Davis v. Prince George's County, MD , 348 F. App'x 842 ( 2009 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-2140
QUAN LEWAYNE DAVIS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY, MD; ISMAEL CANALES,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Deborah K. Chasanow, District Judge.
(8:05-cv-03080-DKC)
Submitted: September 30, 2009 Decided: October 23, 2009
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael P. Coyle, Richard Chaifetz, Columbia, Maryland, for
Appellant. Kevin Karpinski, Victoria M. Shearer, KARPINSKI,
COLARESI & KARP, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Quan Lewayne Davis appeals the district court’s
adverse grant of summary judgment and dismissal of his complaint
alleging violations of his civil rights as guaranteed by the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, as set forth in 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1983, 1985 (2006), false arrest, false imprisonment,
malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress against Defendants Prince George’s County, Maryland,
and Detective Ismael Canales. The charges related to Davis’
arrest in 2002 and subsequent trial in Maryland state court on
murder, assault, riot, and weapons charges relating to a fight
and the killing of Brandon Malstrom after a homecoming party
near the University of Maryland campus. On appeal, Davis
challenges the district court’s determination that Canales
possessed probable cause to charge Davis with murder, thus
establishing Canales’ entitlement to qualified immunity, and its
dismissal of Davis’ common law malicious prosecution claim. For
the reasons stated below, we affirm.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, CACI
Int'l, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 566 F.3d 150,
155 (4th Cir. 2009), viewing factual evidence in the light most
favorable to Davis, against whom summary judgment was granted.
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of
2
material fact exists and the moving party is “entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Summary
judgment will be granted unless a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party on the evidence presented.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
Davis’ first claim of error is that the district court
erred in its determination that Canales possessed probable cause
to charge Davis with murder, thus establishing Canales’
entitlement to qualified immunity. Specifically, he asserts
that Canales had no probable cause to arrest Davis for
Malstrom’s murder, that he made material misrepresentations in
his Application for Statement of Charges, and that he omitted
material facts, which resulted in the improper issuance of the
first degree murder arrest warrant.
Qualified immunity protects government officials
performing discretionary functions from liability for civil
damages “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Utilizing a two-prong test for resolving
qualified immunity claims, a court first "must decide whether
the facts that a plaintiff has alleged (see Fed. Rules Civ.
Proc. 12(b)(6), (c)) or shown (see Rules 50, 56) make out a
violation of a constitutional right," Pearson v. Callahan, 555
3
U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815-16 (2009), and, "[s]econd, if the
plaintiff has satisfied this first step, the court must decide
whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time
of [the] alleged misconduct." Id. at 816 (citation omitted).
Overruling Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), the Supreme
Court recently held that "courts of appeals [are] permitted to
exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two
prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed
first in light of the circumstances in [a] particular
case. . . ." Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 818. In this case, we find
that "it is plain that [the] constitutional right" postulated by
Davis "is not clearly established." Id. at 811, 818; see also
Walker v. Prince George’s County, MD, 575 F.3d 426, 429 (4th
Cir. 2009). 1
Davis bears the burden of proving that Canales
“deliberately or with a reckless disregard for the truth made
material false statements in his affidavit . . . or omitted from
that affidavit material facts with the intent to make, or with
reckless disregard of whether they thereby made, the affidavit
misleading.” Miller v. Prince George’s County, MD, 475 F.3d
621, 627 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal quotations and citations
1
Qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v.
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
4
omitted). “Reckless disregard” can be established by evidence
that the officer acted “with a high degree of awareness of [a
statement’s] probable falsity,” that is, “when viewing all the
evidence, the affiant must have entertained serious doubts as to
the truth of his statements or had obvious reasons to doubt the
accuracy of the information he reported.” Id. (internal
quotations and citations omitted). With respect to omissions,
“reckless disregard” can be established by evidence that a
police officer “failed to inform the judicial officer of facts
[he] knew would negate probable cause.” Id. (internal
quotations and citations omitted). Allegations of negligence or
innocent mistake by a police officer will not provide a basis
for a constitutional violation. Id. at 627-28.
