Wallace v. Branker , 354 F. App'x 807 ( 2009 )


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  •                              UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 08-10
    HENRY LOUIS WALLACE,
    Petitioner - Appellant,
    v.
    GERALD J. BRANKER, Warden, Central Prison, Raleigh, North
    Carolina,
    Respondent - Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
    District   of  North   Carolina,  at  Charlotte.     Robert J.
    Conrad, Jr., Chief District Judge. (3:05-cv-00464-RJC)
    Argued:   October 29, 2009                 Decided:   December 2, 2009
    Before WILKINSON, MICHAEL, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished opinion.       Judge Michael wrote         the
    opinion, in which Judge Wilkinson and Judge Agee joined.
    ARGUED: Ann Bach Petersen, GLOVER & PETERSEN, PA, Chapel Hill,
    North Carolina, for Appellant.      Steven Mark Arbogast, NORTH
    CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
    Appellee.   ON BRIEF: James R. Glover, GLOVER & PETERSEN, PA,
    Chapel Hill, North Carolina, for Appellant.          Roy Cooper,
    Attorney General, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    MICHAEL, Circuit Judge:
    In January 1997 Henry Louis Wallace was convicted in
    North      Carolina    of      nine      counts       of    first-degree     murder,    eight
    counts of first-degree rape, one count of second-degree rape,
    two counts of first-degree sexual offense, two counts of second-
    degree sexual offense, one count of assault on a child under the
    age   of    twelve,      and      five    counts       of    robbery    with    a   dangerous
    weapon.      He was sentenced to death on each of the murder counts.
    After      exhausting       his       state    remedies,         Wallace       petitioned     a
    federal district court in North Carolina for a writ of habeas
    corpus, which the court denied.                            We granted a certificate of
    appealability       on      two    of     Wallace’s         claims:    (1)   that   pretrial
    publicity     and     the      state     court’s       denial    of    his     motion   for   a
    change of venue deprived him of an impartial jury and (2) that
    delayed      administration              of    Miranda         warnings      rendered       his
    confessions      involuntary             and   therefore         inadmissible.          After
    considering these claims, we affirm the district court’s denial
    of the writ.
    I.
    A.
    The North Carolina Supreme Court described the facts
    of the nine murders for which Wallace was convicted as follows:
    The State presented evidence tending to show that
    defendant [Henry Louis Wallace] murdered nine women in
    the Charlotte area over a two-year period.   Defendant
    2
    was identified as a suspect in three of the later
    murders by a palmprint found on the car of one of the
    victims.    As will be detailed below, defendant was
    arrested   on  an   outstanding   larceny  charge  and
    interrogated by police.    He confessed to the murders
    of Shawna Hawk, Audrey     Spain, Valencia Mack, Betty
    Baucom, Brandi Henderson, and Deborah Slaughter.   The
    State presented the following evidence:
    Caroline Love Murder
    On 15 June 1992, Caroline Love was living in an
    apartment with Sadie McKnight, defendant’s girlfriend.
    That night, after completing her shift at the
    Bojangles’ restaurant on Central Avenue in Charlotte,
    Love asked the night manager if she could buy a roll
    of quarters to do her laundry.      The night manager
    exchanged a roll of quarters for a ten-dollar bill,
    and Love left the premises. As Love walked toward her
    apartment, her cousin, Robert Ross, saw her walking,
    offered her a ride, and drove her home. Ross watched
    as Love entered her apartment.
    A few days later, Love’s employer contacted
    Love’s sister, Kathy Love (Kathy), and informed her
    that Love had not come to work in two days. Kathy went
    to Love’s apartment and left a note.       However, the
    next day, Kathy was again informed Love had not come
    to work.    Kathy then contacted defendant, whom she
    knew, to find Love’s roommate, McKnight.          Kathy,
    McKnight, and defendant went to the police station to
    file a missing person’s report.      Later, Kathy went
    into Love’s apartment.   She noticed that some of the
    furniture had been moved and that some of the sheets
    from Love’s bed were missing, but there was no
    evidence   of   Love’s   whereabouts.       During   the
    investigation   of   the   missing    person’s   report,
    Investigator Tony Rice of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg
    Police Department determined that the roll of quarters
    Love bought prior to leaving work on 15 June 1992 was
    missing from her apartment.    Love was not found as a
    result of the missing person’s report.
    On 13 March 1994, defendant confessed to the
    murder of Caroline Love.        At trial, the State
    introduced redacted versions of defendant’s tape-
    recorded confession.    In the confession, defendant
    stated that he made a copy of McKnight’s house key and
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    went to the apartment when neither McKnight nor Love
    was there.   Defendant heard Love enter the apartment.
    He indicated to Love that he was in the bathroom and
    would leave as soon as he came out.    Upon coming out
    of the bathroom, however, defendant went into the
    living room where Love was watching television and
    kissed her on the cheek.    Love promised not to tell
    McKnight about the kiss if defendant promised not to
    do it again. Defendant then put his arms around Love
    in a manner similar to a wrestling choke hold.
    Defendant confessed that there was a scuffle, that
    Love scratched him on his arms and face, and that he
    kept holding Love until she passed out.        Defendant
    then moved Love to her bedroom, removed her clothes,
    tied her hands behind her back with the cord of a
    curling iron, and placed tape over her mouth.
    Defendant had oral sex and sexual intercourse with
    Love, during which she was semiconscious.          While
    engaged in intercourse with Love, defendant continued
    to apply the choke hold until Love’s body became limp.
    Defendant stated he could tell she was still alive
    because   he   could   feel  her   heart   and    pulse.
    Afterwards, defendant strangled Love to death.
    Defendant further confessed that he left the
    apartment to move his car closer to the stairwell and
    then returned to the apartment with a large orange
    trash bag.    Defendant wrapped Love’s body in a bed
    sheet and put the body inside the trash bag. . . .
    Defendant carried the bags down the stairs, placed
    them in the backseat of his car, and then        drove
    around Charlotte trying to find a place to dump
    Love’s body. Defendant . . . dumped the bag into the
    woods. The following day, defendant drove back to the
    location because he feared the orange bag would be
    noticeable from the road.    Defendant stated that he
    removed the body from the orange trash bag and then
    moved the body into a shallow ravine. Defendant also
    admitted taking a roll of quarters        from Love’s
    dresser.
    Later    on  13   March   1994,   after     defendant’s
    confession,    defendant    directed    Rice     and    other
    investigators to the site where he had dumped Love’s
    body.   Subsequently, Dr. Michael Sullivan, a forensic
    pathologist and medical examiner . . . went to . . .
    recover    Love’s   skeletal    remains.     Dr.     Sullivan
    4
    performed an autopsy on those remains. . . .       Dr.
    Sullivan determined that the cause of death        was
    homicide by means of strangulation.
    Shawna Hawk Murder
    In February 1993, Shawna Hawk was living with her
    mother, Sylvia Denise Sumpter, in Charlotte. Hawk was
    a paralegal student at Central Piedmont Community
    College and worked at a Taco Bell restaurant . . .
    where defendant was her manager. On 19 February 1993,
    Sumpter arrived home . . . .      Hawk’s car was not
    there, but Sumpter saw Hawk’s coat and purse in a
    closet. This seemed unusual because it was very cold
    outside, Hawk never went anywhere without her purse,
    and Sumpter had seen Hawk earlier in the day wearing
    the coat.    Sumpter called Hawk’s boyfriend, Darryl
    Kirkpatrick, to ask if he had seen Hawk, but
    Kirkpatrick said he had not.
    Sumpter then learned that Hawk was to have picked
    up her godson from daycare but had not done so.
    Sumpter looked through Hawk’s purse and noticed that
    her keys were not there and that some money was
    missing. . . . Kirkpatrick and Sumpter decided to file
    a missing person report and called the police.
