United States v. Gagnon , 343 F. App'x 867 ( 2009 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-8230
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MARC MARK GAGNON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Big Stone Gap. James P. Jones, Chief
District Judge. (2:06-cr-00011-jpj-pms-1)
Submitted: September 10, 2009 Decided: September 14, 2009
Before KING, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael T. Hemenway, THE LAW OFFICES OF MICHAEL T. HEMENWAY,
Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. Julie C. Dudley,
United States Attorney, Zachary T. Lee, Assistant United States
Attorney, Abingdon, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Marc Mark Gagnon appeals from the district court’s
order denying his motion for conditional release. 1 On appeal,
Gagnon contends that the court erred in its determinations that
he had not recovered from his mental disease sufficiently to be
conditionally released under a prescribed regimen of treatment,
that the medical staff under whose care Gagnon had been had
insufficient opportunity to properly assess the sincerity of
Gagnon’s statements and struggled to distinguish between
Gagnon’s progress and goal oriented behavior, and that there was
no evidence presented regarding the conditions under which
Gagnon would be released. Finding no reversible error, we
affirm.
To be permitted to be released on conditional release
in the community after a civil commitment, Gagnon must have
recovered from his mental disease or defect to such extent that
his release would no longer create a substantial risk of bodily
injury to another person or serious damage to property of
another. See 18 U.S.C. § 4246(e). A district court’s denial of
1
The charge upon which Gagnon’s civil commitment pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 4243(d) (2006), was based was interstate
stalking, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 2261A (West Supp. 2008).
The charge arose from his serious threats to and obsession with
a well-known actress. Gagnon has a long history of mental
illness, having been diagnosed with schizophrenia more than ten
years ago.
2
release under 18 U.S.C. § 4246(d) is a factual determination
that we will not overturn unless it is clearly erroneous. See
United States v. Woods, 995 F.2d 894, 896 (9th Cir. 1993);
United States v. Cox, 964 F.2d 1431, 1433 (4th Cir. 1992). “A
finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although there is evidence
to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is
left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been committed.” United States v. Dugger, 485 F.3d 236, 239
(4th Cir. 2007).
We conclude that the district court did not clearly
err in denying Gagnon’s conditional release. Despite the
recommendation of the treatment team favoring conditional
release, Gagnon’s treating psychologist testified that Gagnon
regularly and repeatedly denied any mental illness and refused
to comply with his treatment team’s recommendations regarding
medication. He testified that Gagnon’s progress at the facility
had “been fairly minimal,” and that Gagnon continues to suffer
from paranoid schizophrenia. He further attested that Gagnon
occasionally suppressed his delusional condition and his
motivations. 2 Gagnon still clearly maintains his delusional
2
For example, after Gagnon became aware that the victims
had expressed fear to the court that he would cause them
substantial harm if released, he met with his treatment team
minutes before his hearing and, for the first time, acknowledged
his mental illness.
3
beliefs regarding his relationship with the victim of his
violent threats, and attempted to contact her indirectly on
several occasions while committed and taking his medication,
including shortly before making his application for release, and
after claiming to his treatment team that he had no desire to
contact her.
On these facts, we can find no clear error in the
district court’s denial of conditional release. We accordingly
affirm. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
4