To establish a constitutional violation, the false
statements or omissions must be “material,” that is, “necessary
to the [neutral and disinterested magistrate’s] finding of
probable cause.” Id. at 628 (quoting Franks v. Delaware, 438
U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978)). To determine materiality, a court
must “excise the offending inaccuracies and insert the facts
recklessly omitted, and then determine whether or not the
‘corrected’ warrant affidavit would establish probable cause.”
Id. at 628 (quoting Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 789 (3d Cir.
2000)). If the “corrected” warrant affidavit establishes
5
probable cause, no civil liability lies against the officer.
Id.The facts underlying the case are as follows. Davis
ran into an acquaintance, John Ryan Schlamp, the afternoon on
November 9, 2002. Schlamp informed Davis that he was planning
to go to College Park the following night to attend homecoming
parties, and Davis ultimately arranged to meet Schlamp. At
approximately 9:30 p.m. on November 10, 2002, Davis and his
friends Jessica Pryor, Stanley Chalk, and Aaron Diggs met up
with Schlamp and his friends Robert Fournier, Jake Adams, Ryan
Horan, and Kenny Kahalawei at a College Park convenience store.
Davis, an African American male, is 5 feet 3 inches tall. On
this occasion, his hair was braided in cornrows and he was
wearing a baggy navy blue velour sweat suit with a matching navy
blue shirt under the sweat suit jacket. The two groups later
went to a party being held at two adjoining houses on Dickenson
Avenue, one of which was the residence of Scott Ehrlich, located
at 7307 Dickenson Avenue.
According to the statement Davis gave police, while at
the party, Davis was accused of inappropriately touching a
female. Davis was asked to leave the party, but refused to do
so. Davis became loud and aggressive, and Schlamp, who had been
drinking, began to yell. Davis stated that he was forced to
pull Schlamp away to calm him down.
6
Schlamp was becoming increasingly inebriated, loud,
and antagonistic. He reported to police later that night that
he had had so much to drink that he “blacked out” and did not
remember much of the night’s events. At one point later in the
party, Schlamp reportedly screamed out, “Fuck these
motherfuckers. If anyone has the balls to bring it then . . .
bring it. We will kill all these mother fuckers here.” Later,
Schlamp, who was of mixed race, began initiating problems with a
group of five to six African American men. Davis testified in
his deposition that he observed one of the men in this group
reaching for his hip, as if he had a gun. In response, Davis
asked Pryor, Chalk, and Diggs if they had a pocket knife in the
event something happened. One of his friends handed Davis a
pocket knife. According to Davis, he diffused the situation
with the African American men, and returned the knife to his
friends.
Davis also possessed a larger knife that evening,
which knife he showed to Jake Adams. Adams described the knife
as “a Rambo knife. Serrated on the back, sharp.”
As the party was ending, Davis realized he had lost
his cell phone and went to look for it. When he returned to the
front of the house, he observed Schlamp, Fournier, Adams,
Kahalawei, and Horan in a confrontation with Brandon Malstrom,
William Malstrom, Brandon Conheim, Matt Mitchell, and Paul
7
Speakman, who were all University of Maryland students. Schlamp
had approached this group, accused them of taking his cell
phone, and demanded the group give him their cell phones.
Brandon Malstrom (“Malstrom”) told Schlamp that he did not have
his cell phone, whereupon Schlamp stated, “I am gonna kill you”
and punched Malstrom in the face. While Davis asserted in his
deposition that he never came within 10-12 feet of the
altercation, 2 others made statements that Davis and Fournier got
into the fight, and Malstrom was placed in a chokehold by
Fournier. William Malstrom, Conheim, and Mitchell entered the
fight, and Conheim and Mitchell observed Davis reach for
something that was tucked into the back of his waist. Chalk
observed the fight and described the scene as “one big bunch” of
people with each “grabbing each other and then scuffling
around.” William Malstrom heard his brother scream out. Then
someone yelled “police” and everyone scattered. According to
William Malstrom’s statement, his brother stumbled into the back
yard. Malstrom was found about a minute later on the ground in
the backyard with a stab wound in his chest. Davis fled the
scene and ran to his car as police arrived, leaving with Pryor,
Chalk, and Diggs.