    Subsequently, Kirkpatrick walked through the house
    looking in each room.         He entered a bathroom
    downstairs and noticed the shower curtain outside the
    bathtub.   When Kirkpatrick pulled the shower curtain
    back, he saw Hawk curled up and submerged in
    water . . . . Emergency personnel arrived, tried to
    resuscitate Hawk, and then transported her to the
    hospital, where she was pronounced dead.
    On 20 February 1993, Dr. Sullivan performed an
    autopsy on Hawk’s body. . . . Based on his
    observations, Sullivan opined that the cause of Hawk’s
    death was ligature strangulation.
    Defendant confessed that he stopped by Hawk’s
    home to see her and that they talked for a while. As
    defendant was leaving, Hawk gave him a hug. Defendant
    then told Hawk he wanted her to have sex with him.
    Defendant took Hawk to her bedroom, told her to remove
    her clothing, and told her to perform oral sex on him,
    which she did. Then, defendant performed oral sex on
    Hawk.    The two then engaged in sexual intercourse.
    5
    Defendant admitted that Hawk was afraid and cried the
    whole time. Afterwards, defendant told Hawk to put her
    clothes on, and he took her into the bathroom.
    Defendant placed Hawk in a choke hold, with her head
    between his arms, until she passed out.      Defendant
    then filled the bathtub with water and placed Hawk in
    it. Defendant also admitted taking fifty dollars from
    Hawk.
    Audrey Spain Murder
    On 23 June 1993, [Audrey] Spain was to report to
    work at 6:30 pm at a Taco Bell restaurant . . . .
    Spain did not show up for work.        Mark Lawrence,
    Spain’s manager, thought it was unusual for Spain not
    to come to work, so he drove by Spain’s apartment that
    evening. Lawrence saw Spain’s car in the parking lot.
    Lawrence then called Spain and left a message on her
    answering machine.
    The next morning, 24 June 1993, Lawrence rode by
    Spain’s apartment and again saw her car in the
    lot. . . .    Spain did not show up for work that
    evening. . . . Lawrence called 911.        Thereafter,
    officers periodically rode by the apartment and
    knocked on the door, but got no response.
    On 25 June 1993, maintenance personnel from the
    apartment complex entered the apartment . . . and
    discovered Spain’s body on the bed. . . .
    On 26 June 1993, Dr. Sullivan conducted an
    autopsy on Spain’s body . . . . Dr. Sullivan opined
    that the cause of death was strangulation.
    Defendant confessed that he went to Spain’s house
    and that they smoked marijuana together.     Defendant
    admitted that his motive for visiting Spain was
    robbery. He stated that he put Spain in a choke hold
    in her living room and inquired about the combination
    for the safe at her workplace, but she said she did
    not know the combination.   Defendant also asked about
    money in her personal bank account, but she said she
    did not have any money . . . .
    Defendant said he did not remember asking Spain
    to remove her clothes. Spain begged defendant not to
    hurt her, but defendant maintained the choke hold
    6
    until Spain passed out.   Defendant then dragged Spain
    into her bedroom and had intercourse with her.
    Afterwards, defendant took Spain into the bathroom,
    where he put her into the shower to wash off any
    evidence.    Defendant placed Spain into her bed and
    tied a T-shirt and bra around her neck.         Before
    leaving,   defendant took Spain’s keys and Visa credit
    card.     He used the Visa card to purchase gas.
    Defendant returned to Spain’s apartment to make phone
    calls so it would seem as though she had not died on
    the day defendant killed her.
    Valencia Jumper Murder
    In August 1993, Valencia Jumper was a senior at
    Johnson C. Smith University in Charlotte, studying
    political science. She also worked at Food Lion . . .
    and at Hecht’s . . . . On 9 August 1993, a friend of
    Jumper’s, Zachery Douglas, spoke with Jumper on the
    phone about meeting later that night. Subsequently,
    Douglas arrived at Jumper’s apartment in the early
    morning hours of 10 August 1993 and noticed smoke
    coming from her apartment . . . .
    As firefighters arrived on the scene . . .
    firefighter Dennis Arney entered the kitchen and
    noticed that a burner on the stove had been left on.
    Based   on   examinations at   the  fire   scene,  the
    information provided by firefighters, and the observed
    pattern the fire traveled, the investigators believed
    the fire originated from a pot left burning on the
    stove.     Firefighters found Jumper’s body in the
    bedroom of her apartment.
    On 10 August 1993, Sullivan performed an autopsy
    on Jumper’s body. . . .        [H]e found no soot in
    Jumper’s airway, indicating there was no significant
    inhalation of smoke during the fire.    After learning
    there was no carbon monoxide in Jumper’s blood, Dr.
    Sullivan listed thermal burns as the cause of death.
    After defendant’s confession, Dr. Sullivan reexamined
    the Jumper autopsy and amended the cause of Jumper’s
    death.    Dr. Sullivan testified that the cause of
    Jumper’s death was strangulation.
    Defendant confessed to Jumper’s murder . . . .
    On the night in question, defendant stated that he
    stopped by Jumper’s apartment and that they talked for
    7
    a while and then defendant left.       Defendant later
    returned to Jumper’s apartment and asked her to call
    McKnight because they had gotten into a fight. When
    Jumper reached toward the phone, defendant put her in
    a choke hold.     Defendant told Jumper to go to the
    bedroom. Jumper begged defendant not to hurt her and
    stated she would do anything he wanted.          Jumper
    removed her clothes. Defendant and Jumper engaged in
    oral sex and sexual intercourse.     Afterwards, while
    Jumper was putting her clothes back on, defendant put
    a towel around her neck and choked her until she
    passed out.     Defendant stated that Jumper started
    bleeding from the nose, so he kept the pressure on the
    towel for about five minutes until he felt no pulse.
    Then defendant wiped his fingerprints from certain
    areas of the apartment. Defendant went into the
    kitchen and noticed a bottle of rum, so he took the
    bottle to the bedroom and poured the rum on Jumper’s
    body, on the bed, and on the floor nearby. Defendant
    then went back into the kitchen, opened a can of
    beans, put the beans in a pot on the stove, and turned
    the stove on high. Defendant took the battery out of
    the smoke detector. Defendant went back into the
    bedroom, lit a match, and threw it on Jumper’s     rum-
    soaked body before leaving the apartment.     Defendant
    returned to the apartment twenty minutes later.    When
    he saw smoke rushing out the door, he left and went
    home. Defendant admitted taking jewelry from Jumper’s
    body and pawning it in a local pawn shop.
    Michelle Stinson Murder
    In September 1993, Michelle Stinson, age twenty,
    lived in an apartment in Charlotte, with her two young
    sons.    On 15 September 1993, Stinson’s friend, James
    Mayes, stopped by her apartment to visit . . . .
    Mayes knocked on the front door, but no one answered.
    Mayes heard the children knocking on the window and
    telling him their mother was sleeping on the kitchen
    floor . . . .      Mayes had turned to leave when the
    oldest child came out the back door and grabbed him.
    Mayes picked up the child and went back into the
    apartment through the back door.      Mayes discovered
    Stinson lying on the kitchen floor with blood around
    her. Mayes picked up the phone but realized the cord
    had been cut or jerked out of the wall. Mayes took the
    8
    children and asked the neighbors to help him find a
    phone. He then called the police.
    Dr. Sullivan performed an autopsy on Stinson’s
    body on 16 September 1993. . . .    Dr. Sullivan opined
    that the cause of Stinson’s death was stab wounds to
    the chest with strangulation as a contributing cause.
    Defendant confessed that he stopped by Stinson’s
    apartment around 11:00 pm, with the intention of
    raping and murdering her.    They talked for a while,
    and then defendant got ready to leave and they hugged.
