United States v. Owens , 358 F. App'x 468 ( 2009 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-5255
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CARROL LEE OWENS,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 08-8361
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CARROL LEE OWENS,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 08-8429
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CARROL LEE OWENS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Lacy H. Thornburg,
District Judge. (1:08-cr-00025-LHT-1)
Submitted: November 23, 2009 Decided: December 31, 2009
Before KING, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Faith S. Bushnaq, BUSHNAQ LAW OFFICE, PLLC, Charlotte, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Edward R. Ryan, Acting United States
Attorney, Mark A. Jones, Assistant United States Attorney,
Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Carrol Lee Owens pled guilty to Count 8, bank fraud in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 2 (2006), and Count 9, fraud
with identification documents, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 1028(A) (West 2000 & Supp. 2009) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). He
was sentenced to twenty-four-month sentences for each violation,
to be served consecutively, for a total sentence of forty-eight
months. On appeal, counsel has raised two issues: First,
whether Owens’ waiver of counsel was knowing and voluntary and
second, whether the district court erred by denying Owens’
motion to substitute counsel. Owens has filed a pro se
supplemental brief listing two additional issues. Owens first
alleges that the district court erred by denying his motion to
withdraw his plea agreement. In his remaining issue, Owens
argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to
dismiss the indictment and motion to strike surplusage from the
indictment. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
We find no error in the district court’s decision to
allow Owens to waive his right to counsel and proceed pro se.
See United States v. Singleton, 107 F.3d 1091, 1097 n.3 (4th
Cir. 1997) (giving review standard). A review of the record
reveals that Owens knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to
counsel. United States v. Gallop, 838 F.2d 105, 110-11 (4th
Cir. 1988). Neither do we find that the district court abused
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its discretion when it denied Owens’ motion to substitute
counsel, made the day after Owens informed the court he was
willing and able to represent himself better than his appointed
counsel. See United States v. Corporan-Cuevas, 35 F.3d 953, 956
(4th Cir. 1994) (stating review standard).
Owens’ pro se issues are also lacking. Owens fails to
show that the district court abused its discretion in denying
his motion to withdraw his plea agreement. See United States v.
Ubakanma, 215 F.3d 421, 424 (4th Cir. 2000) (providing review
standard). Finally, we find no reversible error in the district
court’s denial of Owens’ motion to dismiss his indictment and
motion to strike surplusage from the indictment. The indictment
informed Owens of the crimes for which he was being prosecuted
and we discern no grounds for dismissal. Fed. R. Crim. P.
7(c)(1); see United States v. Hatcher, 560 F.3d 222, 224 (4th
Cir. 2009). As found by the district court, Owens failed to
identify irrelevant and prejudicial allegations as would be
needed in a motion to strike surplusage from an indictment. See
Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(d). Owens has failed to show that the
district court abused its discretion in denying the motions.
United States v. Williams, 445 F.3d 724, 733 (4th Cir. 2006)
(discussing review standard and legal analysis); United
States v. Poore, 594 F.2d 39, 41 (4th Cir. 1979) (same).
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Accordingly, we affirm Owens’ convictions. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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