Brown v. Rectors & Visitors of the University of Virginia , 361 F. App'x 531 ( 2010 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-1637
DOUGLAS P. BROWN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
RECTORS AND VISITORS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA; JAMES A.
MARSHALL,
Defendants – Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Charlottesville. Norman K. Moon,
District Judge. (3:07-cv-00030-nkm-bwc)
Submitted: August 26, 2009 Decided: January 19, 2010
Before NIEMEYER, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Paul Erik Wilke, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant.
Richard C. Kast, Special Assistant Attorney General,
Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Douglas Brown appeals the district court’s order
granting the Defendants’ motion to dismiss his complaint for
failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Brown raised claims of violation of due process and breach of
contract arising from his removal from a graduate program in
chemistry at the University of Virginia. The district court
found that Brown failed to plead a violation of his due process
rights or a breach of contract claim, and that Defendant James
Marshall is entitled to qualified immunity. For the reasons
stated below, we affirm.
I Due Process
Brown first argues that the district court erroneously
found that he was entitled to only minimal process because he
was removed from the program for academic reasons, rather than
disciplinary reasons. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, no state
“shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
Generally, a due process claim requires a two-part analysis:
“whether [the claimant] was deprived of a protected interest,
and, if so, what process was his due.” Logan v. Zimmerman Brush
Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982). In the context of claims against
institutions of higher learning, the Supreme Court has assumed
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without deciding that students have a protected property right
in continued enrollment. See Regents of Univ. of Mich. v.
Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 222-23 (1985) (assuming the existence of a
protected property interest in student’s continued enrollment);
Bd. of Curators, Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 84-85
(1978) (assuming existence of dismissed student’s liberty or
property interests); see also Tigrett v. Rector & Visitors of
the Univ. of Va., 290 F.3d 620, 627 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting
assumption).
When determining what type of procedural safeguards
are required in the educational setting, courts have
consistently drawn a distinction between academic and
disciplinary dismissals. Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 87. When a
school takes serious disciplinary action against a student,
generally the student must be offered notice and an opportunity
to be heard. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975).
Procedural requirements are greatly reduced, however, when a
student is dismissed for academic, as opposed to disciplinary,
reasons. Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 87-88. “[D]isciplinary
proceedings require more stringent procedural protection than
academic evaluations, even though the effects of an adverse
decision on the student may be the same.” Henson v. Honor Comm.
of Univ. of Va., 719 F.2d 69, 74 (4th Cir. 1983).
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The district court did not err in finding that Brown
was dismissed for academic reasons, rather than disciplinary
reasons. Although Brown’s complaint suggests that he was
removed for his failure to abide by the Defendants’
interpretation of the graduate program’s rules and regulations,
rather than as a direct result of his failing the Ph.D.
candidacy exam, the complaint also indicates that the decision
to remove him was based upon his failure to complete his M.S.
degree thesis within the required time limits following his
failure on the candidacy exam. The Graduate Studies Committee,
which Marshall heads, interpreted its rules governing academic
standards for timely completion of the graduate program’s
requirements, rather than disciplinary rules governing student
conduct, to find that Brown was no longer eligible to remain in
the program. Because Brown was removed for academic reasons,
rather than disciplinary reasons, the district court properly
found that the removal decision was entitled to heightened
deference and subject to greatly reduced procedural
requirements.
II Qualified Immunity
Brown next contends that the district court engaged in
improper fact-finding that contradicted the allegations in his
complaint when it found that the notice and hearing process he
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received in January 2004 was relevant to his ultimate removal
from the program in 2006, resulting in an improper finding that
Marshall was entitled to qualified immunity.
We review de novo a district court’s Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal, “focus[ing] only on the legal sufficiency of the
complaint.” Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir.
2008). “[W]hen ruling on a defendant’s motion to dismiss, a
judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations
contained in the complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct.
2197, 2200 (2007) (citations omitted). However, to survive a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” and the
pleading must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007). “[T]he tenet that a court must
accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint
is inapplicable to legal conclusions” or “[t]hreadbare recitals
of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937,
1949 (2009). A complaint may survive a motion to dismiss only
if it “states a plausible claim for relief” that “permit[s] the
court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct”
based upon “its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at
1950.
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Qualified immunity protects government officials
performing discretionary functions from liability for civil
damages “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The court must “determine whether the
plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual
constitutional right at all,” and, if so, “whether that right
was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.”
Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999). For a right to be
clearly established, “its contours must be sufficiently clear
that a reasonable official would understand that what he is
doing violates that right.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739
(2002) (internal quotation omitted).
The district court did not engage in improper fact-
finding in determining that Marshall was entitled to qualified
immunity. The allegations in Brown’s complaint describe the
hearing process that was afforded him in January 2004, after he
was first informed that he was not in compliance with the
requirements for remaining in the graduate program. Although
the complaint states in a conclusory fashion that Brown was not
afforded notice or a hearing prior to his removal from the
program in 2006, the district court was not required to accept
as true this statement that merely described a legal element of
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the cause of action. Because Brown’s complaint did not state
any purported reason for his removal from the program that did
not relate to his failure to complete his M.S. thesis in a
timely fashion, the court did not err in finding that the
process Brown was afforded in 2004 related to his ultimate
removal in 2006. Accordingly, the court did not err in finding
that any minimal violation of his due process rights that might
have occurred did not violate a right that was clearly
established, and that Marshall was entitled to qualified
immunity.
III Breach of Contract
Brown also argues that the district court erred in
finding that the Graduate Student Handbook referenced in the
complaint did not constitute a contract between himself and UVA
as a matter of law. The district court did not err because
Brown’s complaint contained only conclusory allegations that the
Graduate Student Handbook constituted a contract between himself
and UVA, and that assertion was unsupported by the terms of the
Handbook and expressly contradicted by the Graduate Record
incorporated therein.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district
court’s order. We dispense with oral argument because the facts
and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
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before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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