A Helping Hand, LLC v. Baltimore County, MD , 355 F. App'x 773 ( 2009 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-2253
A HELPING HAND, LLC, A Maryland Corporate Entity; JOHN DOE
1; JANE DOE NUMBER 1; JOHN DOE 2,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
and
JANE DOE NUMBER 2; JANE DOE NUMBER 3,
Plaintiffs,
v.
BALTIMORE COUNTY, MARYLAND; OFFICE OF THE ZONING
COMMISSIONER OF BALTIMORE COUNTY; COUNTY COUNCIL OF
BALTIMORE COUNTY; BALTIMORE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PERMITS AND
DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT,
Defendants - Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, District Judge.
(1:02-cv-02568-CCB)
Argued: December 1, 2009 Decided: December 10, 2009
Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Reversed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Paul M. Mayhew, BALTIMORE COUNTY OFFICE OF LAW, Towson,
Maryland, for Appellants. Jimmy Rock, TROUTMAN SANDERS, LLP,
Washington, D.C., for Appellees. ON BRIEF: John E. Beverungen,
County Attorney, Jeffrey Grant Cook, Assistant County Attorney,
BALTIMORE COUNTY OFFICE OF LAW, Towson, Maryland, for
Appellants. Deborah A. Jeon, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF
MARYLAND, Centreville, Maryland; Tameka M. Collier, Daniel W.
Cohen, TROUTMAN SANDERS, LLP, Washington, D.C.; Richard A.
Simpson, WILEY REIN, LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Baltimore County (“the County”) appeals from the judgment
of the district court granting A Helping Hand, LLC (“the
Clinic”) a two-year injunction as remedy for a jury finding that
the County violated the Clinic’s substantive due process rights.
Because the Clinic has established neither irreparable harm nor
the inadequacy of money damages, we must reverse.
I.
Despite significant opposition from the local community,
the Clinic, a for-profit methadone clinic, opened at its current
site on Slade Avenue in the County in April 2002. At that time,
in response to the public mood, the County enacted an ordinance
restricting the location of all “state-licensed medical
clinics,” including the Clinic.
The ordinance bans such clinics from operating, without a
special exception, in commercial zones or within 750 feet of a
residence. The Clinic’s site on Slade Avenue lies within the
restricted area.
The ordinance only applies to those clinics established and
operating after April 1, 2002. For clinics established and
operating between April 1, 2002 and April 16, 2002, the
ordinance provides an amortization period, which permits those
clinics to operate for six months before relocating. The
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amortization provision allows investors to recoup some of their
investment, and provides a period for the clinics to relocate.
Clinics established and operating after April 16, 2002 do not
receive any benefit from the amortization provision.
When the County enacted the ordinance, the Clinic argued in
an administrative challenge that because the Clinic had begun
operations on April 15, it should at least receive the benefit
of the amortization period. The County disagreed and began
enforcing the ordinance against the Clinic immediately. The
Clinic then filed this action in federal court, alleging that
the County’s enforcement of the ordinance violated the Americans
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The County decided not to enforce the
ordinance pending the outcome of this litigation.
Following a ten-day trial, a jury returned a verdict
finding that the County’s enforcement of the ordinance against
the Clinic violated both the ADA and the Clinic’s substantive
due process rights. The district court then awarded a
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to the Clinic. (The
Clinic did not seek money damages). The injunction prohibited
the County from discriminating against the Clinic on the basis
of its patients’ disabilities and from enforcing the ordinance
against the Clinic. Thus, the injunction permitted the Clinic
to remain on Slade Avenue without complying with the ordinance.
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On appeal, we held that the district court had erred in
finding for the Clinic as a matter of law on an element of its
ADA claim. See A Helping Hand, LLC v. Baltimore County, Md.,
515 F.3d 356, 368 (4th Cir. 2008). We reversed the jury verdict
as to the ADA claim and remanded the case for a new trial if the
Clinic should choose to pursue that claim. Id. at 373. We also
held, however, that the County had not preserved a challenge to
the jury’s verdict on the substantive due process claim, and so
upheld the jury’s verdict for the Clinic on that claim. Id. at
370. Finally, we vacated the injunction and remanded the case
to the district court to “determine the appropriate injunctive
relief on the basis of the due process claim alone.” Id. at
373.
On remand, the district court issued a new injunction,
prohibiting the County from enforcing the ordinance against the
Clinic for two years. A Helping Hand, LLC v. Baltimore County,
Md., No. CCB-02-2568, 2008 WL 4755843 (D.Md. Oct. 8, 2008). The
court chose a two-year time period in an attempt to balance the
County’s interest in zoning control against the Clinic’s
interest in a reasonable amount of time to relocate.
The district court entered its order on October 8, 2008.
The County timely appealed. After the parties had filed all
appellate briefs, we heard oral argument in the case on December
1, 2009. Throughout this period, the Clinic has continued to
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operate at its Slade Avenue site, and other methadone clinics
have opened in the County subject to the requirements of the
ordinance.
II.