    At that point, defendant told Stinson that he wanted
    to have sex with her and that he wanted her to remove
    her clothes. Stinson told defendant she was sick, but
    defendant did not believe her . . . . Defendant began
    to choke Stinson.    Stinson then agreed to have sex
    with defendant and removed her clothes.        Defendant
    told Stinson he wanted her to perform oral sex on him,
    but she stated she did not know how.           Defendant
    responded, “well you’re about to learn.” Stinson then
    performed oral sex on defendant.   After having sexual
    intercourse   on    the   kitchen    floor,    defendant
    administered  a   choke  hold   until   Stinson   became
    unconscious. Defendant strangled Stinson with a towel
    he had retrieved from the bathroom. Stinson began to
    gasp for air, so defendant took a knife and stabbed
    her approximately four times.        Defendant used a
    washcloth to wipe his fingerprints from a glass, the
    door, the phone, the wall, and the floor.         Before
    defendant left the apartment, Stinson’s oldest son
    awoke and defendant told him to go back to bed.
    Defendant left through the back door, using a towel to
    avoid leaving fingerprints, and threw the knife and
    washcloth over a fence near the back of Stinson’s
    apartment.
    Vanessa Mack Murder
    In February 1994, Vanessa Mack was living in an
    apartment in Charlotte with her two young daughters.
    She worked at Carolinas Medical Center.         On 20
    February 1994, Barbara Rippy, the grandmother of
    Mack’s oldest daughter, went to Mack’s apartment to
    pick up Mack’s youngest daughter . . . . Rippy arrived
    at 6:00 am and went to the back door, but the door was
    ajar. Rippy called out, but Mack did not respond. As
    she entered, Rippy noticed Mack’s four-month-old
    9
    daughter lying on the couch, which she felt was
    unusual.   Rippy entered the bedroom and saw Mack’s
    feet hanging off the side of the bed. . . .    Rippy
    called 911. Rippy then picked up Mack’s daughter and
    went outside . . . .
    Officer Jeffrey Bumgarner of the Charlotte-
    Mecklenburg Police Department found Mack lying on her
    bed.   Bumgarner observed a towel around Mack’s neck
    and blood coming from her nose, ears, and the back of
    her head.   Bumgarner also noticed a pocketbook, with
    its contents scattered on the bed.
    Dr. Sullivan performed an autopsy on Mack’s body
    on 21 February 1994. . . .    Dr. Sullivan opined that
    the cause of Mack’s death was strangulation.
    Defendant confessed that he had been in Mack’s
    neighborhood and had called to see if she was at home.
    When she answered, he hung up the phone.       He then
    walked over to her apartment. Defendant admitted that
    his motives for going to see Mack were robbery, to
    support his cocaine addiction, and murder.    Defendant
    stated that he tried to find a way to maneuver Mack
    into the position he needed in order to administer a
    choke hold, but she refused to give defendant a hug,
    so he asked for something to drink. When Mack turned
    her back, defendant pulled out a pillowcase he had
    brought with him and placed it around her neck.      As
    Mack resisted, defendant put more pressure on the
    pillowcase and explained that this was a robbery.
    Defendant and Mack went into the bedroom, where
    defendant commanded Mack to give him all the money she
    had, including her . . . (ATM) card and . . . (PIN).
    After Mack gave defendant everything, he told her to
    remove her clothes, which she did. Defendant and Mack
    engaged in sexual intercourse.    Afterwards, defendant
    told Mack to put her clothes back on. Defendant then
    tightened the pillowcase around Mack’s neck until she
    passed out.   Defendant added another garment to keep
    the pillowcase from loosening. Defendant then checked
    on Mack’s baby and stayed until the baby went to
    sleep. . . .   Later, defendant attempted to use the
    ATM card at several banks and discovered that the PIN
    given to him by Mack was not correct.
    10
    Betty Baucom Murder
    In March 1994, Betty Baucom lived in an apartment
    in Charlotte with her adopted daughter.    On 9 March
    1994, Baucom, an assistant manager at the Bojangles’
    restaurant . . . was scheduled to work, but she did
    not report to work.    Baucom’s unit director, Jeffrey
    Ellis, called Baucom’s apartment several times but
    received no answer. . . .
    The next morning, Ellis became increasingly
    worried because Baucom was again scheduled to work but
    did not report.   Neither Baucom’s mother nor Baucom’s
    aunt had heard from Baucom.         Ellis and another
    employee drove to Baucom’s apartment . . . .      They
    knocked on the door and looked in the windows, and
    everything appeared normal . . . . Ellis and Baucom’s
    mother decided to contact the police department, and
    they identified Baucom as a missing person.
    Officer   Gregory   Norwood  of   the   Charlotte-
    Mecklenburg Police Department received a call on the
    morning of 10 March 1994 to respond to an apartment
    where a young woman had been found.        She was not
    breathing . . . .    Norwood discovered Baucom’s body
    lying facedown with a towel around her neck. . . .
    Dr. Sullivan performed an autopsy on Baucom’s
    body on 11 March 1994 . . . .  He testified that the
    injuries were consistent with a struggle.        Dr.
    Sullivan opined that the cause of Baucom’s death was
    strangulation.
    Defendant confessed that he went to Baucom’s
    apartment and told her he needed to use the phone.
    Baucom let defendant into her apartment.   They talked
    for a while. As defendant was getting ready to leave,
    he placed a choke hold on Baucom, and she fell to the
    floor.   Defendant told her this was a robbery and
    demanded the alarm code, keys, and combination to the
    safe for the Bojangles’ restaurant . . . . Baucom was
    very upset, and she took approximately thirty minutes
    to produce the safe’s combination.      Defendant then
    released the choke hold.   Defendant remembered Baucom
    asking, “Why did you do that to me?”          Defendant
    responded that he was a sick person and that he had
    hurt many people.    Baucom then embraced defendant,
    said that she forgave him, and told him he needed
    11
    help.   Defendant became enraged and grabbed Baucom by
    the throat, slammed her to the floor, and then
    scuffled with her.    Defendant got Baucom to her feet
    and took her into the bedroom, where he told her to
    remove her clothes . . . . Defendant then told Baucom
    he wanted her to perform oral sex on him. She grabbed
    his   penis   and  started   pulling   and  scratching.
    Defendant and Baucom began to scuffle again . . . .
    Defendant was able to tighten the towel around
    Baucom’s neck until she was nearly unconscious.      At
    this point, Baucom removed her clothes and engaged in
    sexual   intercourse   with  defendant.     Afterwards,
    defendant told Baucom to put her clothes back on. He
    then placed a towel around her neck and asked her if
    she had any money. Baucom gave defendant the money in
    her purse, and he    took a gold chain from around her
    neck.
    After strangling Baucom to death, defendant took
    her television and left in her car. Defendant sold the
    television for drugs.    He then returned to Baucom’s
    apartment to make sure Baucom was dead and to take her
    VCR.    While in Baucom’s apartment, defendant used a
    wet cloth to wipe off the phone, door knobs, and the
    wall on which some of the struggle took place.
    Defendant used money from Baucom’s purse, the gold
    chain, and the VCR to purchase more drugs. . . .
    Defendant then left [her] car in a parking lot,
    because    he  thought  police  were   following  him.
    Defendant stated that he wiped the interior and most
    of the exterior of the car, but forgot to wipe the
    trunk lid.
