United States v. Ledingham , 340 F. App'x 150 ( 2009 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4928
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JOHN LAWTON LEDINGHAM,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Lynchburg. Norman K. Moon, District
Judge. (6:07-cr-00007-nkm)
Submitted: June 30, 2009 Decided: August 7, 2009
Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Joseph A. Sanzone, SANZONE & BAKER, P.C., Lynchburg, Virginia,
for Appellant. Julia C. Dudley, United States Attorney, Jean B.
Hudson, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlottesville,
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
A jury convicted John Lawton Ledingham of possessing a
firearm (Count 6) and ammunition (Count 7) after having been
convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
(2006). He appeals his convictions, challenging the district
court’s evidentiary rulings and asserting that the Government
violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Finding no
reversible error, we affirm.
Ledingham argues that the district court erred in
allowing the Government to cross-examine him regarding his prior
convictions after he stipulated that he was a convicted felon.
We review a district court’s determination as to the scope of
cross-examination for abuse of discretion. See United States v.
Scheetz, 293 F.3d 175, 184 (4th Cir. 2002); cf. United States v.
Basham, 561 F.3d 302, 325 (4th Cir. 2009) (“We review
evidentiary rulings of the district court for abuse of
discretion.”).
In Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997),
the Supreme Court held that, when a defendant stipulates to his
felony status at the time of his alleged possession of a firearm
in violation of § 922(g)(1), the Government is precluded from
offering other evidence to prove the prior conviction. Id. at
191; see United States v. Williams, 461 F.3d 441, 442-43 (4th
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Cir. 2006). The Government, however, did not offer any
additional evidence on Ledingham’s prior convictions in its
case-in-chief. When the Government elicited testimony regarding
Ledingham’s other convictions on cross-examination, Ledingham
already had testified to part of his criminal history. See
Williams, 461 F.3d at 451 (“The fact that the jury already knew
of [defendant’s] felon status when it heard the names of his
prior . . . convictions mitigates any damage that may have been
caused by the introduction of those names.”).
Turning to Ledingham’s claim that the district court
erred in admitting evidence of his prior convictions under Rule
609(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Ledingham focuses on
the district court’s failure to conduct the required balancing
test set forth in Rule 609(a)(1). See United States v. Gray,
852 F.2d 136, 139 (4th Cir. 1988). Because he did not rely on
this ground in the district court, this court’s review is for
plain error. United States v. Kemp, 546 F.3d 759, 763 (6th Cir.
2008); see United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-36 (1993)
(providing standard).
Assuming that the district court’s failure to conduct
the balancing test amounted to error that was plain, we find
that such error did not affect Ledingham’s substantial rights.
The prior convictions included drug offenses and possession of
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stolen property, none of which were similar to the instant
§ 922(g)(1) offense. Cf. United States v. Saunders, 964 F.2d
295, 297-98 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding evidence of similar prior
convictions inadmissible under Rule 609(a)). Moreover, the
district court gave the jury a cautionary instruction regarding
the use of prior convictions. See Williams, 461 F.3d at 451(“We have held that [curative] instructions mitigate the
possibility of prejudice from improperly admitted evidence of
the defendant’s criminal history because [w]e generally follow
the presumption that the jury obeyed the limiting instructions
of the district court.”) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the
district court’s evidentiary ruling.
Next, Ledingham contends that the district court erred
by denying his motion for a mistrial after the Government
cross-examined him about a prior conviction he did not commit.
We review a district court’s denial of a motion for a mistrial
for an abuse of discretion and find none in light of the
district court’s limiting instructions to the jury. See United
States v. Wallace, 515 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 2008) (stating
standard of review); Williams, 461 F.3d at 451 (noting that this
court presumes jury follows trial court’s limiting
instructions).
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Ledingham also asserts on appeal that the Government
violated Brady by failing to disclose a Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (“BATFE”) asset claim form, in
which his wife stated that she owned the guns seized during the
search of his home. Due process is violated if the evidence in
question: (1) is favorable to the defendant because it is
either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) was suppressed by the
government either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) is
material. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999).
“[H]owever, where exculpatory information is not only available
to the defendant but also lies in a source where a reasonable
defendant would have looked, a defendant is not entitled to the
benefit of the Brady doctrine.” United States v. Jeffers, __
F.3d __, __, 2009 WL 1678046, at *10 (4th Cir. June 17, 2009)
(No. 06-5289) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Moreover, “there is no Brady violation if the defense is aware
of the evidence in time to reasonably and effectively use it at
trial.” Id.Although the original BATFE asset claim form could
have been used to impeach Mrs. Ledingham’s testimony that the
guns belonged to Ledingham, we find that the nondisclosure of
the form itself did not undermine the outcome of the trial. See
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433-34 (1995) (providing
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standard). Our review of the record on appeal leads us to
conclude that Ledingham was aware of the information contained
in the form before trial and could have taken reasonable
measures to obtain a copy of the form from the BATFE. See
Jeffers, 2009 WL 1678046, at *10. Thus, this claim fails.
Finally, Ledingham asserts that the district court
erred by allowing his wife to testify after he asserted a
marital communications testimonial privilege. We review the
trial court’s resolution of the marital privilege issue for an
abuse of discretion and find none. See United States v. Acker,
52 F.3d 509, 515 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating standard of review).
Because Ledingham and his wife jointly were involved during
their marriage in ongoing criminal activity (i.e., conspiring to
lie to federal officials on the BATFE asset claim form regarding
the ownership of the firearms seized during the search of his
home), he cannot rely on the marital communications privilege.
United States v. Parker, 834 F.2d 408, 411 (4th Cir. 1987)
(recognizing “that where marital communications have to do with
the commission of a crime in which both spouses are
participants, the conversation does not fall within the marital
privilege”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
6
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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