Keith Goodman v. Gene Johnson , 524 F. App'x 887 ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-7990
KEITH D. GOODMAN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
GENE M. JOHNSON; HAROLD W. CLARKE; JOHN JABE; A. DAVID
ROBINSON; FRED SHILLING; KIM RUNION; J. LAFOON; Q.
BIRCHETTE; G. F. SIVELS; CASSANDRA TAYLOR; C. MAYES; C.
BAILEY; HARVARD STEPHENS, Doctor,
Defendants - Appellees,
and
G. ROBINSON; ELTON BROWN, Doctor; KRYM; SPRUILL, Doctor;
PRISON HEALTH SERVICES,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Gerald Bruce Lee, District
Judge. (1:11-cv-00079-GBL-IDD)
Submitted: April 29, 2013 Decided: May 3, 2013
Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.
Keith D. Goodman, Appellant Pro Se. Christopher Davies Supino,
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Keith D. Goodman appeals the district court’s orders
dismissing and granting summary judgment to the defendants on
his claims alleging deliberate indifference to his medical needs
and violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101-12213 (2006) (“ADA”). Generally, Goodman’s claims stem
from the Virginia Department of Corrections’ (“VDOC”) refusal to
provide him with contact lenses, instead of eyeglasses, to
correct his impaired vision. Goodman alleges that his
eyeglasses cause him severe headaches and that prison officials
have failed to adequately respond to his complaints due to their
misapplication of a VDOC policy that restricts prisoners from
receiving contact lenses absent a doctor’s prescription
(“contacts policy”). We affirm in part, vacate in part, and
remand.
I. Deliberate indifference
To succeed on his claims of constitutionally
inadequate medical care, Goodman was required to allege acts or
omissions on the part of prison officials harmful enough to
constitute deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Meeting this high
standard requires a showing that “the defendants actually knew
of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious injury . . . or
that they actually knew of and ignored a . . . serious need for
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medical care.” Young v. City of Mt. Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 575
(4th Cir. 2001).
a. Dismissals for failure to state a claim
Assuming without deciding that Goodman suffers from a
sufficiently serious medical need, we consider first the
district court’s dismissal of Goodman’s claims under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(b)(1) (2006) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Our review
is de novo, and a complaint should not be dismissed for failure
to state a claim unless, “after accepting all well-pleaded
allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint as true and drawing all
reasonable factual inferences from those facts in the
plaintiff’s favor, it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot
prove any set of facts in support of his claim entitling him to
relief.” Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th
Cir. 1999); see Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 391 (4th
Cir. 2011); Slade v. Hampton Rds. Reg’l Jail, 407 F.3d 243, 248
(4th Cir. 2005).
1. Dr. Krym, Dr. Elton Brown, and Dr. Spruill
Liberally construing the allegations in Goodman’s
complaint, we conclude that the district court prematurely
dismissed Goodman’s claims of deliberate indifference against
Dr. Krym, Dr. Elton Brown, and Dr. Spruill, each of whom have
treated Goodman’s vision problems. As we recently discussed, a
prisoner’s accusation that the care he is receiving is not
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adequate to treat his medical needs may support a claim of
deliberate indifference. De’Lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 526
(4th Cir. 2013) (“[A] prisoner does not enjoy a constitutional
right to the treatment of his or her choice, the treatment a
prison facility does provide must nevertheless be adequate to
address the prisoner’s serious medical need.”). Although such
claims may, on closer inspection, amount to nothing more than a
prisoner’s disagreement with his diagnosis or prescribed
treatment, prison doctors violate the Eighth Amendment if they
decline to provide the level of care they deem medically
necessary or fail to adequately address a prisoner’s complaints
that the care he is receiving is not effective. See Miltier v.
Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 853 (4th Cir. 1990) (treating physician may
be deliberately indifferent where he fails to provide level of
care he believes is necessary); Sosebee v. Murphy, 797 F.2d 179,
182 (4th Cir. 1986) (failure to respond to an inmate’s known
medical needs raises an inference of deliberate indifference to
those needs).
