United States v. Howard ( 2011 )

FILED: January 14, 2011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-4487
(CR-03-141)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
QUANTAS LEE HOWARD,
Defendant - Appellant.
O R D E R
Upon consideration of the submissions filed relative to the
motion to amend the opinion, the Court grants the motion. The
opinion filed March 28, 2005, is modified by replacing the name
of the driver of the vehicle mentioned in the opinion with her
initials.
For the Court – By Direction
/s/ Patricia S. Connor
Clerk
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
_______________
No. 04-4487
_______________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
QUANTAS LEE HOWARD,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Roanoke. James C. Turk, Senior
District Judge. (CR-03-141)
_______________
Submitted: February 18, 2005 Decided: March 28, 2005
_______________
Before LUTTIG and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
_______________
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
_______________
Gary L. Lumsden, Rhonda Lee Overstreet, LUMSDEN, OVERSTREET &
HANSEN, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellant. John L. Brownlee,
United States Attorney, R. Andrew Bassford, Assistant United
States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.
_______________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Quantas Lee Howard appeals the denial of a motion to
suppress evidence obtained in a search of a vehicle in which he
was a passenger. Finding no error, we affirm.
I.
On September 19, 2003, government agents and local
police were conducting an interdiction operation at the Roanoke
City bus terminal. During this operation, officers observed a
car driven by J.Y., in which Howard was a passenger, enter the
parking area of the bus terminal. The car pulled alongside a
red minivan while the occupants of both cars engaged in
conversation. One individual gestured toward the police and
then both cars prepared to leave. At this time, an individual,
later identified as Shawn Collins, was seen exiting the van and
walking away from the bus terminal with his luggage. The
officers thought this behavior was suspicious so they pursued
him and eventually found a concealed weapon in Collins=s
possession. Howard, who was also observed exiting J.Y.=s car and
walking away from the station, approached the area of Collins=s
detention. Howard stood next to a plain clothes officer, Agent
Bonaventura, and appeared interested in Collins=s detention and
nervous. Howard admitted to Bonaventura that he and Collins
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were friends. When Collins=s weapon was discovered, Howard
expressed surprise, stating AOh, damn!,@ and then began walking
away.
At this time, Bonaventura identified himself as a DEA
agent and asked to speak with Howard. Howard denied having any
identification and reported his name to be AGregory Omar Thomas.@
He then produced a school transcript bearing that same name.
However, the social security number Howard told police did not
match the number listed on the transcript.* Both Bonaventura and
another officer reported that Howard appeared nervous and had a
change in breathing rate while talking to the officers.
Bonaventura concluded that Howard was trying to conceal his
identity and proceeded to pat him down for weapons. Bonaventura
felt a hard object in Howard=s front pants pocket. The item
turned out to be a marijuana pipe. At this point, Bonaventura
turned Howard over to the local police, who transported him to
*
Howard further asserts that the Government=s evidence
regarding the identifying information Howard allegedly gave to
police and how it appeared suspicious is in conflict. He
appears to be attacking the credibility of the officers for
giving conflicting testimony. However, the court specifically
stated that its determination of reasonable suspicion was based
on Bonaventura=s testimony. A review of the testimony offered at
the suppression hearing does not support a conclusion that the
district court=s credibility finding was clearly erroneous.
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the police station. While at the station, the police determined
Howard=s actual identity and that he was a convicted felon wanted
on state probation violation warrants.
While agents were dealing with Howard, ATF Agent
Whorley observed J.Y.=s car parked across the street from the bus
terminal. He approached J.Y. and asked for permission to search
her car. J.Y. consented. When Whorley asked about the luggage
and book bag in the back seat, J.Y. indicated that the items
belonged to Howard. Whorley then proceeded to search the book
bag and found a handgun and notebook inside. The notebook
contained Howard=s actual name.
