United States v. Ronnie Eddings , 521 F. App'x 115 ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4718
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
RONNIE GLENN EDDINGS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan,
District Judge. (5:11-cr-00306-FL-1)
Submitted: March 20, 2013 Decided: April 5, 2013
Before NIEMEYER and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer P.
May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Ronnie Glenn Eddings appeals his sixty-month sentence
imposed for theft of government property in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 641 (2006). On appeal, Eddings argues that his
sentence was substantively unreasonable because the district
court varied upwards without providing sufficient reasons for
its decision. We affirm.
We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying a
deferential abuse of discretion standard. United States v.
Susi, 674 F.3d 278, 282 (4th Cir. 2012). Whether a sentence is
substantively unreasonable is considered “in light of the
totality of the circumstances.” United States v. Worley, 685
F.3d 404, 409 (4th Cir. 2012). In reviewing whether a district
court’s decision to vary from the applicable Guidelines range is
substantively reasonable, this Court “‘may consider the extent
of the deviation [from the applicable Guidelines range], but
must give due deference to the district court’s decision that
the [18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006)] factors, on a whole, justify
the extent of the variance.’” United States v. Diosdado-Star,
630 F.3d 359, 366 (4th Cir.) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 51 (2007)), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2946 (2011).
The degree of the variance impacts the level of
justification necessary to support the sentence imposed, with a
significant variance requiring more substantial justification
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than a minor variance. Id. Nevertheless, “[t]hat a variance
sentence deviates significantly from the advisory Guidelines
range . . . does not alone render it presumptively unreasonable.
Indeed, a sentence that deviates from the Guidelines is reviewed
under the same deferential abuse-of-discretion standard as a
sentence imposed within the applicable guidelines range.”
United States v. Rivera-Santana, 668 F.3d 95, 106 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, No. 11A1054, 12-5002, 2012 WL 2805025 (U.S. 2012).
As a result, “‘[t]he fact that the appellate court might
reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was
appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the district
court.’” Diosdado-Star, 630 F.3d at 366 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S.
at 51).
Upon review of the record, we conclude that the
district court gave sufficient reasons for its upward variance.
The district court emphasized that the advisory Guidelines range
did not account for the length of time during which Eddings
committed his crime, the damage to the public trust created by
his deception, and the full impact of Eddings’ theft. See
Diosdado-Star, 630 F.3d at 367 (holding that due deference is
warranted when the district court makes a reasoned and
reasonable determination based on the § 3553(a) factors). In
addition, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by mentioning Eddings’ need for treatment because
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there is no evidence that the district court imposed a sentence
of imprisonment based on a desire to rehabilitate Eddings in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (2006). See Tapia v. United
States, 131 S. Ct. 2382 (2011) (holding that a district court
may not consider rehabilitation as a factor when determining the
length of a term of imprisonment).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the material before this
court and argument will not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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