2
Davis’ recollection was corroborated by Conheim at the
criminal trial.
8
University of Maryland Police Officer Ross Bogash
arrived first at the scene and took Schlamp into custody after
Conheim identified Schlamp as the individual who instigated the
assault. An individual thereafter told Officer Bogash that
there was someone in the backyard who was injured, and he found
Malstrom with a four to five inch cut on the left side of his
chest, and his inner organs protruding. Malstrom was not
breathing and had no pulse. He was transported to the hospital
where he later died of his injuries.
Officers detained Kahalawei, Fournier, and Horan for
questioning at the scene, and then released them. When Officer
Bogash told Schlamp that he was being detained for assault,
Schlamp spontaneously stated to the Officer, “I killed him.”
During the drive to the police station, Schlamp repeatedly
asserted, “I killed someone tonight.”
Detectives from the Prince George’s County Police
Department took statements from several witnesses in an attempt
to determine who was involved in the assault. Conheim stated
during his interview that, after Schlamp punched Malstrom in the
face and Fournier put Malstrom in a chokehold, he saw “a black
male with corn rows (dread-locks) dressed in dark blue-jeans and
a dark blue jacket reaching for something that was tucked into
the back of his waste [sic]. At that point in time, I
remembered thinking that he was reaching for a gun.” In
9
describing the same sequence of events, Mitchell stated to
police that, “There was a kid in black leather jacket, dark blue
jeans, and dreeds[sic] tied back that pulled something from
[]waist and was one of the kids involved.” Speakman stated
that, “There was also another person involved in the physical
assault. He was African American 5’9” 170 lbs with corn rows.
He was wearing all black. He was one of the main people
threatening to physically assault people at the party. William
Malstrom identified three individuals as initiating the assault
on his brother, and similarly described Davis as one of those
individuals who was "hands on" with his brother.
Detective Canales was selected as the lead homicide
detective. He reviewed the statements of the University of
Maryland police officers and the statements of Mitchell, William
Malstrom, and Speakman. Canales interviewed Schlamp later in
the morning of November 10, 2002, at which time Schlamp
identified Davis as being present with him during the
altercation with Malstrom. A statement also was taken from
Fournier, who described an individual, “About 5’3” tall/Black
male/Dark velvet type jacket/Dark skinned/Pants might have
matched jacket/,” as Schlamp’s friend who was present.
On November 10, 2002, Canales filed an Application for
Statement of Charges against Schlamp, charging him with first
degree murder, and a judicial officer found there to be probable
10
cause to arrest Schlamp. The following day, Canales filed an
Application for Statement of Charges against Davis, also
charging him with first degree murder in Malstrom's death. The
Application stated as follows:
I, the undersigned, apply for a statement of charges
and a summons or warrant which may lead to the arrest
of the above named Defendant because on or about
November 10, 2002 at 7307 Dickinson Ave. College Park,
Prince George’s County, Maryland, the above named
Defendant did stab and kill the victim, Brandon James
MALSTROM (W/M/8/21/82). On November 10th, 2002, at
approximately 0125 hrs, Uniformed Patrol Officers
responded to 7307 Dickenson Ave. College Park, Prince
George’s County, MD for the report of a fight. Once
on the scene officers located the victim in the
backyard of the residence suffering from an apparent
stab wound to the chest. Officers located several
witnesses on the scene that identified the co-
defendant John Ryan SCHLAMP, as being one of three
subjects involved in an altercation with the victim.
This co-defendant was subsequently apprehended on the
scene. He later identified the def., who is a known
associate, as the other subject involved in this
altercation. According to witnesses, the def. and co-
def. were observed striking the victim. Witnesses
observed the def. pulling an unknown object from his
waistband and striking the victim in the torso.
