Canal Insurance Co. v. Barker , 358 F. App'x 470 ( 2009 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-1301
CANAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JAMES M. BARKER, III, d/b/a Barker & Son; DENISE A. PENN;
HOUSTONIA CLYMER,
Defendants – Appellants,
and
JUSTIN J. COLVARD,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. James R. Spencer, Chief
District Judge. (3:07-cv-00339-JRS)
Argued: October 29, 2009 Decided: December 31, 2009
Before SHEDD, Circuit Judge, HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge, and
Norman K. MOON, United States District Judge for the Western
District of Virginia, sitting by designation.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: John Janney Rasmussen, INSURANCE RECOVERY LAW GROUP,
PLC, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellants. Marc A. Peritz, MORIN
& BARKLEY, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:
Elliott M. Buckner, CANTOR ARKEMA, PC, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellant Denise A. Penn; Joseph R. Winston, LAW OFFICES OF
JOSEPH R. WINSTON, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant James M.
Barker, III, d/b/a Barker & Son; M. Scott Bucci, BUCCI & DIX,
Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant Houstonia Clymer.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
PER CURIAM:
A truck owned by James M. Barker III, d/b/a Barker & Son
(“Barker”), and driven by Justin J. Colvard (“Colvard”),
collided with a car, which was driven by Denise A. Penn (“Penn”)
and carrying Houstonia Clymer (“Clymer”) (collectively,
“Appellants”). Penn and Clymer were injured in the collision.
Canal Insurance Company (“Canal” or “Appellee”) brought suit
seeking a declaratory judgment as to the policy limits of an
insurance policy that Canal issued to Barker. The district court
rejected Appellants’ contention that Virginia Code § 46.2-2143
or federal regulations would operate to increase the policy’s
limit to $750,000 through its “Out of State Insurance”
provision, and instead granted Canal’s Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings that the policy was limited to the face amount of
$100,000 listed on its declaration page. We agree and affirm the
judgment.
I.
On August 2, 2005, the tractor-trailer driven by Colvard
and owned by Barker was traveling southbound on Interstate 85 in
Brunswick County, Virginia, when it was involved in the
collision with the car carrying Penn and Clymer. Earlier that
day, Colvard made a delivery to a location in Petersburg,
Virginia, and was “deadheading” (traveling with an empty
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trailer) at the time of the accident. The following day, Colvard
was expected to pick up property in Salisbury, North Carolina
and transport it to Elberton, Georgia. Barker and Colvard were
both domiciled in Georgia, and Penn and Clymer were both
domiciled in New York. Canal is a corporation with its principal
place of business in, and organized under the laws of, South
Carolina.
Barker had previously purchased an insurance policy from
Canal, Basic Automobile Policy No. 447668 (“the Policy”),
covering the period between September 2004 and September 2005.
The Policy provides on the declaration page that Barker was
insured to a $100,000 limit of liability, and Canal offered to
pay that amount to satisfy Penn and Clymer’s claims arising out
of the accident. At issue is the meaning and effect that the
Policy’s Out of State Insurance provision has on the Policy’s
liability limit, and specifically whether this provision
operates to increase the limit to $750,000, the amount of
insurance that Appellants allege is required by Virginia law. 1
1
The “Out of State Insurance” provision states in pertinent
part:
If, under the provisions of the motor vehicle
financial responsibility law or the motor vehicle
compulsory insurance law or any similar law of any
state or province, a non-resident is required to
maintain insurance with respect to the operation or
use of a motor vehicle in such state or province and
(Continued)
4
Canal brought suit, seeking a declaratory judgment that the
Policy had a liability limit of the face value of $100,000. Penn
and Clymer counterclaimed that Canal owed a duty to indemnify
Barker and Colvard at least $750,000 to cover claims arising
from the accident. Penn and Clymer argued, inter alia, that
Virginia Code § 46.2-2143(B) required that “[a]ll motor carriers
shall keep in force at all times insurance . . . in an amount
required by this section,” and that under subsection (C), that
amount of “minimum insurance for motor carriers operating in
interstate commerce shall equal the minimum required by federal
law, rule, or regulation.” Viewed with reference to federal
regulations 49 C.F.R. §§ 387.7 and 387.9, which set the minimum
level of financial responsibility for interstate motor carriers
at $750,000, Penn and Clymer argued that both Virginia law, and
federal regulations, operated to increase the Policy’s liability
limit to $750,000. Canal contended that a holistic reading of
the statutory scheme in Virginia regulating motor carriers
such insurance requirements are greater than the
insurance provided by the policy, the limits of the
company’s liability and kinds of coverage afforded by
the policy shall be as set forth in such law, in lieu
of the insurance otherwise provided by the policy, but
only to the extent required by such law and only with
respect to the operation or use of a motor vehicle in
such state or province....
