its sentence and
they do in fact support the variant sentence ultimately imposed.
Grubbs, 585 F.3d at 804-05. Thus, any procedural error with
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respect to its departure analysis is harmless. Rivera-Santana,
688 F.3d at 104; Evans, 526 F.3d at 165.
To the extent that Beale argues the court failed to
expressly consider the mitigating evidence he presented at
sentencing, his claim is belied by the record. The district
court considered Beale’s “difficult childhood,” but found it to
be “no excuse” for his “[in]ability to conform his conduct to
socially accepted standards,” his failure to “submit to
authority,” and “the dangerousness that [he] presents” as
“demonstrated on the [very mature] record.”
Last, Beale argues his sentence is substantively
unreasonable because the district court did not meaningfully
consider his acceptance of responsibility. We conclude the
sentence imposed upon Beale is also substantively reasonable, in
light of “the totality of the circumstances.” Gall, 128 S. Ct.
at 597. The district court explained at length its decision to
sentence Beale above the Guidelines range, referring multiple
times to Beale’s extensive criminal history and his disregard
for the law and authorities. We find the district court’s
decision to depart thirty-one months above the high end of the
Guidelines range is supported by the record and does not
constitute an abuse of discretion.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
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legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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