    Brandi Henderson Murder
    In March 1994, Brandi Henderson was living in an
    apartment with her boyfriend, Verness Lamar Woods, and
    their ten-month-old son, T.W. On 9 March 1994, Woods
    was at the apartment taking care of T.W. because
    Henderson had a doctor’s appointment.     As Henderson
    was leaving, defendant went to the apartment to say he
    was leaving town.    Defendant stayed for only a few
    minutes and then left.   Henderson returned during the
    afternoon . . . . When Woods left, Henderson and T.W.
    were alone in the apartment . . . . Woods returned to
    the apartment around midnight to find the front door
    unlocked, items scattered about the living room, and
    12
    the stereo missing. Woods then went through the
    apartment.   He first came to T.W.’s bedroom where he
    turned on the light and saw T.W. sitting on the bed
    gasping for air with something white coming out of his
    mouth and a pair of shorts around his neck.      Woods
    immediately ran to T.W. to remove the shorts . . . .
    Woods then realized that Henderson was lying facedown
    on the bed.    Woods rolled her onto her back and saw
    that towels were tied around her neck and that her
    face was blue.     Woods removed the two towels from
    Henderson’s neck and then called 911.        He moved
    Henderson’s body from the bed to the floor and began
    administering CPR pursuant to instructions from the
    911 operator.    When police officers arrived, it was
    obvious Henderson was dead.    T.W. was taken to the
    hospital.
    . . . Dr. Tom Brewer examined T.W. in the
    emergency room.    Dr. Brewer testified that T.W. was
    awake,   breathing,   and  had   stable  vital  signs.
    However, his failure to pull away when struck with a
    needle was some evidence that he was not acting
    normally . . . .       Dr. Brewer testified that he
    believed the ligature and T.W.’s injuries caused great
    pain and suffering.
    Dr. Sullivan performed an autopsy on Henderson’s
    body on 10 March 1994. . . . Dr. Sullivan opined that
    the cause of death was strangulation.
    Defendant confessed that he planned to murder
    Henderson on Tuesday morning, but when he arrived at
    the apartment, Woods was present.    Defendant left the
    apartment, found Baucom’s apartment in the same
    apartment complex, and murdered Baucom.     He returned
    to Henderson’s apartment the same night when he knew
    Woods would be at work. . . . Henderson and defendant
    talked for a while, and then defendant asked for
    something to drink.    When Henderson reached into the
    cabinet, defendant choked her and told her to go into
    the bedroom.   Henderson begged defendant to allow her
    to hold her son, but he said, “I don’t know if that
    would be a good idea for what we’re about to do.”
    Defendant told her this was also going to be a robbery
    and demanded money.     Henderson gave defendant . . .
    approximately twenty dollars worth of coins and said
    there was no other money in the house. Defendant also
    told Henderson he would be taking the television and
    13
    stereo when he left. Defendant then told Henderson to
    remove her clothes, which she did.    Henderson grabbed
    her son, laid him across her chest, and turned his
    head away so that he could not see what was going on.
    Defendant   and  Henderson   started  to   have   sexual
    intercourse in Henderson’s bedroom but moved to T.W.’s
    bedroom so he would not cry.      Once in T.W.’s room,
    defendant and Henderson continued to have sexual
    intercourse, with T.W. lying across Henderson’s chest.
    Afterwards, defendant told Henderson to put her
    clothes back on . . . . Defendant went into the
    bathroom, got a towel, and wiped off everything.
    Thereafter, defendant folded the towel, put it around
    Henderson’s   neck,   and  strangled   her   to   death.
    Henderson’s body fell to the floor.    Defendant picked
    up Henderson’s body and put it onto T.W.’s bed.       He
    also tied the towel in a knot around her neck.      T.W.
    started    crying,    so   defendant    gave    him    a
    pacifier. . . .    Defendant then took another towel
    from the bathroom and tied it tight around T.W.’s neck
    so it would be difficult for him to breathe and so he
    would stop crying. T.W. stopped crying and laid down
    next to his mother’s body.     Defendant then ran into
    the living room, disconnected the stereo, and loaded
    it into Baucom’s car.         Defendant also took a
    television . . . .   Defendant sold the television and
    stereo for $175.000 which he used to purchase crack
    cocaine.
    Deborah Slaughter Murder
    In March 1994, Deborah Slaughter lived alone in
    an apartment in Charlotte.        On 12 March 1994,
    Slaughter’s mother, Lovey Slaughter (Lovey), went to
    Slaughter’s apartment . . . . Lovey had a key to the
    apartment . . . .   When Lovey arrived, she knocked on
    the door and got no response.    She put the key into
    the lock and discovered the door was not locked.    As
    Lovey walked through the door, she saw Slaughter’s
    body lying on the floor . . . .
    Officer   Ronnie   Chambers   of   the  Charlotte-
    Mecklenburg  Police   Department   entered  Slaughter’s
    apartment and found a purse with its contents
    scattered on the floor.         Chambers then noticed
    Slaughter’s body lying on the floor faceup. There was
    white fabric in Slaughter’s mouth and a towel around
    14
    her neck.    Chambers also observed   several   puncture
    wounds in Slaughter’s chest.
    On 14 March 1994, Dr. Sullivan performed an
    autopsy on Slaughter’s body . . . . Dr. Sullivan
    opined that Slaughter’s death was caused by multiple
    stab wounds, with strangulation as a contributing
    factor in the death.
    Defendant confessed that he went to Slaughter’s
    apartment to use drugs with her. . . .         Defendant
    asked Slaughter to get him something to drink.        As
    Slaughter turned around, defendant put a towel he
    brought with him around Slaughter’s neck and tightened
    it.   Slaughter fell to her knees.      Defendant stated
    that Slaughter then realized that defendant was the
    one who had killed two other girls in nearby
    apartments.    Defendant told Slaughter to remove her
    clothes and perform oral sex on him.           Defendant
    remembered Slaughter saying, “I don’t do that; you
    might as well go ahead and kill me.”           Defendant
    tightened the towel and asked if she wanted to change
    her mind. Slaughter       stated that she would not
    perform oral sex on defendant.     Defendant engaged in
    sexual   intercourse   with   Slaughter.     Afterwards,
    defendant told Slaughter to put her clothes on.
    Defendant, knowing Slaughter carried a knife in her
    purse at all times, asked Slaughter to empty the
    contents of her purse . . . .      Defendant kicked the
    knife away and then told Slaughter to open the wallet
    and give him everything in it. As Slaughter did this,
    defendant grabbed the knife. . . .        Slaughter hit
    defendant and screamed for the police. Defendant then
    tightened the towel around Slaughter’s neck until she
    fell to the floor and started kicking.         Defendant
    tightened the towel more and tried to sit on top of
    Slaughter’s legs to keep Slaughter from alerting the
    neighbors downstairs.    Defendant went to the bathroom
    to retrieve another towel, which he tied with the
    first around Slaughter’s neck. Defendant stabbed
    Slaughter with the     knife approximately twenty times
    in the abdomen. Defendant then washed the knife clean
    and wiped his fingerprints from it . . . .
    State v. Wallace, 
    528 S.E.2d 326
    , 331-40 (N.C. 2000).
    15
    B.
    On    the    evening      of    March      12,    1994,    two       Charlotte-
    Mecklenburg police officers arrested Wallace on an outstanding
    larceny warrant.          Wallace was a suspect in some of the murders
    described above at the time of his arrest.                     Rather than take him
    to the Intake Center, where arrestees on a single charge were
    typically       taken,     the     officers        took      Wallace        to    the    Law
    Enforcement       Center       for       questioning          about       the      murders.
