Cornelius Corey v. Faye Daniels , 626 F. App'x 414 ( 2015 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 15-6707
    CORNELIUS MAURICE COREY,
    Plaintiff – Appellant,
    v.
    FAYE DANIELS; MICHAEL T.          GIBBS;   ERNEST   RIGGS;   ALICE
    MUSSARI; DARRELL HOPKINS,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Fox, Senior
    District Judge. (5:14-ct-03265-F)
    Submitted:   September 24, 2015             Decided:   October 6, 2015
    Before DUNCAN, AGEE, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished
    per curiam opinion.
    Cornelius Maurice Corey, Appellant Pro Se.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Cornelius Maurice Corey appeals the district court’s order
    dismissing his 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     (2012) complaint as frivolous
    pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B) (2012), and dismissing his
    amended     claims      without     prejudice         for     failure     to    exhaust.
    Because    we    conclude    that       the       amended    claims     were    dismissed
    prematurely,      we     vacate     in        part     and     remand     for    further
    proceedings.
    “Whether a district court properly required a plaintiff to
    exhaust [his] administrative remedies before bringing suit in
    federal court is a question of law” that this Court reviews de
    novo.     Talbot v. Lucy Corr. Nursing Home, 
    118 F.3d 215
    , 218 (4th
    Cir. 1997).      The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires
    a   prisoner     to    exhaust    his    available          administrative      remedies
    before filing an action under § 1983.                         42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)
    (2012); Woodford v. Ngo, 
    548 U.S. 81
    , 83-85 (2006); Porter v.
    Nussle,    
    534 U.S. 516
    ,     532    (2002).        Such    exhaustion       must   be
    “proper”; that is, the prisoner must “us[e] all steps that the
    agency holds out[] and do[] so properly.”                     Woodford, 
    548 U.S. at 90
     (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted).
    Under the PLRA, failure to exhaust administrative remedies
    is an affirmative defense, which an inmate is not required to
    plead or demonstrate in his complaint.                      Jones v. Bock, 
    549 U.S. 199
    , 216 (2007).          Rather, the defendant bears the burden to
    2
    establish a prisoner’s failure to exhaust.                        Moore v. Bennette,
    
    517 F.3d 717
    ,    725    (4th     Cir.       2008).      A   district     court    is
    permitted      to     address    the    issue        of     exhaustion   sua    sponte,
    however, and may dismiss the complaint without input from the
    defendant, if the “failure to exhaust is apparent from the face
    of the complaint,” and the inmate is provided an opportunity to
    respond on the exhaustion issue.                    Anderson v. XYZ Corr. Health
    Servs., Inc., 
    407 F.3d 674
    , 682 (4th Cir.                     2005).
    Our review of the record indicates that failure to exhaust
    the amended claims is not clear from the face of Corey’s amended
    complaint and attachments, which include copies of a grievance
    and related documents.               Further, there is no indication that
    Corey was given an opportunity to respond regarding exhaustion.
    Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s dismissal of the
    amended   claims       and    remand    for       further    proceedings     consistent
    with this opinion.            We express no opinion regarding the merits
    of the claims.         We affirm the dismissal of the claims set forth
    in the original complaint for the reasons stated by the district
    court.    Corey v. Daniels, No. 5:14-ct-03265-F (E.D.N.C. Apr. 27,
    2015).       Finally,    we     dispense      with    oral    argument     because     the
    facts    and   legal     contentions       are      adequately     presented     in    the
    3
    materials   before   this   Court   and   argument   would   not   aid   the
    decisional process.
    AFFIRMED IN PART,
    VACATED IN PART,
    AND REMANDED
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