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clearly establishes that Virginia Code § 46.2-2143 only applies
to motor carriers who are registering in Virginia.
The district court found Canal’s interpretation of the
statutory scheme in Virginia regulating motor carriers to be
more persuasive. J.A. 110. Particularly, the court found this
interpretation to be supported by Virginia Code § 46.2-2102(2),
which exempts “from this chapter . . . [t]ransportation of
property between any point in this Commonwealth and any point
outside this Commonwealth or between any points wholly within
the limits of any city or town in this Commonwealth.” Therefore,
the court held that § 46.2-2102(2) exempts the application of
Chapter 21 (which includes § 46.2-2143) to motor carriers like
Barker who engage in interstate commerce. J.A. 110. The court
also found that § 46.2-2143, when read in its entirety, sets
forth the requirements for a motor carrier to register in
Virginia. J.A. 110-11. The district court was not persuaded by
the argument that federal regulations operated, through the Out
of State Insurance provision, to increase the Policy’s liability
limit to $750,000. J.A. 112. Even though Barker was required by
federal regulations to show a financial responsibility of
$750,000, the court held that Barker was not required to carry
insurance and could opt to meet the financial responsibility
through one of several ways. J.A. 113-14.
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II.
We review de novo a district court’s decision to grant
judgment on the pleadings. See Burbach Broad. Co. of Del. v.
Elkins Radio Corp., 278 F.3d 401, 405-06 (4th Cir. 2002). In
reviewing an award of judgment on the pleadings, we assume the
facts alleged in the relevant pleadings to be true, and we draw
all reasonable inferences therefrom. Volvo Constr. Equip. N. Am.
v. CLM Equip. Co., Inc., 386 F.3d 581, 591 (4th Cir. 2004)
(citing Elkins Radio, 278 F.3d at 406).
The appellants have raised several issues upon appeal, and
we address each in turn.
A.
The principal question raised on appeal is whether the
district court erred in its holding that Virginia Code § 46.2-
2143 only served to establish financial responsibility
requirements for motor carriers who are registered in the state
of Virginia, or whether, as Appellants contend, § 46.2-2143 also
applies to interstate motor carriers such as Barker. We hold
that the district court did not err in its interpretation of the
Virginia statute.
The applicable rules of statutory interpretation, to be
applied in the interpretation of a Virginia statute, are not in
7
dispute. 2 Where the language of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, “a court may look only to the words of the statute
to determine its meaning.” Hubbard v. Henrico Ltd. P’ship, 255
Va. 335, 339, 497 S.E.2d 335, 337 (1998) (citing Harrison &
Bates, Inc. v. Featherstone Assocs., 253 Va. 364, 368, 484
S.E.2d 883, 885 (1997)). Furthermore, it is a “settled principle
of statutory construction that every part of a statute is
presumed to have some effect and no part will be considered
meaningless unless absolutely necessary.” Id. at 340-41 (citing
Sims Wholesale Co. v. Brown-Forman Corp., 251 Va. 398, 405, 468
S.E.2d 905, 909 (1996)). “Whenever possible, however, it is our
duty to interpret the several parts of a statute as a consistent
and harmonious whole so as to effectuate the legislative goal.
‘[A] statute is not to be construed by singling out a particular
phrase.’” Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Bd. of County
Supervisors of Prince William County, 226 Va. 382, 387-88, 309
S.E.2d 308, 311 (1983) (quoting VEPCO v. Citizens, 222 Va. 866,
869, 284 S.E.2d 613, 615 (1981)). “Consequently, courts apply
the plain language of a statute unless . . . applying the plain
2
Additionally, as the parties have observed, Canal issued
the insurance policy to Barker in Georgia; therefore, the
interpretation of the policy is governed by Georgia law. See
Res. Bankshares Corp. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 407 F.3d
631, 635 (4th Cir. 2005).
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language would lead to an absurd result.” Boynton v. Kilgore,
271 Va. 220, 227, 623 S.E.2d 922, 926 (2006).
The plain terms of Virginia Code § 46.2-2143, when read in
their entirety, and even without reference to other sections of
the Code, make clear that it is a registration statute. Virginia
Code § 46.2-2143(B) provides that “[a]ll motor carriers shall
keep in force at all times insurance, a bond or bonds, in an
amount required by this section.” Furthermore, Virginia Code §
46.2-2143(C) provides that “[t]he minimum insurance for motor
carriers operating in interstate commerce shall equal the
minimum required by federal law, rule, or regulation.” The
Appellants conclude that these two subsections of § 46.2-2143,
in conjunction with certain federal regulations, operate as an
insurance requirement for all motor carriers and not only those
registering in Virginia.