    Investigators Mark Corwin and Darrell Price began questioning
    Wallace    at    around    6:43      p.m.        To    establish      a     rapport      with
    Wallace,    Corwin       and     Price     asked      him    about    his    background,
    sports,    and   his     military     and    employment        history.          The    trial
    court found that the investigators did not elicit incriminating
    information during this initial period of questioning.                             Wallace
    voluntarily raised his drug addiction and his acquaintance with
    victims Brandi Henderson and Betty Baucom.                           The investigators
    provided Wallace with regular breaks, food, and drink during
    this first phase of questioning.                   Corwin testified that Wallace
    was held for three hours and fifteen minutes before being given
    Miranda warnings, though Wallace was not questioned continuously
    during this period due to several breaks.                        Corwin stated that
    the investigators waited to advise Wallace of his rights because
    they wanted to “establish[] a good enough rapport with [Wallace]
    so that he would continue to cooperate;” they did not “want to
    16
    throw up a roadblock in [the] interview process by mentioning
    attorneys and lawyers and remaining silent.”                  J.A. 1374, 1376.
    Corwin acknowledged, however, that “[o]nce we plan to start the
    interrogation process we have to advise them.”               J.A. 1376.
    At approximately 10:00 p.m. on March 12, Corwin and
    Price read Wallace his Miranda rights.                Corwin testified that
    Price read the rights from a standard form. Wallace indicated
    that he understood each right and initialed the form.                      Corwin
    also    stated   that       Wallace   read    the    rights       aloud    without
    difficulty and never indicated that he had trouble understanding
    them    or   needed    further   explanation.         Price    testified     that
    Wallace was alert both before and after he signed the waiver.
    After the rights advisement and waiver, Corwin and Price asked
    Wallace more specific questions about his relationship with the
    murder victims.
    Investigator Price left the room and Investigator C.E.
    Boothe entered.       Boothe asked Wallace if he was involved in the
    deaths of Betty Baucom and Deborah Slaughter.                Wallace responded
    that he knew the women but was not involved in their deaths.
    Boothe then told Wallace that fingerprints taken from Baucom’s
    car    matched   Wallace’s     fingerprints.         Boothe    testified     that
    Wallace did not respond to this statement, but that he became
    very   emotional      and   formed    tears   when   shown    a    prior    arrest
    photograph of himself.         Wallace told Boothe that he felt he was
    17
    being accused of murdering women.                 Boothe said that Wallace then
    discussed        his    drug     addiction      and    his     problems      with     his
    girlfriend, Sadie McKnight.              As Wallace continued to cry, Boothe
    told Wallace he (Boothe) “felt he knew who [Wallace] needed to
    talk to.”        J.A. 1554.         Boothe was referring to “Jesus or to the
    Lord.”     
    Id.
         Boothe then left the room to speak with Corwin and
    Price.
    At around 5:07 a.m. on March 13, Investigator Tony
    Rice     entered       Wallace’s      interview    room.       He     also   discussed
    Wallace’s drug addiction and relationship with McKnight.                             Rice
    asked if he could say a prayer.                 After Wallace agreed, Rice held
    Wallace’s    hand       and    asked   “our   heavenly       father”   to    “lead    us,
    guide us, and direct us as we discuss this most serious issue,”
    and to “forgive us of our sins and cleanse us through the blood
    of Jesus.”        J.A. 1855.         Rice testified that it was not unusual
    for him to pray with arrestees during interrogations and that he
    made up this particular prayer.                   Rice said that Wallace cried
    after the prayer, breathed a “sigh of relief,” and wrote down
    the names of all his victims.                 J.A. 1640.        According to Rice,
    the prayer’s purpose was to prompt Wallace to “start telling the
    truth” but not to “confess.”             J.A. 1886.
    After Wallace made his list, investigators asked if
    they   could      record      his    statements,      and   Wallace    agreed.       The
    recording started around 5:56 a.m., and Wallace gave detailed
    18
    confessions to the nine murders.                   Wallace took a break to sleep
    at around 7:30 a.m., and during the break the police went to a
    magistrate and obtained murder warrants.                          Afterwards, Wallace
    accompanied the police on a van ride to show them the locations
    of the bodies of Caroline Love and another woman, Sharon Nance. 1
    In his statements recorded at the Law Enforcement Center and on
    the van ride, Wallace gave detailed confessions to each murder
    and repeatedly indicated that he had been advised of his rights
    but still wished to talk with the police.                        Wallace said that he
    had not been threatened or coerced and that he had “gotten the
    truth off . . . . Now these people’s families will know . . . .
    I’m grateful that it’s over now and I don’t have to live with it
    anymore.”       J.A. 2181, 2189.
    The trial court admitted the confessions, finding no
    evidence that Wallace was coerced or that he had ever expressed
    a desire to stop talking or speak with a lawyer.                         The court also
    found       that   the     officers    did        not    elicit    any     incriminating
    information prior to administering Miranda warnings.                            Although
    the     trial      court    observed    that        at    some     point    during    the
    interrogation, Wallace requested to see his girlfriend and hold
    his   daughter,       the    court    concluded          that    the   police   did   not
    1
    The state chose not to prosecute the Sharon Nance murder
    with the nine others.    Wallace v. Polk, No. 3:05cv464-C, 
    2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36679
    , at *25 n.2 (W.D.N.C. May 5, 2008).
    19
    interpret this request as a condition for giving a statement.
    Wallace said on tape that he did not view the arrangement of a
    final moment with his girlfriend as a mechanism to obtain a
    statement.      He went on to say that he had “wanted to tell the
    story for a long time,” that if he had not “told [the police]
    . . . the killing would have continued and probably I would have
    killed myself as well.”          J.A. 2183.
    C.
    On March 13, 1994, the day after Wallace’s arrest, the
    Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department held a press conference.
    Deputy Chief Jack Boger announced that the police “believe[d]
    they ha[d] the man responsible” for several murders and that the
    “community should feel some sense of relief.”                    J.A. 693.           Boger
    also confirmed that Wallace had led police to the remains of
    Caroline Love.       Deputy Chief Larry Snider told reporters at the
    press   conference        that     Wallace       was    cooperating          with      the
    investigation.       Snider also said that Wallace was a suspect in
    the   murders   of   three       other   women.        (There    was    no     physical
    evidence   linking    Wallace      to    those    murders,      and    he    was     never
    charged with them.)
    Subsequent    press     coverage      of    Wallace’s          arrest    was
    extensive.      It included a typical serial killer profile.                          Some
    of the press described past criminal investigations of Wallace,
    while other articles described the shocked reactions of those
    20
    who knew Wallace and considered him an “ordinary person.”                       J.A.
    514.    Much of the press stemmed from criticism of the Charlotte-
    Mecklenburg police for failing to apprehend Wallace sooner given
    the similarity of the crimes, their proximity to one another,
    Wallace’s employment connection to several of the victims, and
    his past sex-crime charges.                  Commentators suggested that the
    police did not aggressively pursue an investigation because the
    victims       were     African   American.           The   police   responded     by
    describing Wallace as someone who had “been around policemen
    enough to know how they worked” and who took “great pains” to
    remove physical evidence from crime scenes.                      J.A. 535.       Two
    headlines labeled Wallace a “clever suspect” and a “charmer.”
    J.A.    535,    540.      Some   of    the    statements    conveyed     the   police
    department’s conviction that Wallace was linked to several of
    the murders based on physical evidence recovered at the scenes.
    On August 9, 1994, Wallace moved for a change of venue
    on the grounds that the extensive pretrial publicity surrounding
    his    case    presumptively     rendered         prospective   jurors   prejudiced
    against him.         At the motion hearing in January 1995, Chief Boger
    confirmed that many of the police officers’ press statements
    were in response to public criticism.                   Boger said that some of
    the    information      released      to   combat    criticism   would    otherwise
    have remained unavailable to the public until trial.                       Sergeant
    Rick Sanders testified that he was concerned about whether these
    21
    press statements might taint the trial and that the district
    attorney’s       office       discouraged         further     press        conferences.