According to witnesses, it was during the melee that
the victim was stabbed. The victim staggered away and
collapsed a short distance away. Fireboard responded
and transported the victim to Prince George’s
Hospital. Upon police arrival, the def. was able to
make his escape. On Nov. 10th, 2002, at 0645 hrs, the
victim was pronounced dead by Dr. BLAIR/Physician as a
result of his injuries.
All these events occurred in Prince George’s County,
Maryland.
On the same date, a judicial officer for the District Court of
Maryland for Prince George’s County found there to be probable
11
cause to arrest Davis. 3 Following his arrest, Davis denied
having any involvement in the fight, and maintained that he was
merely a bystander. 4
A grand jury indicted Davis on charges of first degree
murder, common law riot, first degree assault, second degree
assault, and openly carrying a dangerous weapon. On June 27,
2003, Davis was found guilty by a jury of common law riot and
openly carrying a deadly weapon, but was acquitted of the murder
and assault charges. The court sentenced Davis to ten years’
imprisonment for the riot conviction and three years’
imprisonment, to be served consecutively, for the possession of
a deadly weapon conviction.
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed Davis’
convictions in an unpublished opinion on February 20, 2004.
Davis filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, which was
denied. Davis then filed the suit which is the subject of this
appeal.
3
Fournier also was arrested for Malstrom's murder.
4
Canales later obtained a search warrant for Davis’ car,
and officers found a navy blue velour jacket and pants located
in the trunk. Laboratory analysis revealed the presence of
blood on the pants, and the laboratory found to a reasonable
degree of scientific certainty, that, based on DNA, the blood
found on Davis’ pants belonged to Brandon Malstrom.
12
In support of his civil suit, Davis claimed that
Canales made several false and misleading statements in the
Application for Statement of Charges. He first challenges the
statement that Schlamp identified Davis as the “other subject
involved in the altercation.” He points to Schlamp’s statement
that Schlamp had “blacked out” prior to the start of the fight
and could not remember exactly what had happened or who had been
present, stating only that he presumed that the people present
with him at the fight were those with whom he remembered leaving
a friend’s house, including Davis, and concludes that the
statement that Davis was involved in the fight was untrue.
Second, he challenges the statement that Davis was seen “pulling
an unknown object from his waistband and striking the victim in
the torso.” While Canales reviewed witness statements that
Davis was involved in the altercation with Malstrom, including
those of William Malstrom, Conheim, and Speakman, and possessed
witness statements that Davis reached into his waistband during
the fight, Davis asserts that no witness said that he or she had
seen Davis in physical contact with the victim. 5 Davis also
5
While the district court likewise stated that no one had
actually seen Davis making contact with the victim, a careful
review of the witness’ statements reveals that there was some
evidence to the contrary. Specifically, Speakman identified
Davis as involved in the physical assault, and William Malstrom
identified Davis as one of three “principle altercators [sic]”
who were “hands on” with his brother. In addition, Mitchell
(Continued)
13
challenges Canales’ statements that “[a]ccording to witnesses,
it was during this melee that the victim was stabbed,” and
“[t]he victim staggered away and collapsed a short distance
away.” As Davis argues, the timing of the stabbing was not
based on any fact stated by any witness, but rather based on
inference taken from the various statements. No one saw
Malstrom get stabbed, nor did anyone see Malstrom move to the
rear of the house where he was found injured. As the district
court found, these statements were speculation and inference by
Canales, based on the facts as described by the witnesses, and
based on William Malstrom’s statement that “my brother ended up
stumbling into the back yard.”
In addition to the affirmative statements set forth
above, Davis argues that Canales omitted material exculpatory
facts from his warrant application that would have negated
probable cause. The alleged omissions include witness
statements that Schlamp, Fournier, and Kahalawei threw punches
at Malstrom, that no one stated that they saw Davis make
stated that three to five individuals were “throwing punches” at
the victim’s mid-section while Fournier had him in a bear hug
from behind, and that Davis, who “pulled something from [his]
waist [] was one of the kids involved.” Thus, this statement by
Canales may not have been a misstatement at all.
