Adair v. McGuireWoods, LLP ( 2009 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-1078
NANCY MATHIAS ADAIR,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
MCGUIREWOODS, LLP; JOSEPH G. TIRONE,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Marvin J. Garbis, Senior District
Judge. (1:06-cv-02602-MJG)
Submitted: July 29, 2009 Decided: August 6, 2009
Before WILKINSON, MICHAEL, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Nancy Mathias Adair, Appellant Pro Se. William Willis Carrier,
III, Jaime Walker Luse, TYDINGS & ROSENBERG, LLP, Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Nancy Mathias Adair appeals from the district court’s
judgment after a jury trial dismissing all claims against
McGuireWoods, LLP (“McGuireWoods”). Adair claimed McGuireWoods
interfered with her rights under the Family Medical Leave Act of
1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2006) (“FMLA”) and retaliated
against her for asserting her entitlement to leave under the
Act. She also asserted state law claims of defamation and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. We affirm.
When reviewing the evidence at trial, this court must
determine whether there was sufficient evidence to support the
jury verdict. The evidence must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party and all reasonable inferences
must be drawn in the party’s favor. The court must not weigh
the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. Baynard v.
Malone, 268 F.3d 228, 234-35 (4th Cir. 2001); Herold v. Hajoca
Corp., 864 F.2d 317, 319 (4th Cir. 1988). We find the evidence
supports the jury’s findings that McGuireWoods did not interfere
with Adair’s right to seek leave under the FMLA, nor was she
terminated in retaliation for having sought protection under the
FMLA.
With respect to the trial issues raised by Adair on
appeal, we find no reversible error with the district court’s
evidentiary decisions, the manner in which the trial was to
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proceed or with the jury. The court did not abuse its
discretion by granting in part McGuireWoods’ motion in limine.
See Buckley v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 306, 317 (4th Cir. 2008)
(stating standard of review). We further find no reversible
error with respect to evidence about one of the Defendants being
injured on September 11, 2001. Because Adair cannot show
prejudice, it was also not reversible error to inquire as to
whether Adair’s brother could afford to cover the costs of
providing care for their mother.
While we review decisions made on summary judgment de
novo, we find no reversible error with respect to the district
court’s decision to drop one of the Defendants or to grant
summary judgment to McGuireWoods on Adair’s defamation and
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.
As for the remaining issues raised by Adair, we find
no merit. Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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