Sloan Pleasants v. Town of Louisa , 524 F. App'x 891 ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-1496
SLOAN PLEASANTS,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
TOWN OF LOUISA; ROBERT RIGSBY, sued in his individual capacity,
Defendants – Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Charlottesville. Norman K. Moon,
Senior District Judge. (3:11-cv-00032-NKM-BWC)
Argued: March 22, 2013 Decided: May 7, 2013
Before SHEDD, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and Joseph R. GOODWIN,
District Judge for the Southern District of West Virginia,
sitting by designation.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded by unpublished
opinion. Judge Shedd wrote the opinion in which Judge Floyd and
Judge Goodwin joined.
ARGUED: Jeffrey Edward Fogel, Steven David Rosenfield,
Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. Maurice Scott Fisher,
Jr., HARMAN, CLAYTOR, CORRIGAN & WELLMAN, Richmond, Virginia,
for Appellees. ON BRIEF: David P. Corrigan, Jeremy D. Capps,
HARMAN, CLAYTOR, CORRIGAN & WELLMAN, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
SHEDD, Circuit Judge:
Sloan Pleasants filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983, alleging that Officer Robert Rigsby unlawfully entered her
home and arrested her. The district court granted summary
judgment to Officer Rigsby on the unlawful-entry claim and
dismissed the false-arrest claim. We affirm the grant of
summary judgment on the unlawful-entry claim, reverse the
dismissal of the false-arrest claim, and remand the case for
further proceedings.
I.
A.
Before setting out the facts of this case, we pause to note
the peculiar procedural posture of this case. After the
defendants filed a motion to dismiss all of Pleasants’s claims,
the district court granted limited discovery on Pleasants’s
unlawful-entry claim. J.A. 16–17. The parties engaged in
discovery on this issue, but based on the depositions of
Pleasants and Officer Rigsby included in the Joint Appendix on
appeal, this discovery also encompassed testimony about the
false-arrest claim. See J.A. 55–63 (Pleasants’s deposition);
J.A. 115–18 (Rigsby’s deposition). Those parts of the
depositions related to the arrest, however, were never put
before the district court, which decided the unlawful-entry
claim under the summary judgment standard and the false-arrest
2
claim under the motion to dismiss standard. 1 J.A. 196–204
(unlawful-entry claim); J.A. 205–10 (false-arrest claim). Thus,
we can consider the developed record in evaluating the district
court’s decision to grant summary judgment on the unlawful-entry
claim, but in reviewing the district court’s decision to dismiss
the false-arrest claim, we are limited to the allegations in the
complaint, without any benefit of the facts developed in
discovery.
B.
We review the facts relevant to the unlawful-entry claim in
the light most favorable to Pleasants, the nonmoving party. See
Laing v. Fed. Express Corp., 703 F.3d 713, 714 (4th Cir. 2013).
On November 1, 2009, Kevin Pleasants, Pleasants’s ex-
husband, called the police and asked for an officer to go with
him to Pleasants’s home to pick up his eleven-year-old daughter,
K.P., who “was bawling . . . [and] hysterical on the phone with
him” because Pleasants was threatening to throw her out of the
house. J.A. 89. During this time, Mr. Pleasants was in a
custody battle with Pleasants over their daughter. Mr.
Pleasants wanted an officer to witness the interaction because
1
Had this evidence been before the district court when it
made its decision, we could have considered it on appeal and
evaluated the false-arrest claim under the summary judgment
standard. See Dean v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 395 F.3d 471, 474
(4th Cir. 2005).
3
Pleasants had accused him of having intimidated her in the past,
and he told the dispatcher that his ex-wife was “very violent”
and “possibly intoxicated.” J.A. 131–32. After Officer Rigsby
and Mr. Pleasants arrived at Pleasants’s house, Officer Rigsby
stood back, observing the conversation but not participating.