    Defense     counsel       offered    the      testimony      of    criminal       justice
    professor     Dr.   Robert     M.    Bohm,    who    concluded      from     a    poll    he
    designed that a majority of the population from which the jury
    would be drawn had already deemed Wallace guilty.
    In denying the motion to change venue in January 1995,
    the trial court acknowledged that Wallace “received widespread,
    and    at   times   inflammatory        coverage      from    the     news       media   in
    Mecklenburg County and surrounding counties.”                       J.A. 1051.           The
    court found that Wallace was the subject of sixty-four stories
    in the Charlotte Observer between March 13, 1994, and May 10,
    1994,   and     that   local    television         stations       aired    roughly       174
    stories during the same period.                   Although some of the coverage
    was inflammatory and misleading, the court concluded that some
    of it was favorable to Wallace and much of it was factual and
    informative rather than inflammatory.                   The court characterized
    the statements of senior officers as “motivated in part [by] a
    desire to provide information to allay public fears, to quiet
    rumors, and to explain the conduct of the police department.”
    J.A.    1054.       The    court     found    “no    evidence      that     any    police
    representative         knowingly       released       false        information,           or
    information known to be misleading.”                  J.A. 1054.          Finally, the
    court   concluded      that    Dr.    Bohm’s      survey    was    not    probative       of
    22
    prejudice.       Because Mecklenburg County was large (a voting-age
    population      of   350,000)     and    diverse,    the    court   found    it   more
    likely that prospective jurors would base their conclusions on
    trial evidence than pretrial publicity.                     The court determined
    that    voir    dire   examination       was   the   most    efficient      means   of
    remedying any prejudice of pretrial publicity.
    During voir dire in October 1996, nine of Wallace’s
    twelve jurors admitted exposure to pretrial publicity about the
    case.     All nine stated that their exposure was limited to the
    time period between the murders and Wallace’s arrest.                         Of the
    nine,    three    remembered      nothing      or   were   not   asked    what    they
    remembered; the other six remembered only a few details, such as
    Wallace’s name or the fact that some of the victims worked at
    restaurants.         All nine avowed to decide the case solely on the
    evidence at trial.
    D.
    The jury found Wallace guilty of the nine murders and
    related crimes and recommended death sentences, which the trial
    court imposed.         The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed his
    convictions and death sentences on direct appeal.                        The supreme
    court rejected Wallace’s arguments that the denied motion to
    change venue and the admission of his confessions violated his
    constitutional rights.          In      November 2001 Wallace filed a motion
    for     appropriate      relief      (MAR)     in    the     Superior     Court     of
    23
    Mecklenburg County.            After a three-day evidentiary hearing in
    August 2004, the MAR court denied Wallace’s claims.                       Wallace did
    not raise the pretrial publicity and Miranda claims before the
    MAR court, though he did raise these claims on direct appeal to
    the North Carolina Supreme Court in 2000.                     After the MAR court
    denied   relief,       the    North    Carolina       Supreme    Court    denied    his
    petition for certiorari on November 5, 2005.                     Wallace petitioned
    for a writ of habeas corpus in the Western District Court of
    North Carolina on November 8, 2005.                  The district court rejected
    all of his claims.           We granted a certificate of appealability on
    the   pretrial        publicity       and     involuntary       confession       claims.
    Wallace appeals.
    II.
    Under      the   Antiterrorism         and    Effective     Death    Penalty
    Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 
    110 Stat. 1214
    , a
    federal court exercising collateral review of criminal claims
    adjudicated      on    the     merits       in    state     courts    accords     great
    deference   to    a    state    court’s          legal    conclusions    and     factual
    findings.        We     must    deny        habeas   relief     unless     the     state
    adjudication:
    (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to,
    or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
    established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
    Court of the United States; or
    24
    (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an
    unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
    the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
    
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (d).                A state court’s decision is contrary to
    clearly established federal law “if the state court arrives at a
    conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a
    question    of    law”        or     “confronts     facts    that    are    materially
    indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and
    arrives at a result opposite” to the Supreme Court’s.                         Williams
    v. Taylor, 
    529 U.S. 362
    , 405 (2000).                  A state court unreasonably
    applies federal law when it “correctly identifies the governing
    legal    rule    but    applies        it     unreasonably    to    the    facts   of    a
    particular . . . case.”                 
    Id. at 407-08
    .         A state court also
    unreasonably applies federal law when it “applies a precedent in
    a context different from the one in which the precedent was
    decided and one to which extension of the legal principle of the
    precedent is not reasonable,” or when it “fails to apply the
    principle of a precedent in a context where such failure is
    unreasonable.”          Robinson v. Polk, 
    438 F.3d 350
    , 355 (4th Cir.
    2006) (internal citations omitted).                    Further, a state court’s
    factual findings are presumed correct and may be rebutted only
    by clear and convincing evidence.                   
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (e)(1).             We
    review     de    novo     a        district     court’s     application      of    these
    principles.      Robinson, 
    438 F.3d at 354
    .
    25
    Wallace contends that the North Carolina state court
    reached decisions that were contrary to, and an unreasonable
    application of, federal law when it determined that (1) denying
    his motion to change venue based on pretrial publicity did not
    deprive him of an impartial jury under the Sixth Amendment, and
    (2)   his   confessions    were    voluntary    and    not    obtained   amidst
    circumstances calculated to undermine his free will.
    A.
    Wallace argues that the pretrial publicity surrounding
    his arrest was so widespread and inflammatory that a jury drawn
    from the community should have been presumed partial regardless
    of responses given during voir dire.              Supreme Court precedent
    sets a high bar for presumed prejudice on the basis of pretrial
    publicity.     For   a    jury    to   be   presumed   partial    by   pretrial
    publicity, the publicity must involve coverage that is almost
    irrefutably incriminating and proximate in time to the trial, or
    the publicity must disturb the trial proceedings.                The publicity
    must rise to a level that renders court proceedings “a hollow
    formality.”    Rideau v. Louisiana, 
    373 U.S. 723
    , 726 (1963).
    In Rideau residents of a town with a population of
    150,000 were repeatedly exposed to a film clip of a defendant
    personally confessing to murder.            
    Id. at 724
    .      The Supreme Court
    presumed juror prejudice based on the spectacle of a broadcast
    confession by the defendant himself.            
    Id. at 726
    .      The clip was
    26
    shown two months before the defendant’s trial.                        
    Id.
        The Court
    also found presumed prejudice in Irvin v. Dowd, 
    366 U.S. 717
    ,
    725 (1961), a case in which the defendant was the subject of a
    “barrage       of    newspaper         headlines,      articles,        cartoons    and
    pictures” six months before his trial.                    The coverage reported
    that the defendant confessed to six murders and offered to plead
    guilty    to    avoid     the    death    penalty.        
    Id. at 725-26
    .       The
    publicity also characterized the defendant as “remorseless and
    without    conscience.”           
    Id. at 726
    .    The     unabated     publicity
    convinced the Court that jurors’ “statement[s] of impartiality
    [during voir dire] [could] be given little weight.”                       
    Id. at 728
    .
    Other Supreme Court decisions indicate that jurors may
    be   presumed       prejudiced     by    publicity     that     infects     the   actual
    trial proceedings.              In Estes v. Texas, 
    381 U.S. 532
    , 535-36
    (1965), the Court found presumed prejudice in a case of national
    notoriety in which the press attended and televised pretrial
    hearings, undermining the courtroom’s atmosphere of decorum with
    obtrusive       cables,    wires,        and    microphones.          Similarly,      in
    Sheppard    v.      Maxwell,     
    384 U.S. 333
       (1966),    the     Court    found
    presumed prejudice in the nationally known murder trial of Sam
    Sheppard.        Not    only     was    there    pervasive      publicity    from   the
    outset characterizing Sheppard as the murderer, but the press
    took on the air of theater.                     Reporters broadcasted a staged
    inquest presided over by the coroner and prosecutor and attended
    27
    by hundreds of spectators.                  