14
physical contact with the victim, 6 Schlamp’s statement that he
“killed someone tonight” made on the way to the police station,
the fact that Kahalawei was a U.S. Marine who would have been
more likely to be in possession of the type of knife that killed
Malstrom, and that there was no evidence that Malstrom sustained
his injuries during the fight. 7
After reviewing the “corrected” facts, disregarding
Canales’ alleged misleading statements, and taking into account
the facts Davis believes would have been exculpatory, as the
district court is required to do under Miller, 475 F.3d at 628,
the district court nonetheless found that probable cause existed
to support issuance of the arrest warrant. We find no error in
this determination.
Probable cause to arrest deals with probabilities and
depends on the totality of the circumstances; the officer's
reasonable ground for belief of guilt "must be particularized
with respect to the person to be searched or seized." Maryland
6
Again, based upon a careful reading of the witness
statements, there was evidence to the contrary.
7
Davis is referring to speculation at the scene that
perhaps Malstrom sustained his injury trying to jump over a
fence in the backyard. Officers at the scene inspected the
fence, but found no sign of an accident. No one saw Malstrom
fall or attempt to climb the fence. Plus, the medic at the
scene told one of the officers that he believed the injury was
caused by a knife.
15
v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (citing Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983), Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91
(1979)). Here, undisputed evidence demonstrates that Davis was
involved in the fight, was seen pulling something from his
waistband, and was one of only three people consistently
identified as a participant in the melee. Moreover, the
evidence supported the reasonable inference that Davis stabbed
Malstrom because he was identified as one of the three
individuals going “hands on” with Malstrom, was seen pulling
something from his waistband, and, within a short time
thereafter, William Malstrom heard the victim scream out, and
Malstrom was found within a minute thereafter with a four to
five inch stab wound in his chest. As the district court held,
Davis “was in the right place at the right time to have stabbed
Malstrom, and had taken actions consistent with being the
killer, such as jumping into the fight and pulling an object
from his waistband.” See e.g., Pringle, 540 U.S. at 374(upholding probable cause to arrest finding where defendant was
one of three stopped in car containing drugs and there were no
indicia that any one suspect was more likely guilty than the
others). This evidence is sufficient to establish probable
cause to issue the arrest warrant.
Nor does Schlamp’s statement that he killed someone
negate probable cause, especially in light of his extreme
16
intoxication, which makes the veracity of his statement
questionable and does not remove Davis from suspicion.
Moreover, the possibility that Malstrom received his injury from
an accident, rather than from a stabbing, is purely speculative
and does not serve to negate probable cause, given the facts
supporting a stabbing injury. Finally, there is no showing that
Canales displayed a reckless disregard for the truth in drafting
his statement supporting probable cause for the arrest of Davis.
The assumptions he made were entirely reasonable, given the
statements he reviewed, the evidence that he had available to
him at the time, and the chaotic circumstances surrounding the
crime.
Given that there was probable cause to arrest Davis
for Malstrom’s murder notwithstanding the alleged misstatements
and omissions in Canales’ warrant application, the district
court did not err in finding that Davis failed to assert any
constitutional violation to a right clearly established, such
that Canales was not entitled to qualified immunity. The
district court’s dismissal of the suit based on qualified
immunity against both Canales and Prince George’s County 8 is
8
See Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 579 (4th
Cir. 2001).
17
affirmed. 9 We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
9
In light of our determination that Canales had probable
cause to arrest Davis for the murder of Malstrom, and because no
malice by Canales has been demonstrated, Davis’ assertion of
error by the district court in dismissing his common law
malicious prosecution claim likewise fails and was properly
rejected by the district court. See Exxon Corp. v. Kelly, 281
Md. 689, 692, 381 A.2d 1146, 1149 (1978).
18