Pleasants initially refused to let K.P. leave with Mr. Pleasants
and shut the door, but K.P. eventually came out and left with
her father, to which Pleasants acquiesced. During these events,
Officer Rigsby could not hear all of the conversation, and
although he noticed that Pleasants had bloodshot eyes, he could
not detect that Pleasants had been drinking.
On December 13, 2009, Mr. Pleasants again called the police
to have an officer go with him to Pleasants’s house and perform
a “welfare check” on K.P. Mr. Pleasants had returned a missed
telephone call from K.P., but Pleasants would not let him speak
with K.P. During this call, Mr. Pleasants heard K.P. screaming
and crying in the background. Officer Rigsby again went with
Mr. Pleasants to Pleasants’s home. Pleasants opened the door
and told them both to leave. Mr. Pleasants said that he wanted
to see K.P., who was standing approximately ten feet inside the
doorway. As Pleasants was trying to close the door, Officer
Rigsby entered the house to talk to K.P. and check on her.
4
C.
In reviewing the allegations in the complaint relevant to
the false-arrest claim, “we accept as true all well-pleaded
allegations and view the complaint in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff.” Philips v. Pitt County Mem’l Hosp., 572 F.3d
176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009).
Two paragraphs in the complaint discuss the false arrest.
See J.A. 7–8 (¶¶ 12–13). Pleasants alleges that after Officer
Rigsby entered the house, he began to question K.P.
In response to one of [Officer] Rigsby’s
questions, [K.P.] stated that [Pleasants]
had slapped her on her leg where her arm was
resting. [K.P.] also told [Officer] Rigsby
that her mother grabbed her by her wrist and
told her to take a shower. [Officer] Rigsby
saw no welts or other indicia of even a mild
or minor physical injury.
J.A. 7–8 (¶¶ 12–13).
Based on those statements, Rigsby arrested Pleasants, and
she was charged with assault and battery against a family
member, in violation of Va. Code § 18.2-57.2. The charge was
ultimately dropped by the Commonwealth’s Attorney.
D.
Pleasants then filed this suit against the Town of Louisa
and Officer Rigsby. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, she sued
Officer Rigsby under theories of unlawful entry, false arrest,
and malicious prosecution; she also filed state-law claims of
5
malicious prosecution and gross negligence against him. She
sued the Town, pursuant to § 1983, for failure to train.
The Town and Officer Rigsby filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss the complaint. Before deciding this motion, the
district court granted limited discovery on the unlawful-entry
claim. After this limited discovery, the court dismissed all of
Pleasants’s claims. Pleasants now appeals the district court’s
decision to grant summary judgment to Officer Rigsby on the
unlawful-entry claim and to dismiss the false-arrest claim. 2
II.
Section 1983 “is designed to provide a comprehensive remedy
for the deprivation of constitutional rights.” Smith v. Hampton
Training Sch. for Nurses, 360 F.2d 577, 581 (4th Cir. 1966). To
state a claim under § 1983, “a plaintiff must establish three
elements . . . : (1) the deprivation of a right secured by the
Constitution or a federal statute; (2) by a person; (3) acting
under color of state law.” Jenkins v. Medford, 119 F.3d 1156,
1159-60 (4th Cir. 1997).
Not all violations of a plaintiff’s rights, however, will
subject a defendant to liability. The doctrine of qualified
2
Although Pleasants’s notice of appeal challenges the
district court’s entire decision, J.A. 220, she pursues only her
unlawful-entry and false-arrest claims on appeal, Appellant’s
Reply Br. at 11 n.4.
6
immunity protects government officials performing discretionary
functions “from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). It is
“an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of
litigation.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
Qualified immunity is a two-step inquiry “that asks first
whether a constitutional violation occurred and second whether
the right violated was clearly established.” Henry v. Purnell,
652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting Melgar v.
Greene, 593 F.3d 348, 353 (4th Cir. 2010)). We need not,
however, necessarily address these inquiries in that order.