    Id. at 339
    .        At trial the press was
    a constant presence inside and outside the courtroom.                                  Jurors’
    photographs were published.                  
    Id. at 345
    .           The jury visited the
    murder scene in the presence of hundreds of reporters.                                The jury
    was    not    sequestered       and     was      only     admonished      to    avoid    press
    coverage during the trial.              
    Id. at 347, 353
    .
    When pretrial publicity does not reach an amplitude
    that makes trial “a hollow formality,” voir dire examination is
    the     trial    court’s       metric       of    juror      partiality.           Murphy    v.
    Florida, 
    421 U.S. 794
     (1975).                     If voir dire “indicates no such
    hostility to [a defendant] by the jurors . . . as to suggest a
    partiality       that     could       not        be   laid    aside,”       then      pretrial
    publicity has not deprived the defendant of a fair trial.                                   
    Id. at 800
    .       Jurors are not expected to be “totally ignorant of the
    facts    and    issues     involved,”         and     even    a    juror’s     preconceived
    conclusion       on    guilt   will     not       alone    rebut    the     presumption      of
    impartiality if the trial court is satisfied that the juror “can
    lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based
    on the evidence presented in court.”                          
    Id.
     (citing Irvin, 
    366 U.S. at 723
    ).            Additionally, the Supreme Court has noted the
    distinction between “mere familiarity with [a defendant] or his
    past    and     an    actual   predisposition             against     him,”     and    between
    “largely       factual    publicity         from      that    which    is      invidious     or
    inflammatory.”         
    Id.
     at 801 n.4.
    28
    Wallace argues that the state court did not address
    his motion to change venue under the Supreme Court’s precedent
    governing       presumed          prejudice,    but       instead    went    straight        to
    actual prejudice by discussing voir dire.                           Although the court
    did not explicitly address Rideau, Irvin, Estes, or Sheppard in
    its ruling, a “state court’s disposition of a claim need not
    include extended analysis to qualify as an ‘adjudication on the
    merits’ under section 2254(d).”                     Walker v. True, 
    401 F.3d 574
    ,
    579 n.1 (4th Cir. 2005).                 The record indicates that the state
    court reasonably applied the Supreme Court’s preference for voir
    dire     as     the    mitigating        tool       of    pretrial     publicity       after
    implicitly       finding      that     Wallace’s         pretrial    publicity      did     not
    meet the high bar required for presumed juror prejudice.                               After
    finding that the publicity was more factual than inflammatory, a
    distinction that the Supreme Court recognizes, Murphy, 
    421 U.S. at
      801      n.4,    the   trial     court     went      on   to   note    that    “jurors’
    responses to the questions on Voir Dire are the best evidence of
    whether       pretrial      publicity     was       inflammatory      or    prejudicial.”
    J.A. 1055.           The court concluded its ruling by noting Wallace’s
    “right     to    renew      the    motion,     because      of   subsequent        events    or
    because of information elicited during Voir Dire.”                             J.A. 1056.
    This suggests the state court understood that further publicity
    shortly before jury selection might create presumed prejudice.
    29
    The    state     court    could      reasonably   conclude   that   the
    pretrial      publicity    did    not      make   Wallace’s    trial    a   hollow
    formality.      In a case involving nine brutal, similar murders in
    a relatively short time span in the same geographic area, it
    would be a tall order to assemble a jury that had heard nothing
    about the case.         Of course, the high-profile nature of Wallace’s
    case gave the trial court reason to consider his motion for
    changed venue even more carefully, and we are satisfied that the
    court did so.
    Most importantly, the time gap between the bulk of the
    publicity and the trial was substantially longer in Wallace’s
    case than in Rideau.         Wallace’s trial was nearly two years after
    the surge of publicity, whereas Rideau’s trial occurred less
    than two months after his broadcast confession.                  When it denied
    Wallace’s motion to change venue at the hearing in January 1995,
    the   state     court     could     have    reasonably   concluded      that   the
    prejudicial effects of pretrial publicity would dissipate by the
    time jury selection would begin in October 1996. 2                Additionally,
    2
    The North Carolina Supreme Court observed that although
    the trial court referenced the passage of time in its findings
    of fact, it did not explicitly rely on this rationale in denying
    the motion. State v. Wallace, 
    528 S.E.2d 326
    , 345 (N.C. 2000).
    We agree with the supreme court, however, that the trial court
    factored time into its conclusion as part of the “totality of
    the circumstances.”    J.A. 1056.   In rejecting the probative
    value of Dr. Bohm’s poll, the trial court explained that the
    “passage of time and the publicity or lack thereof after the
    (Continued)
    30
    prospective jurors in Wallace’s case, unlike those in Rideau,
    were    not    presented    with   Wallace’s     taped    confession     in   news
    broadcasts.
    We also conclude that the state court did not make an
    unreasonable determination of the facts when it concluded that
    most     of     Wallace’s    pretrial        publicity       was   factual,   not
    inflammatory.       We must presume this factual finding correct, 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (e)(1), and Wallace has failed to rebut it by clear
    and convincing evidence.           Although Wallace’s arrest was followed
    by some provocative and conclusory press – such as the serial
    killer profile and the portrayal of Wallace as a clever suspect
    who destroyed evidence – we agree that most of the coverage was
    factual.       Much of it focused on the victims and the family and
    friends who mourned them.            Although the coverage of Wallace’s
    prior arrests was certainly unfavorable, it was also factual.
    And even if Wallace was not charged with some of the crimes
    mentioned, the fact that police believed that he was connected
    to the crimes is not necessarily inflammatory.
    While we do not discount the prejudicial effects of
    hasty    and    confident   statements       made   by   a    police   department
    facing     public criticism, we also cannot discount the right of
    pole [sic] was taken, could amelierate [sic] or exacerbate the
    responses to the questions . . . .” J.A. 1055.
    31
    the department to communicate information to the public.                                Nor
    can we expect the press to discriminate between information that
    would be admissible and inadmissible at trial.                             In sum, the
    state court reasonably found that the pretrial publicity would
    not make Wallace’s trial a hollow formality and that voir dire
    would    provide      the     best   indicia       of    prejudice.         Unlike      the
    prospective jurors in Rideau and Irvin, Wallace’s jury pool did
    not   encounter       almost    irrefutably        incriminating        information       –
    such as a taped confession or a promised guilty plea – shortly
    before trial.          Nor is there any indication that the publicity
    infected the trial itself as in Sheppard and Estes.
    B.
    Wallace’s         next   claim       is     that   the      state     court’s
    admission       of     his     confessions        was      contrary       to,     and    an
    unreasonable application of, federal law.                          The investigators’
    delayed administration of Miranda warnings, Wallace argues, was
    a   coercive    tactic       calculated     to    undermine       his   free     will   and
    render    his        confessions     involuntary           under     the    Fifth       and
    Fourteenth Amendments.
    Wallace         argues   that      the      applicable      Supreme      Court
    precedent for this claim is Missouri v. Seibert, 
    542 U.S. 600
    (2004),   rather       than    Oregon     v.     Elstad,    
    470 U.S. 298
        (1985).
    Although Seibert was decided after Wallace’s conviction became
    final, Wallace argues that the case did not announce a new rule
    32
    of constitutional law, but was rather a necessary consequence of
    Elstad.       We need not decide this question because under either
    case,    the    state     court    reasonably         applied        the     law       to    admit
    Wallace’s      confessions.         Both    cases      involved          suspects           giving
    incriminating statements before being advised of their Miranda
    rights.       Yet the state court here found that the police did not
    elicit incriminating information during the pre-warning period
    of questioning.           Therefore, the question is whether the state
    court reasonably found under the totality of the circumstances
    that Wallace’s subsequent confessions were voluntary.                                  Moran v.
