United States v. Lesane ( 2010 )


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  •                               UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 08-5022
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    JAMES STEVEN LESANE,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of Virginia, at Richmond.    James R. Spencer, Chief
    District Judge. (3:08-cr-00185-JRS-1)
    Submitted:    December 30, 2009             Decided:   January 19, 2010
    Before WILKINSON and      MICHAEL,   Circuit   Judges,   and   HAMILTON,
    Senior Circuit Judge.
    Dismissed in part; affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam
    opinion.
    James F. Sumpter, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant.      Dana J.
    Boente, United States Attorney, Elizabeth C. Wu, Assistant
    United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    James    Steven   Lesane        appeals      from    a     judgment      of
    conviction,     and    sentence     of    140    months’    imprisonment,           after
    pleading      guilty    to   conspiracy         to   possess      with        intent   to
    distribute and distribution of 50 grams or more of cocaine base,
    in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 846
     (2006). 1                      On appeal, Lesane
    asserts district court error in:                (1) its determination that a
    conspiracy existed; (2) its refusal to grant Lesane’s motion to
    suppress evidence from a December 4, 2007, stop in Spotsylvania
    County, Virginia; and (3) its refusal to grant Lesane’s motion
    to   suppress    evidence    from    an    April     26,   2007,       stop    in   Cecil
    County, Maryland.
    As a preliminary matter, we dismiss Lesane’s appeal as
    to his claim of district court error relative to the existence
    of a conspiracy.        This assignment of error is outside the scope
    of Lesane’s conditional plea, which reserved to Lesane the sole
    right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to
    suppress. 2     His conclusory mention of the sufficiency of the
    1
    Lesane’s guilty plea was conditional, allowing him to
    appeal the denial of his motion to suppress, which motion was
    denied by the district court following an evidentiary hearing.
    2
    While Lesane’s motion to suppress contains a single
    summary statement challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to
    support the conspiracy charge, and while Lesane’s counsel
    advanced limited argument at the hearing on Lesane’s motion to
    suppress   supporting  his  present   contention  regarding  the
    (Continued)
    2
    evidence supporting the conviction and his limited argument on
    the    issue     during    the    hearing        on    the    motion    to    suppress     is
    insufficient to preserve the issue on appeal.                           Moreover, Lesane
    is bound by the statements he made relative to his guilty plea
    and    he   may   not     now    claim     that       the    statements      in    which    he
    expressly acknowledged his guilt of the crime of conspiracy were
    untrue.        See Blackledge v. Allison, 
    431 U.S. 63
    , 74 (1977).
    Finally, as Lesane acknowledges on appeal, the issue relating to
    the existence of a conspiracy was not ruled upon by the district
    court.      As    such,    it    is   not    properly         before     this      court   for
    review.     Muth v. United States, 
    1 F.3d 246
    , 250 (4th Cir. 1993).
    As to Lesane’s appeal of the district court’s rulings
    relative to the suppression of evidence from the December 4,
    2007, stop in Spotsylvania County, Virginia, and the April 26,
    2007, stop in Cecil County, Maryland, we construe the evidence
    in the light most favorable to the United States, the prevailing
    party below.        United States v. Seidman, 
    156 F.3d 542
    , 547 (4th
    Cir.    1998).      We    review      de    novo       the    district    court’s      legal
    conclusions        and      review         for        clear     error        its     factual
    conspiracy charge, the district court did not enter a ruling on
    the issue of the existence of a conspiracy at the suppression
    hearing, nor did it address the issue at all in its Memorandum
    Opinion denying the motion to suppress.
    3
    determinations.           United States v. Rusher, 
    966 F.2d 868
    , 873 (4th
    Cir. 1992).
    Lesane claims the December 4, 2007, police stop was
    pretextual. 3           We find no clear error in the district court’s
    factual determination crediting Deputy Taylor’s testimony that
    Lesane failed to stop at a stop sign over the testimony of Jaime
    Coleman, Lesane’s wife and a passenger in the vehicle, that she
    “believed” the car stopped.                   See Rusher, 
    966 F.2d at 873
    .          The
    failure to obey the stop sign provided Deputy Taylor with the
    requisite probable cause to stop the vehicle.                       See United States
    v.   Hassan         El,   
    5 F.3d 726
    ,    730   (4th    Cir.    1993)    (adopting
    objective        test     for    determining       whether    officer   had    probable
    cause       to   stop     vehicle).        The     ensuing    search,   during   which
    contraband was discovered, did not offend the Fourth Amendment.
    Nor do we find merit to Lesane’s assertion of district
    court       error    in    its    denial      of   Lesane’s    motion    to   suppress
    evidence relative to the April 26, 2007, search of his toiletry
    bag.        Lesane claims he had an expectation of privacy in his
    toiletry bag, and that the officer’s search of that bag exceeded
    the scope allowed by the probable cause from the smell of burnt
    marijuana.          He asserts further that when the officer failed to
    3
    Lesane’s argument that he was unaware of the bags of crack
    cocaine in the back of the vehicle next to him on the seat is
    not relevant to the validity of the stop.
    4
    find contraband in his search of the interior of the car, the
    officer’s          probable       cause   was      no    longer     supported, 4      and    his
    further search of the closed bag located on the backseat of the
    vehicle, without a warrant, violated Lesane’s Fourth Amendment
    rights.
    The Fourth Amendment permits a warrantless search of a
    vehicle        and    any    containers       or       compartments      found     within    it,
    where        probable       cause    exists     to      search    the    vehicle.       United
    States v. Ross, 
    456 U.S. 798
    , 823 (1982); see also California v.
    Acevedo, 
    500 U.S. 565
    , 570 (1991).                       This court has held that the
    odor of marijuana, without more, may provide requisite probable
    cause to support the warrantless search of a vehicle and baggage
    contained in that vehicle.                    United States v. Scheetz, 
    293 F.3d 175
    , 184 (4th Cir. 2002).
    Here,    the     officer     pulled         Lesane’s      car     over    for
    speeding       and     erratic      driving,       and    he     testified    that    when    he
    reached the window he “could smell the odor of marijuana.”                                   He
    searched the vehicle and the toiletry bag based on the marijuana
    odor.         Under prevailing Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit case
    law,        that    testimony       supports    the      district       court’s    conclusion
    that the officer had probable cause to search the inside of the
    4
    Lesane’s conclusory assertion is offered without legal
    support.
    5
    vehicle, as well as the toiletry bag contained in the vehicle.
    See Acevedo, 
    500 U.S. at 570
    ; Scheetz, 
    293 F.3d at 184
    .
    Accordingly,   we   dismiss      for   lack    of   jurisdiction
    Lesane’s claims relating to the sufficiency of the evidence to
    support   a    conspiracy,   affirm    the    district    court’s       denial    of
    Lesane’s motion to suppress, and affirm Lesane’s conviction and
    sentence.      We further deny Lesane’s pro se motions to file pro
    se supplemental briefs.        We dispense with oral argument because
    the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
    materials     before   the   court    and    argument    would    not    aid     the
    decisional process.
    DISMISSED IN PART;
    AFFIRMED IN PART
    6