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
III.
We first address Pleasants’s unlawful-entry claim. She
argues that Officer Rigsby is not entitled to qualified immunity
because his entry into her home on December 13, 2009, was not
justified by any exigency. We disagree.
A.
On this claim, the district court permitted limited
discovery and considered this evidence in holding that Officer
Rigsby was entitled to qualified immunity. When matters outside
the pleadings are considered, a motion to dismiss must be
7
treated as a motion for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(d). We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, “applying
the same legal standards as the district court.” Pueschel v.
Peters, 577 F.3d 558, 563 (4th Cir. 2009). Summary judgment
should be granted if “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law,” based on the “materials in the record.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56. At this stage, we must view all evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Rowzie v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 556 F.3d 165, 167 (4th Cir. 2009).
B.
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to
be secure in their . . . houses . . . against unreasonable
searches.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Because “the Fourth
Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house,” a
warrantless entry into a home by police is “presumptively
unreasonable.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 591, 586
(1980). A warrantless entry is permitted, however, in certain
instances “because the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth
Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’” Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart,
547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).
One such instance is exigent circumstances. Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474–75 (1971). One type of
exigency is the emergency-aid exception to the warrant
8
requirement, which allows police to enter a home “to protect an
occupant from imminent injury.” Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct.
1849, 1856 (2011) (quoting Brigham City, Utah, 547 U.S. at 403).
Courts have shown particular concern for emergency situations of
domestic violence, given their “combustible nature,” Tierney v.
Davidson, 133 F.3d 189, 197 (2d Cir. 1998), as well as for
children who may be in danger, see Hunsberger v. Wood, 570 F.3d
546, 555 (4th Cir. 2009) (relying in part on the fact that a
child was in a home in which she was not supposed to be in
holding that an officer reasonably believed that exigent
circumstances existed to enter that home); see also Doe v. Heck,
327 F.3d 492, 517 n.20 (7th Cir. 2003) (observing “that the
exigent circumstances exception . . . gives the State the
ability to take immediate action to ensure the physical safety
of a child suspected of abuse who is located on private
property”). In determining whether an officer’s entry into a
home was justified under this doctrine, “we ask whether the
circumstances known to [the officer] would create an
‘objectively reasonable belief that an emergency existed that
required immediate entry to render assistance or prevent harm to
persons or property within.’” Hunsberger, 570 F.3d at 555(quoting United States v. Moss, 963 F.2d 673, 678 (4th Cir.
1992)).
9
When Officer Rigsby went with Mr. Pleasants to Pleasants’s
home on the night of December 13, Officer Rigsby was making his
second visit to the home in six weeks because of circumstances
that placed the child in a volatile and potentially dangerous
situation. Despite Pleasants’s attempt to characterize her
behavior during the November incident as “cooperative, friendly,
and gracious in allowing her daughter to go with [Mr.
Pleasants],” Appellant’s Br. at 13, this incident was far more
contentious than that. Although Pleasants eventually acquiesced
in K.P. leaving with Mr. Pleasants, Officer Rigsby could have
reasonably viewed her shutting the door before K.P. finally
reopened the door to leave as hostility and a desire to keep
K.P. away from Mr. Pleasants, no matter K.P.’s safety or
condition.
On the night of December 13, Officer Rigsby was told that
K.P. was screaming and crying in the background of the telephone
and that Pleasants would not let Mr. Pleasants speak with K.P.
Mr. Pleasants explicitly requested that Officer Rigsby do a
welfare check on K.P., reflecting his concern about his
daughter. When Officer Rigsby arrived at the house and in
contrast to the November incident, Pleasants refused to let K.P.
speak with Officer Rigsby or Mr. Pleasants. This refusal left
Officer Rigsby unsure of K.P.’s well-being.