    Burbine, 
    475 U.S. 412
    , 421 (1986).
    In Elstad the Supreme Court held that the failure to
    give    Miranda     warnings       until   after       a    suspect          has       given   an
    incriminating statement does not necessarily render post-warning
    confessions       inadmissible,        provided            that      the          post-warning
    statements       are     voluntary.        
    470 U.S. at 312
    .          The      Court
    underscored the “vast difference between the direct consequences
    flowing from coercion of a confession by physical violence or
    other deliberate means calculated to break the suspect’s will
    and     the    uncertain    consequences         of    disclosure            of    a     ‘guilty
    secret’ freely given in response to an unwarned but noncoercive
    question.”         
    Id.
          Elstad     voluntarily          made        an    incriminating
    statement before police advised him of his rights.                                
    Id. at 315
    .
    The    Court    refused    to     extend   Miranda         to    hold      that     “a      simple
    33
    failure     to       administer   the   warnings,     unaccompanied          by    ‘any’
    actual coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine
    the suspect’s ability to exercise his free will, so taints the
    investigatory process that a subsequent voluntary and informed
    waiver is ineffective for some indeterminate period.”                             
    Id. at 309
    .
    In Seibert the Court addressed the consequences of a
    deliberate rather than inadvertent delay of Miranda warnings.                          A
    plurality held that when the delayed administration of Miranda
    warnings is deliberate and elicits a confession, it is unlikely
    that subsequent warnings serve their purpose because suspects
    presumably conclude that the pre-warning statement is admissible
    regardless.          
    542 U.S. at 613
    .      In concurrence, Justice Kennedy
    proposed that post-warning statements given after a deliberate
    delay should be excluded unless police employ curative measures,
    such as an additional warning explaining that the pre-warning
    statement       is    likely   inadmissible.         
    Id. at 622
    .    Because       no
    rationale in Seibert garnered a majority, and Justice Kennedy
    concurred on the narrowest grounds, his opinion may be treated
    as the Court’s holding.            Marks v. United States, 
    430 U.S. 188
    ,
    193 (1977).
    Both Elstad and Seibert focus on warnings given after
    police    have       already   elicited   an   admission.        The    state      court
    found    that    investigators      Corwin     and    Price     did    not    ask    any
    34
    questions designed to elicit an incriminating response before
    administering warnings.             See Rhode Island v. Innis, 
    446 U.S. 291
    ,    300-01      (1980)     (defining      “interrogation”         for    Miranda
    purposes    as   not    only    “express      questioning,”        but   “words      or
    actions on the part of police . . . that the police should know
    are    reasonably    likely    to    elicit     an    incriminating      response”).
    Wallace maintains that his statements regarding his drug abuse
    and acquaintance with Henderson and Baucom were incriminating
    because they were links in a chain of evidence against him, and
    that the police exploited these statements by immediately asking
    for more detail about Wallace’s connection to the victims after
    they gave him the Miranda warnings.                  The case that Wallace cites
    to support this argument, Ohio v. Reiner, 
    532 U.S. 17
     (2001) is
    inapplicable.       Reiner addressed the reasonableness of witnesses’
    perceptions      that   their       testimony     is     incriminating      for     the
    purposes    of    the   Fifth       Amendment’s        privilege   against        self-
    incrimination.       
    Id. at 20
    .        The Court held that the privilege
    extends to answers “which would furnish a link in the chain of
    evidence needed to prosecute.”             
    Id.
           Reiner thus speaks to what
    makes a statement sufficiently incriminating to allow a witness
    to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege; it does not define what
    constitutes interrogation for Miranda purposes.                      Interrogation
    is defined by police questioning and conduct designed to elicit
    35
    an incriminating response, not by a suspect’s belief as to what
    statements are incriminating.
    Because Miranda warnings are not required unless there is
    both custody and interrogation, 
    384 U.S. 436
    , 467-68 (1966),
    Wallace’s argument that his post-warning suppression should have
    been suppressed must rest on the voluntariness of his waiver of
    his Miranda rights.             A voluntary waiver is one that was “the
    product     of     a     free     and      deliberate   choice      rather   than
    intimidation, coercion, or deception” and was “made with full
    awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and
    the consequences of the decision to abandon it.”                      Moran, 
    475 U.S. at 421
    .       “Only    if   the    ‘totality   of   the   circumstances’
    surrounding the interrogation reveals both an uncoerced choice
    and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly
    conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived.”                  
    Id.
    Wallace argues that under Elstad the delayed administration
    of Miranda warnings was a circumstance calculated to undermine
    his free will and that it rendered his subsequent confession
    involuntary.        In   Wallace’s      case,    however,    the   state   court’s
    finding of voluntariness despite the delay was not contrary to,
    nor an unreasonable application of, federal law.                   After properly
    finding that the police did not ask questions designed to elicit
    an incriminating response prior to giving the warnings (and that
    Miranda therefore did not apply to Wallace’s initial phase of
    36
    questioning), the state court properly applied federal law by
    assessing the voluntariness of his waiver under the totality of
    the circumstances.
    Although the state court found that the pre-warning
    questioning     of     Wallace    was     not    interrogation,      it     properly
    considered delay as a circumstance bearing on the voluntariness
    of Wallace’s post-warning waiver.                Voluntariness factors include
    “both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the
    interrogation.”        Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 
    412 U.S. 218
    , 226
    (1973).       The     court     found    that    the   pre-warning        period   of
    questioning     was    not     continuous       because   Wallace    had     regular
    breaks to access food, drink, and the restroom.                     There were no
    indications     that        Wallace     was    sleep-deprived   or     under       the
    influence     of      any     impairing       substance   during     this      time.
    Investigators Price and Corwin testified that Wallace read and
    initialed     the     Miranda    form     with     comprehension     and     without
    hesitation, and that Wallace told them he had been read Miranda
    rights before.        The state court found that the police did not
    ask specific questions regarding Wallace’s relationship with the
    victims until after they gave the warnings.                Wallace was allowed
    to   sleep   after     his    first     detailed   confession   and       before   he
    accompanied police on the van ride, where he again waived his
    rights.      The state court also found that Wallace did not view
    37
    his request to see his girlfriend and daughter as a condition
    for giving statements.
    Given these factual findings, which Wallace did not
    rebut with clear and convincing evidence, we cannot say that the
    state court unreasonably found Wallace’s confessions voluntary
    despite the delay.     Although the police clearly hoped that the
    pre-warning rapport they established with Wallace would continue
    after the warnings, federal law countenances this strategy.              The
    Elstad Court noted that the Fifth Amendment is not “concerned
    with moral and psychological pressures to confess emanating from
    sources other than official coercion.”        
    470 U.S. at 304-05
    .         The
    state court reasonably found that the delay did not amount to
    official coercion.
    We   also    decline   to    hold   that     the   state      court
    unreasonably   found   that   Investigator    Rice’s    prayer    did    not
    render Wallace’s confessions involuntary.        The prayer was given
    after Wallace had been advised of his Miranda rights.            The state
    court found that Wallace agreed to the prayer, expressed relief
    afterwards, and then gave detailed confessions to each murder.
    As with the delayed administration of warnings, the state court
    could reasonably find that the prayer was more in the nature of
    “moral pressure” than “official coercion.”       Elstad at 305.
    38
    III.
    For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the state
    court’s decisions on Wallace’s pretrial publicity and confession
    claims were not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of,
    clearly   established   federal   law.   Accordingly,   the   district
    court’s order dismissing Wallace’s petition for writ of habeas
    corpus is
    AFFIRMED.
    39