Howard was subsequently indicted for one count of
possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
' 922(g)(1) (2000). Howard moved unsuccessfully to suppress the
gun both on the grounds that police lacked reasonable suspicion
to stop Howard originally and that the search of his book bag
was unconstitutional. The court ruled that Howard was properly
seized and searched because Bonaventura had articulable
reasonable suspicion to believe that Howard was involved in
criminal activity. The court further held that Howard did not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his book bag, which
was left in J.Y.=s car, and therefore had no standing to
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challenge the search. Following the denial of his motion to
suppress, Howard entered a conditional plea of guilty to
possession of a firearm by a felon and was sentenced to forty-
six months incarceration.
II.
Howard first argues that the district court erred in
ruling that his initial detention by Bonaventura was
constitutionally permissible. We disagree.
A police officer may stop and briefly detain a person
for investigative purposes provided that there is reasonable
suspicion, based on articulable facts and in light of his
experience, that criminal activity may be afoot. Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). In reviewing rulings on suppression
motions, we review fact findings, including credibility
determinations, for clear error and the application of the law
to those facts de novo. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S.
690, 699 (1996); United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 398 (4th
Cir. 2000).
In challenging the determination of the district court
that there was reasonable suspicion, Howard argues that his
behavior prior to his detention was insufficient to create a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Various officers
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testified that the following behaviors were suspicious: (1)
driving into a bus terminal and exiting quickly once uniformed
police were spotted; (2) nervous concern for Collins; (3)
Howard=s exclamation when the police found Collins=s gun; (4)
walking away from the bus station at which he had just arrived;
and (5) Howard=s inability to confirm elements of his own
identity. The district court found these facts to be true based
on the credibility of Bonaventura. It is the role of the fact
finder to observe witnesses and weigh their credibility during a
pretrial motion to suppress, and this court accords great
deference to those findings. United States v. Murray, 65 F.3d
1161, 1169 (4th Cir. 1995). A thorough review of the testimony
offered at the suppression hearing does not support a conclusion
that the district court=s credibility finding was clearly
erroneous. Furthermore, we find that the behavior described in
these circumstances is sufficient to meet the reasonable
suspicion standard. Accordingly, we find that Howard=s initial
seizure and search were proper.
III.
Howard next contends that the search of his book bag,
located in J.Y.=s car, was unconstitutional because he had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his belongings. We
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disagree. The privacy interest that must be established to
support standing is an interest in the area searched, not just
an interest in the items found. United States v. Manbeck, 744
F.2d 360, 374 (4th Cir. 1984). Ownership of the seized items is
by itself insufficient to confer a privacy interest in the area
searched. Id.
In challenging the determination of the district court
that there was no privacy interest, Howard relies on this court=s
holdings in United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868 (4th Cir.
1992) and United States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535 (4th Cir. 1978).
Howard asserts that under Rusher, an individual can have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in goods found in a vehicle if
he asserts a right of ownership to those goods. However, in
Rusher, only the driver, who presumably had legitimate
possession of the vehicle, was found to have a privacy interest
in the goods found in the vehicle. Id. at 877. We held that the
passengers in the vehicle did not have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the vehicle or its contents. Id. Furthermore, an
ownership or possessory interest in seized goods is not
dispositive as to whether there is a reasonable expectation of
privacy. Id. The privacy interest that must be established to
support standing is an interest in the area searched, not just
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an interest in the items found. Manbeck, 744 F.2d at 374. This
court has held that a Aperson who cannot assert a legitimate
claim to a vehicle cannot reasonably expect that the vehicle is
a private repository for his personal effects, whether or not
they are enclosed in some sort of a container . . . .@ United
States v. Hargrove, 647 F.2d 411, 412 (4th Cir. 1981). We find
that Howard, as a passenger in J.Y.’s car, cannot assert a
legitimate claim to the vehicle. Therefore, we find that Howard
did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
belongings left behind in J.Y.=s car. Accordingly, the search
and seizure was proper.
IV.
In sum, we affirm the district court order denying
suppression of the evidence recovered because (1) Howard=s
initial detention was permissible; and (2) Howard lacks standing
to challenge the search of goods found in J.Y.=s car. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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