We review a district court’s grant of injunctive relief for
abuse of discretion. Va. Soc’y for Human Life, Inc. v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 263 F.3d 379, 392 (4th Cir. 2001). The
district court abuses its discretion when it makes a legal
mistake or a clearly erroneous factual finding. See id.Injunctive relief is an “extraordinary remedy.” Weinberger
v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982); Nat’l Audubon Soc’y
v. Dep’t of Navy, 422 F.3d 174, 201 (4th Cir. 2005). To obtain
such relief, a plaintiff must demonstrate:
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2)
that remedies available at law, such as monetary
damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury;
(3) that, considering the balance of hardships between
the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is
warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not
be disserved by a permanent injunction.
eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
Furthermore, “an injunction may not be used for ‘punishment or
reparations for . . . past violations.’” Belk v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 269 F.3d 305, 347 (4th Cir. 2001) (en
banc) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Or.
State Med. Soc., 343 U.S. 326, 333 (1952)).
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III.
With these governing principles in mind, it is immediately
clear that the injunction cannot stand. The Clinic has not
demonstrated that it will suffer irreparable injury absent an
injunction. Nor has the Clinic shown that money damages would
provide an inadequate remedy for whatever injury it may suffer
by virtue of being forced to relocate.
The County’s enforcement of the ordinance against the
Clinic could require the Clinic to relocate. Undoubtedly,
relocation would result in some costs and inconvenience for the
Clinic. That injury, however, does not constitute irreparable
(rather than temporary) injury, and money damages could
compensate any cost to the Clinic. See Virginia Carolina Tools,
Inc. v. Int’l Tool Supply, Inc., 984 F.2d 113, 120 (4th Cir.
1993) (upholding a district court finding that “expenses
incurred in relocation, injury to reputation, loss of profits”
and other “highly speculative and largely economic injuries”
were not irreparable harm); Taylor v. Resolution Trust Corp., 56
F.3d 1497, 1507 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“[I]n the absence of special
circumstances, . . . recoverable economic losses are not
considered irreparable.”); cf. Fed. Leasing, Inc. v.
Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 650 F.2d 495, 500 (4th Cir. 1981)
(finding irreparable injury only when economic losses threatened
the very existence of the business); Blackwelder Furniture Co.
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of Statesville, Inc. v. Seilig Mfg. Co., Inc., 550 F.2d 189, 197
(4th Cir. 1977) (finding irreparable harm to business interests
when the losses were “incalculable”), overruled on other grounds
by Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 575
F.3d 342 (4th Cir. 2009).
Notwithstanding these well-established principles, the
Clinic maintains that we should uphold the injunction. The
Clinic offers three rationales for this position. All fail.
First, the Clinic contends that it seeks not merely to make
money, but also to serve its clients, and therefore it will
suffer irreparable harm by virtue of being forced to cease
operations while it relocates. Even assuming that making money
does not primarily motivate the Clinic -- a for-profit business
-- the Clinic has not demonstrated that a temporary interruption
would irreparably frustrate its customer-service purpose. Nor
can it. Were it so, then every service business would have a
foolproof case for an injunction.
Second, the Clinic argues that relocation may prove
complicated because its licenses are tied to its address on
Slade Avenue, and it would therefore have to seek new licenses
from both the state and the County as part of relocation. The
licensing process might well require some time and energy, but
the Clinic has offered no evidence casting doubt on its ability
to secure new licenses. Indeed, the County has represented on
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numerous occasions that it will do everything in its power to
assist the Clinic in relocating. Thus, the possible time and
energy expended to obtain new licenses hardly constitutes an
irreparable injury, not compensable by money damages. 1
Third, relying on Ross v. Meese, 818 F.2d 1132, 1135 (4th
Cir. 1987), the Clinic contends that a constitutional violation
per se constitutes irreparable harm. This contention wrenches
the Ross holding from its context. The plaintiff in Ross
alleged violations of her First, Fourth, and Sixth Amendment
rights arising out of a series of unlawful searches, and sought
to compel the government to destroy the information that it had
acquired and to enjoin the offending law enforcement agents from
disseminating the information. 818 F.2d at 1133. The harm at
issue here -- damage to a business’s property interests -- is
qualitatively different, most clearly because assessing money
damages in Ross would have been, at the very least,
significantly more challenging than in this case.
In sum, the Clinic has failed to demonstrate entitlement to
injunctive relief. We therefore vacate the injunction. Thus
the ordinance, including its amortization provision, will apply
1
Of course, the mere fact that the Clinic has not sought
money damages does not prove them an inadequate remedy.
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to the Clinic from the date of the entry of our mandate. 2 If the
County decides to enforce the ordinance against the Clinic, the
Clinic will have six months from the date of our mandate to
relocate or to win approval of its Slade Avenue location in
accord with the requirements of the ordinance.
IV.
For all of these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the
district court. We direct the clerk to issue the mandate
forthwith.
REVERSED
2
The County argues that the Clinic is not entitled to the
benefit of the amortization provision because the Clinic has
occupied its location for more than six months. The Clinic,
however, never received the benefit of the amortization
provision; indeed, the County’s contention that the Clinic had
no entitlement to the amortization period precipitated this
lawsuit. In this action, the Clinic proceeded to challenge the
ordinance as a whole, including the amortization provision.
Thus, when the jury found the ordinance unconstitutional, its
finding encompassed the amortization provision.
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