10
Ultimately, we need not decide whether these facts 3 created
an exigency permitting Officer Rigsby to enter Pleasants’s home
pursuant to the Fourth Amendment. Under the doctrine of
qualified immunity, an officer is not liable for his actions,
even if those actions would have actually violated the
Constitution, if no clearly established law prohibited those
actions. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.
Although courts have long held that the sanctity of the
home is “[a]t the very core” of the Fourth Amendment, Silverman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961), numerous recent
decisions have shown great concern for domestic violence, see,
e.g., Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 118–19 (2006), and for
children who may be in danger, see, e.g., Hunsberger, 570 F.3d
at 555; see also United States v. Taylor, 624 F.3d 626, 632 (4th
Cir. 2010) (“[T]he absence of responsible adult supervision of
children is an exigent circumstance justifying a warrantless
entry.” (quoting Georgia v. Peterson, 543 S.E.2d 692, 696 (Ga.
2001))). In the absence of caselaw addressing what
3
That much of what Officer Rigsby knew was told to him by
Pleasants’s ex-husband does not mean that Officer Rigsby could
not credit that information. The record reflects no reason why
Officer Rigsby should have disbelieved Mr. Pleasants’s
statements. Furthermore, given the dangers of domestic violence
and the need to protect children, that a police officer errs on
the side of believing a statement and subsequently checking on
the child is often the preferable choice.
11
circumstances are sufficient to constitute an exigency under the
emergency-aid exception to allow police to check on a child,
Officer Rigsby cannot be charged with having notice that the
emergency-aid exception was unjustified here. See Robles v.
Prince George’s County, Md., 302 F.3d 262, 270-71 (4th Cir.
2002) (“Although notice does not require that the ‘very action
in question has previously been held unlawful,’ it does mean
that ‘in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be
apparent.’” (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615
(1999))).
Because no clearly established law prohibited Officer
Rigsby’s warrantless entry into the home to ensure K.P.’s well-
being, the district court properly granted summary judgment to
Officer Rigsby on this claim.
IV.
We turn now to Pleasants’s false-arrest claim. Pleasants
argues that Officer Rigsby is not entitled to qualified immunity
based solely on the allegations in the complaint because under
Virginia law, a parent is allowed to use corporal punishment on
a child, meaning that any touching of a child by a parent cannot
automatically create probable cause for arrest. We agree.
A.
Unlike the unlawful-entry claim, the district court
dismissed this claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12
12(b)(6), looking only at the allegations in the complaint. 4 We
review the grant of a motion to dismiss de novo. Decohen v.
Capital One, N.A., 703 F.3d 216, 222 (4th Cir. 2012). “To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)).
B.
The Fourth Amendment also protects “[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable
. . . seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. An arrest is a seizure
under the Fourth Amendment, and such a seizure is reasonable
only if based on probable cause. Wilson v. Kittoe, 337 F.3d
392, 398 (4th Cir. 2003). Probable cause “to justify an arrest
means facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge
that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of
reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown,
that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to
commit an offense.” Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37
(1979). Whether probable cause exists must be determined “in
4
At oral argument, Officer Rigsby insisted that this is the
proper procedural posture of this case.
13
the light of all of the surrounding circumstances.” Porterfield
v. Lott, 156 F.3d 563, 569 (4th Cir. 1998). In determining what
amounts to probable cause, we have noted that “[p]robable cause
requires more than ‘bare suspicion’ but requires less than
evidence necessary to convict.” Id.Virginia maintains the common-law definition of assault and
battery. Montague v. Virginia, 684 S.E.2d 583, 588–89 (Va.
2009). Thus, the slightest touching may be sufficient to
constitute a battery. Lynch v. Virginia, 109 S.E. 427, 428 (Va.
1921). Yet Virginia allows parents to use corporal punishment
with children, although that “right cannot be used as a cloak
for the exercise of uncontrolled passion, and that such person
may be criminally liable for assault and battery if he inflicts
corporal punishment which exceeds the bounds of due moderation.”