However, a reasonable interpretation of Virginia Code §
46.2-2143 must try to reconcile subsection (A) with subsections
(B) and (C), in an attempt “to interpret the several parts of a
statute as a consistent and harmonious whole.” Virginia Elec. &
Power Co., 226 Va. at 388. Subsection (A) provides that “[n]o
certificate of public convenience and necessity, permit,
identification marker, registration card, or license plate shall
be issued by the Department to any vehicle operated by a motor
carrier until the motor carrier certifies to the Department that
9
the vehicle is covered” under one of four different listed
methods of coverage. In addition, subsection (A) provides that
motor carriers who have filed proof of financial responsibility
“in accordance with the single state registration system
authorized by 49 U.S.C. § 14504 or the unified carrier
registration system authorized by 49 U.S.C. § 14504a are deemed
to have fulfilled the requirements of this article for insurance
purposes,” so long as the motor carrier has on board a
federally-authorized receipt of insurance. Only after § 46.2-
2143 explains the prerequisites for registering a motor carrier
in Virginia with the Department of Motor Vehicles does the
statute reach the issues of the types of financial
responsibility, when financial responsibility is required, and
in what amount.
Importantly, it is not just subsection (A) that couches
motor carrier insurance and financial responsibility obligations
in the context of registration. Virginia Code § 46.2-2143(C)
also provides as follows:
Any motor carrier that meets the minimum federal
financial responsibility requirements and also
operates in intrastate commerce may submit, in lieu of
a separate filing for its intrastate operation, proof
of the minimum federal limits, provided that (i) both
interstate and intrastate operations are insured, (ii)
the public liability filed is at least $750,000, and
(iii) any cargo insurance requirements of this section
have been met.
10
This language, in light of the rest of the statute, is
reasonably read as an alternative means of filing proof of
financial responsibility with the Virginia Department of Motor
Vehicles prior to its issuance of motor carrier registration for
carriers operating on an interstate and intrastate basis.
A clear indicator that Virginia Code § 46.2-2143 is a
registration statute, although one that did not form the basis
of the district court’s opinion, is the title of that statutory
section: “Surety bonds, insurance, letter of credit or
securities required prior to issuance of registration; amounts.”
(emphasis added). The Appellants place emphasis upon the article
in which § 46.2-2143 is situated (“Insurance Requirements”) as
contrasted with the chapter in which its statutory predecessor
was situated (“Titling and Registration of Motor Vehicles”).
Appellants’ Br. at 10-12. However, Appellants ignore the title
of the statutory section, which is the more specific statutory
interpretive marker. It is clear that “[t]he purpose of a title
is to state the general subject covered by the act. While not a
part of the act itself, it may be read to ascertain the act’s
purpose.” Jakabcin v. Town of Front Royal, 271 Va. 660, 667 n.3,
628 S.E.2d 319, 323 (2006) (citing authorities). In this case,
as the section title indicates, the general subject of Virginia
Code § 46.2-2143 concerns the financial responsibility
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requirements for motor carriers prior to the issuance of
registration from the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles.
Looking outside the provisions of § 46.2-2143, we agree
with the district court that a “comprehensive reading of the
pertinent sections of Chapter 21 supports Canal’s interpretation
of the § 46.2-2143.” J.A. 110. Most applicable is § 46.2-
2101(2), which provides that “[t]he following are exempt from
this chapter . . . [t]ransportation of property between any
point in this Commonwealth and any point outside this
Commonwealth or between any points wholly within the limits of
any city or town in this Commonwealth.” In connection with §
46.2-2102, which states that “[n]o motor carrier shall operate
any motor vehicle for the transportation of property for
compensation on any highway in this Commonwealth on an
intrastate basis except in accordance with the provisions of
this chapter,” this statutory scheme clearly regulates motor
carriers operating on an intrastate basis, but not those
operating on an interstate basis or operating entirely within
city or town limits.
We hold that Virginia Code § 46.2-2143 is a registration
statute that sets forth the financial responsibility and
insurance requirements before the Department of Motor Vehicles
can issue registration for a vehicle operated by a motor
carrier. As Barker was under no obligation to register the
12
tractor-trailer involved in this accident in Virginia, and
instead had registered and principally garaged it in another
state, § 46.2-2143 does not apply to Barker. Therefore, § 46.2-
2143 does not require the liability limit of the Policy, through
its Out of State Insurance provision, to be increased above the
$100,000 face value of the Policy.
B.
A separate question, although one related to the
interpretation of Virginia Code § 46.2-2143, concerns the effect
and application of the § 46.2-2101(2) exemption to the present
circumstances. The exemption under § 46.2-2101(2) from “this
chapter” means an exemption from Chapter 21 (“Regulation of
Property Carriers”), which includes § 46.2-2143.
