United States v. Yonel Vasallo , 518 F. App'x 147 ( 2013 )


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  •                               UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 12-4302
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff – Appellee,
    v.
    YONEL REYES VASALLO, a/k/a Yoni, a/k/a Cuba,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    No. 12-4443
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff – Appellee,
    v.
    MICHAEL ANTHONY HOY, a/k/a Chi-Town,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle
    District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder,
    District Judge.      (1:11-cr-00253-TDS-10; 1:11-cr-00375-TDS-1;
    1:11-CR-00253-TDS-8)
    Submitted:   March 29, 2013                 Decided:   April 9, 2013
    Before MOTZ and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
    Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Ferris Ridgely Bond, BOND &    NORMAN, Washington, D.C.; Matthew G.
    Kaiser, THE KAISER LAW        FIRM PLLC, Washington, D.C., for
    Appellants. Ripley Rand,      United States Attorney, Sandra J.
    Hairston, Deputy Chief,       Assistant United States Attorney,
    Greensboro, North Carolina,   for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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    PER CURIAM:
    Michael Anthony Hoy and Yonel Reyes Vasallo pleaded
    guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine and marijuana, in
    violation       of   
    21 U.S.C. § 846
           (2006).       Vasallo       also    pleaded
    guilty     to       traveling      in     interstate             commerce     to    facilitate
    distribution          of     marijuana,           in       violation        of     
    18 U.S.C. § 1952
    (a)(3) (2006).            The district court sentenced Hoy to sixty-
    four months of imprisonment and sentenced Vasallo to ninety-five
    months of imprisonment, and they both appeal.                               For the reasons
    that follow, we affirm.
    Hoy first argues on appeal that the district court
    failed to adequately consider his sentencing argument regarding
    his community service.               We review a sentence for reasonableness,
    applying    an       abuse    of     discretion            standard.        Gall    v.     United
    States,    
    552 U.S. 38
    ,     51   (2007);          see    also   United     States     v.
    Layton, 
    564 F.3d 330
    , 335 (4th Cir. 2009).                                  In so doing, we
    examine     the       sentence        for     “significant             procedural         error,”
    including “failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the
    Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing
    to   consider        the     [18     U.S.C.]           §    3553(a)      [(2006)]        factors,
    selecting       a    sentence      based      on       clearly      erroneous       facts,    or
    failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.”                                  Gall, 
    552 U.S. at 51
    .           We presume on appeal that a sentence within a
    properly    calculated          advisory      Guidelines           range     is    reasonable.
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    United States v. Allen, 
    491 F.3d 178
    , 193 (4th Cir. 2007); see
    Rita v. United States, 
    551 U.S. 338
    , 346-56 (2007) (upholding
    presumption of reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentence).
    “When rendering a sentence, the district court must
    make an individualized assessment based on the facts presented.”
    United    States   v.     Carter,   
    564 F.3d 325
    ,   328   (4th    Cir.    2009)
    (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted).
    Moreover, where the parties present “nonfrivolous reasons for
    imposing a different sentence than that” imposed, “a district
    judge should address the part[ies’] arguments and explain why he
    has rejected those arguments.”                
    Id.
     (internal quotation marks
    and citation omitted).            We have thoroughly reviewed the record
    and conclude that the district court adequately explained the
    sentence and responded to the parties’ sentencing arguments.
    Hoy    next    argues    that     the    court   erred      in    imposing
    special    conditions      of    supervised    release,      including        that   he
    provide     his    probation        officer      with      requested         financial
    information and refrain from incurring new credit without his
    probation officer’s approval.             As Hoy failed to object to these
    conditions before the district court, we review this issue for
    plain error.       See United States v. Olano, 
    507 U.S. 725
    , 731-32
    (1993).    To meet this standard, Hoy must demonstrate that there
    was error, that was plain, and that affected his substantial
    rights. 
    Id. at 731
    .             Moreover, even if Hoy demonstrates plain
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    error   occurred,        this    court             will     not    exercise       discretion     to
    correct    the    error    “unless             the       error    seriously       affect[s]     the
    fairness,        integrity           or        public           reputation        of      judicial
    proceedings.”       
    Id. at 732
     (internal quotation marks and citation
    omitted).
    “A sentencing court may impose any condition that is
    reasonably       related        to        the        relevant           statutory       sentencing
    factors,” including the nature and circumstances of the offense,
    the history and characteristics of the defendant, the need for
    deterrence and protecting the public from future crimes, and
    providing    the    defendant         with          training       or     treatment.        United
    States v. Worley, 
    685 F.3d 404
    , 407 (4th Cir. 2012); see 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a).          While “[a] particular restriction does not
    require an offense-specific nexus, . . . the sentencing court
    must    adequately       explain          its        decision        and    its     reasons     for
    imposing    it.”         
    Id.
        (internal                quotation      marks     and   citations
    omitted).        After reviewing the record and the relevant legal
    authorities, we conclude that the district court did not plainly
    err in imposing these special conditions of supervised release.
    Vasallo       argues          on       appeal        that    the    district      court
    plainly    erred    in    applying             a    two-level        enhancement        under   the
    Guidelines for use of a special skill based on his use of a
    commercial   truck       driving          license          to    commit    the    offense.       As
    Vasallo failed to object to the Guidelines calculations below,
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    we review this issue for plain error.                        See United States v.
    Brack, 
    651 F.3d 388
    , 392 (4th Cir. 2011).                     Under USSG § 3B1.3,
    if   the    defendant      used    a    special      skill    “in    a    manner       that
    significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the
    offense,”     a   court    shall       increase    the   offense         level    by    two
    levels.       The    “central      purpose      of     § 3B1.3      is    to     penalize
    defendants who take advantage of a position that provides them
    with the freedom to commit a difficult-to-detect wrong.”                             Brack,
    
    651 F.3d at 393
     (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
    We have reviewed the relevant legal authorities and conclude
    that Vasallo has failed to demonstrate that the district court
    plainly erred in applying the enhancement.                    See Brack, 
    651 F.3d at 392
     (“An error is ‘plain’ when it is ‘obvious or clear under
    current law.’”) (citation omitted).
    Vasallo next argues that the district court erred in
    failing to consider the disparities between defendants sentenced
    in   districts      with    fast-track         sentencing      programs        for     drug
    offenses and those without such programs.                     In United States v.
    Perez-Pena, 
    453 F.3d 236
    , 244 (4th Cir. 2006), however, we found
    that such disparities are not “unwarranted disparities.”                             See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)(6).          Therefore,      we   conclude      that      Vasallo’s
    argument is without merit.
    Finally,      Vasallo        argues       that    his       sentence        is
    substantively       unreasonable.           The      district       court      sentenced
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    Vasallo within the advisory Guidelines range and we therefore
    apply    a   presumption   of    reasonableness   to   that   sentence.   We
    conclude that Vasallo has failed to overcome that presumption.
    Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the district
    court.       We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
    legal    contentions   are      adequately   presented   in   the   materials
    before this court and argument would not aid in the decisional
    process.
    AFFIRMED
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