United States v. Nathaniel Gaffney , 524 F. App'x 24 ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-6017
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
NATHANIEL MAURICE GAFFNEY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Spartanburg. J. Michelle Childs, District
Judge. (7:07-cr-00711-JMC-5)
Submitted: April 23, 2013 Decided: May 3, 2013
Before MOTZ and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.
Nathaniel Maurice Gaffney, Appellant Pro Se. Jimmie Ewing,
Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina;
Elizabeth Jean Howard, Assistant United States Attorney,
Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
In 2008, Nathaniel Maurice Gaffney was sentenced to
135 months’ imprisonment following his conviction for conspiracy
to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five
kilograms or more of cocaine and fifty grams or more of cocaine
base (“crack”), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 846 (2006). In
2012, Gaffney filed a motion for reduction in sentence pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2006), arguing that U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual App. C, Amends. 750 and 759 (2011), together
with the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (“FSA”), Pub. L. No. 111-
220, 124 Stat. 2372, reduced his advisory Guidelines range and
his mandatory minimum sentence. The district court denied the
motion. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part, vacate
in part, and remand for further proceedings.
Under § 3582(c)(2), the district court may modify the
term of imprisonment “of a defendant who has been sentenced
. . . based on a sentencing [Guidelines] range that has
subsequently been lowered,” if the amendment is listed in the
Guidelines as retroactively applicable. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2);
see also USSG § 1B1.10(c), p.s. (2012). Even if a defendant
qualifies for a sentence reduction based on a Guidelines
amendment, the decision to grant such a modification is subject
to the discretion of the court. See USSG § 1B1.10, cmt.
(backg’d); United States v. Munn, 595 F.3d 183, 186 (4th Cir.
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2010). “A district court abuses its discretion if it fails
adequately to take into account judicially recognized factors
constraining its exercise, or if it bases its exercise of
discretion on an erroneous factual or legal premise.” DIRECTV,
Inc. v. Rawlins, 523 F.3d 318, 323 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Gaffney argued in the district court that his
Guidelines range was lowered both by Amendment 750 and by the
FSA. The FSA increased the threshold quantities of crack
required to trigger certain mandatory minimum sentences.
However, it is only retroactively applicable to defendants who
were sentenced after its effective date of August 3, 2010.
Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2335 (2012); United
States v. Bullard, 645 F.3d 237, 246-49 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 356 (2011). Gaffney was sentenced in 2004,
well before the FSA’s effective date. In any event, in his
informal brief, Gaffney does not challenge the district court’s
conclusion that the FSA did not lower Gaffney’s statutory
mandatory minimum sentence. Therefore, Gaffney forfeited
appellate review of this claim. See 4th Cir. R. 34(b)
(providing that this court considers only issues raised in
briefs). For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s
order to the extent that it concluded that Gaffney’s statutory
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mandatory minimum sentence was not reduced by the FSA and that
he was not eligible for a sentence reduction based on the FSA.
However, the district court denied § 3582(c)(2) relief
without addressing Gaffney’s eligibility for a sentence
reduction under Amendment 750 independent of the FSA. Amendment
750 to the Guidelines lowered the offense levels for crimes
involving certain quantities of crack cocaine and is
retroactive. See USSG §§ 1B1.10(c); USSG App. C Amends. 750,
759. Because we conclude that Gaffney may have been eligible
for such a reduction, we vacate the district court’s order in
part and remand for further proceedings to enable the district
court to determine if Gaffney is eligible and, if so, whether to
grant such a reduction.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED
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