The Appellants contend that “Barker did not even fall
within section 2101’s literal exemption. . . . If Barker’s
truck was empty, it did not fall within section 2101 when the
accident happened, as the truck had finished transporting
property into Virginia and would not transport property again
until after it left the state.” Appellants’ Reply Br. at 6-7. We
disagree that the term “transportation of property,” as found in
§ 46.2-2101(2), would have such a narrow definition that it
would not cover Barker’s carrying property into Virginia from
out of state, and then “deadheading” (traveling with an empty
trailer) back out of state. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1638 (9th
13
ed. 2009) (defining “transportation” as the “movement of goods
or persons from one place to another by a carrier”). A common
sense interpretation of the exemption for “transportation of
property between any point in this Commonwealth and any point
outside this Commonwealth” must include both the trip into the
Commonwealth to unload property, and the return trip with an
empty truck. Under the present facts, where Barker’s truck had
delivered property to Petersburg, Virginia earlier that day, and
was “deadheading” back to North Carolina for a scheduled pickup,
Barker falls within the § 46.2-2101(2) exemption from Chapter
21.
Appellants further argue that § 46.2-2143 and § 46.2-
2101(2) are, in effect, in conflict concerning whether Virginia
law specifically requires “motor carriers operating in
interstate commerce” to keep “minimum insurance” as set forth in
Section 2143. Appellants’ Br. at 16. Therefore, they conclude,
“the specific should control the general,” and “Section 2101
should not apply to exempt interstate motor carriers from
section 2143.” Id. However, “[i]n a situation where one statute
speaks to a subject generally and another deals with an element
of that subject specifically, the statutes will be harmonized,
if possible, and if they conflict, the more specific statute
prevails.” Crawford v. Haddock, 270 Va. 524, 528, 621 S.E.2d
14127, 129 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted)(emphasis
added).
We hold that the most natural reading of the applicable
statutes makes clear that they form a harmonious statutory
scheme. We held above that Virginia Code § 46.2-2143 is a
registration statute that did not apply to Barker, and therefore
there is no conflict between this statute and § 46.2-2101(2).
Virginia’s statutory scheme makes doubly clear through its
exemption in § 46.2-2101(2) that Barker was not required to
carry insurance in the amount of $750,000.
C.
The Appellants challenge the district court’s holding that
the federal financial responsibility regulations, standing
alone, do not require Barker to maintain $750,000 in insurance.
J.A. 112-15. The applicable federal regulations provide that the
motor carrier’s financial responsibility requirement can be
proven by obtaining: (1) liability insurance which includes a
MCS-90 endorsement; (2) a Form MCS-82 surety bond; or (3)
written authorization to self-insure from the Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Administration. See 49 C.F.R. § 387.7(d). The
federal financial responsibility regulations cannot be said to
require a motor carrier to maintain a minimum of $750,000 in
insurance, where a motor carrier opts not to use insurance to
fulfill such requirements. It is undisputed that Barker was not
15
using the Policy to fulfill the federal financial responsibility
requirements, as the Policy does not contain a MCS-90
endorsement. We hold then that the district court did not err in
its finding that federal financial responsibility regulations
did not require Barker to maintain $750,000 in insurance.
Furthermore, the language of the Out of State Insurance
provision is not susceptible to an interpretation whereby
federal law, on its own, would trigger its application.
D.
Finally, Appellants argue that, because Penn and Clymer
never admitted to the accuracy of the policy attached to Canal’s
complaint when it brought suit, the district court could not
enter a judgment on the pleadings.
Both parties to the Policy, Barker and Canal, agree that
the copy attached to the complaint is a true and complete copy
of the Policy. See J.A. 13, 81. However, Penn and Clymer suggest
that the policy copy attached to the complaint is not complete
and accurate, on the basis of two signed endorsements produced
by First Southern Insurance Agency (apparently acting as
insurance agent to Barker) that were not included therein. See
J.A. 101-02.
Had Appellants’ allegations or their accompanying documents
contained some basis for belief that the Policy attached to the
complaint was not a complete and accurate copy of the Policy
16
that was in effect at the time of the accident, this argument
might have gained some traction. One endorsement cited by
Appellants has an “Endorsement Effective Date” of September 9,
2005, and an “Issue Date” of September 21, 2005. J.A. 101. The
other has an “Endorsement Effective Date” of September 3, 2005,
and an “Issue Date” of September 19, 2005. J.A. 102. The two
endorsements concern the schedule of insured equipment, and both
endorsements also clearly provide “ALL OTHER TERMS AND
CONDITIONS REMAIN UNCHANGED.” J.A. 101-02 (capitalization in
original). As the Appellants provided no more than a basis for
belief that subsequent changes were made to the Policy after the
date of the accident on August 2, 2005, and there being no basis
to doubt the true and complete nature of the policy copy
attached to Canal’s complaint as of the date of the accident,
the district court properly granted Canal’s Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
court is
AFFIRMED.
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