Here, Goodman complains that each of his doctors has
refused to adequately address his complaints that his eyeglasses
cause him headaches, ostensibly due to their reliance on the
contacts policy and the direction of their superiors. Because
we find no support for the district court’s conclusion that such
reliance, if true, insulates Goodman’s doctors from liability,
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we vacate the portion of the district court’s order dismissing
Goodman’s claims against Dr. Krym, Dr. Brown, and Dr. Spruill. *
2. G. Robinson, C. Mayes, Kimberly Runion, and Prison
Health Services
Having carefully reviewed Goodman’s complaint, we
conclude that the district court properly found that Goodman
failed to sufficiently allege claims of deliberate indifference
against G. Robinson, C. Mayes, Kimberly Runion, and Prison
Health Services (“PHS”). See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Disregarding Goodman’s conclusory allegations, his
complaint failed to allege facts from which one might infer that
G. Robinson, C. Mayes, or Kimberly Runion improperly interfered
with Goodman’s receipt of contact lenses or was aware that
Goodman’s doctors were not providing him with adequate
treatment. See Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 242 (4th Cir. 2008)
(“If a prisoner is under the care of medical experts . . ., a
non-medical prison official will generally be justified in
*
By this disposition we make no determination regarding the
underlying merit of Goodman’s claims. We simply conclude that
Goodman’s complaint raised allegations against his various
doctors sufficient to survive preliminary review under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(b)(1).
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believing that the prisoner is in capable hands.”). Similarly,
assuming without deciding that PHS is properly subject to suit
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006), Goodman failed to allege facts
sufficient to indicate a likelihood that PHS has an official
policy or custom of contravening the contacts policy and denying
prisoners access to contact lenses in contravention of their
doctors’ recommendation. See Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
901 F.2d 387, 398 (4th Cir. 1990) (allegations of conduct
violating official policy are not sufficient to establish that
conduct occurred pursuant to official policy). Accordingly, we
affirm the dismissal of Goodman’s claims against G. Robinson,
Mayes, Runion, and PHS.
b. Summary judgment
Turning to Goodman’s challenge to the district court’s
grant of summary judgment to Gene Johnson, Harold Clarke, John
Jabe, Fred Schilling, and Dr. Harvard Stephens (collectively
“administrative defendants”), our review is de novo. Bonds v.
Leavitt, 629 F.3d 369, 380 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
398 (2011). Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
“At the summary judgment stage, facts must be viewed
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there
is a genuine dispute as to those facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550
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U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). A
district court should grant summary judgment unless a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party on the
evidence presented. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 249 (1986). An otherwise properly supported motion for
summary judgment will not be defeated by the existence of any
factual dispute; only disputes over facts that might affect the
outcome of the suit under governing law will properly preclude
summary judgment. Id. at 248-49. “Conclusory or speculative
allegations do not suffice, nor does a mere scintilla of
evidence in support of” the nonmoving party’s case. Thompson v.
Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
We conclude that the district court did not err in
finding that Goodman failed to produce evidence, sufficient to
survive summary judgment, that the administrative defendants,
either personally or through prison policy, interfered with his
receipt of proper medical care. Instead, the materials Goodman
submitted in opposition to summary judgment indicate just the
opposite. Accordingly, we affirm the grant of summary judgment
in favor of the administrative defendants.
II. ADA
We also conclude that the district court properly
dismissed Goodman’s claim under the ADA. Assuming Goodman
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suffers from a qualifying disability, he failed to allege facts
indicating that, due to his disability, he has been deprived of
benefits for which he was otherwise qualified. See Simmons v.
Navajo Cnty., 609 F.3d 1011, 1021-22 (9th Cir. 2010) (prisoner
could not establish violation of ADA where there was no
indication that his disability was a motivating factor in his
exclusion from prison programs and because “[t]he ADA prohibits
discrimination because of disability, not inadequate treatment
for disability”); Fitzgerald v. Corrs. Corp. of Am., 403 F.3d
1134, 1144 (10th Cir. 2005) (prisoner failed to establish
violation of ADA based on allegation of improper medical
treatment because he would not have been otherwise eligible for
treatment absent his disability). Accordingly, we affirm the
dismissal of Goodman’s ADA claim.
III. Appointment of counsel
Last, Goodman challenges that district court’s denial
of his motion to appoint counsel. We, however, find no abuse of
discretion. Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160, 163 (4th Cir.
1984) (refusal to appoint counsel in civil case reviewed for
abuse of discretion), abrogated on other grounds by Mallard v.
U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296 (1989).
As the district court explained, counsel should be
appointed in civil cases only under “exceptional circumstances.”
Whisenant, 739 F.2d at 163. The existence of exceptional
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circumstances turns on the complexity of a party’s claims and
his ability to present them. Id. Because Goodman’s allegations
do not present unduly complex factual or legal issues, and
Goodman has not evidenced an inability to adequately pursue his
claims, we conclude that his motion to appoint counsel was
properly denied. For similar reasons, we also deny Goodman’s
pending motion to appoint appellate counsel.
Based on the foregoing, we vacate the district court’s
dismissal of Goodman’s claims of deliberate indifference against
Dr. Brown, Dr. Spruill, and Dr. Krym and affirm the remainder of
the district court’s judgment. We remand to the district court
for further consideration consistent with this opinion. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED
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