Harbaugh v. Virginia, 167 S.E.2d 329, 332 (Va. 1969). Given
this parental right, some touching of a child by a parent—even
if such a touching between people without a parent-child
relationship could be a battery—must be legally permissible.
This conclusion requires us to reject Officer Rigsby’s
contention that any touching by a parent of a child creates
probable cause for an officer to arrest the parent and then a
14
jury is left to determine whether that force was excessive. 5
Such a position is legally untenable in light of Virginia law.
A parent often must use de minimis force to reprimand or even
protect his children, and such force cannot always lead to the
possibility that a police officer can arrest the parent. We do
not attempt to define here what level of force must be used by a
parent to create probable cause for arrest, for such
determinations are typically fact-specific. We simply state for
purposes of this case that the application of de minimus force
by a parent does not automatically create probable cause for
arrest.
Turning to the facts alleged in the complaint, Pleasants
has stated a plausible claim for relief. The complaint alleges
that Officer Rigsby knew Pleasants touched her daughter twice—a
slap on the hand and a grab of the wrist. It also alleges that
Officer Rigsby saw no visible injuries on K.P. Based on these
allegations alone, Pleasants has pled a plausible claim that
Officer Rigsby lacked probable cause to arrest her. Virginia
5
Officer Rigsby’s reliance on Va. Code § 19.2-81.3(B),
which requires an officer to arrest a person who the officer
believes has violated Va. Code § 18.2-57.2, is misplaced.
Section 19.2-81.3(B) still requires the officer to have probable
cause for arrest. As we explain here, probable cause cannot
always exist solely from a witness’s statement without any more
context because Virginia recognizes the right of corporal
punishment, thereby permitting some level of physical force
against the child by the parent.
15
law permits some physical contact of a child by a parent, and
without more factual development of the details of Pleasants’s
contact with K.P., Pleasants’s allegations can support a claim
that contact as described in the complaint is permissible under
Virginia law. Thus, at this stage, we cannot say that Officer
Rigsby did not violate Pleasants’s constitutional right to be
free from arrest without probable cause.
Furthermore, we cannot say, based on the complaint’s
allegations, that Officer Rigsby’s decision to arrest Pleasants
did not violate clearly established law. Virginia expressly
allows some degree of corporal punishment by a parent.
Harbaugh, 167 S.E.2d at 332 (stating that “parents or persons
standing in loco parentis may administer such reasonable and
timely punishment as may be necessary to correct faults in a
growing child”). At this stage, Pleasants has pled a plausible
claim that, based on Virginia law allowing corporal punishment
and in the absence of more factual context for Pleasants’s use
of force, probable cause for her arrest was so lacking that
Officer Rigsby violated her clearly established right not to be
arrested without probable cause. See Henderson v. Simms, 223
F.3d 267, 273 (4th Cir. 2000) (“This Court has held that the
Fourth Amendment right to be arrested only on probable cause is
clearly established.”). Thus, Officer Rigsby is not entitled to
qualified immunity at this point. See Pinder v. Johnson, 54
16
F.3d 1169, 1173 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (“Where the law is
clearly established, and where no reasonable officer could
believe he was acting in accordance with it, qualified immunity
will not attach.”).
On these pleadings, Pleasants has stated a claim for false
arrest, and on the limited record before us, Officer Rigsby is
not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. Therefore,
the district court erred in dismissing the false-arrest claim. 6
V.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the grant of summary
judgment to Officer Rigsby on the unlawful-entry claim, reverse
the dismissal of the false-arrest claim, and remand the case for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
REVERSED IN PART,
AND REMANDED
6
Of course, whether Pleasants will ultimately prevail on
this claim is a different question. On remand, Officer Rigsby
may present to the district court evidence from discovery
relating to the false-arrest claim and move for summary
judgment. The district court would then evaluate Pleasants’s
claim in light of this more developed factual record.
17