Fisher v. Maryland Department of Public Safety & Correctional Services ( 2012 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-1627
VANESSA FISHER,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONAL
SERVICES, an agency of the State of Maryland; KATHLEEN S.
GREEN,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, Senior District
Judge. (1:10-cv-00206-JFM)
Submitted: January 5, 2012 Decided: January 12, 2012
Before WILKINSON, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Robin R. Cockey, COCKEY, BRENNAN & MALONEY, PC, Salisbury,
Maryland, for Appellant. Douglas F. Gansler, Attorney General,
Lisa O. Arnquist, Assistant Attorney General, Pikesville,
Maryland, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Vanessa Fisher appeals the district court’s order
granting summary judgment on her employment discrimination
claim, brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006). Fisher
filed suit after she was terminated following an altercation
with a fellow correctional officer. On appeal, Fisher contends
that the district court erred in failing to apply the
mixed-motive framework for discrimination claims and to deny
Appellees’ motion for summary judgment on that basis. We
affirm.
We review de novo a district court’s order granting
summary judgment, viewing the facts and drawing reasonable
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Bonds v. Leavitt, 629 F.3d 369, 380 (4th Cir.
2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 398 (2011). Summary judgment
shall be granted when “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A district court should grant
summary judgment unless a “reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party” on the evidence presented. See
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An
otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment will
not be defeated by the existence of some factual dispute;
2
“[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the
suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of
summary judgment.” Id. Mere conclusory allegations and bare
denials are insufficient to support the nonmoving party’s case.
Erwin v. United States, 591 F.3d 313, 319-20 (4th Cir. 2010).
A plaintiff may establish a claim of intentional
discrimination sufficient to avoid summary judgment through two
avenues: a mixed-motive framework, in which “it is sufficient
for the [plaintiff] to demonstrate that the employer was
motivated to take the adverse employment action by both
permissible and forbidden reasons,” or (2) the McDonnell Douglas 1
pretext framework, in which a plaintiff “after establishing a
prima facie case of discrimination, demonstrates that the
employer’s proffered permissible reason for taking an adverse
employment action is actually a pretext for discrimination.”
Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277,
284-85 (4th Cir. 2004). Under a mixed-motive analysis, the
employee does not have to demonstrate that the prohibited
discrimination was the sole motivating factor to prevail, so
long as it was a motivating factor. Id. at 284. “Regardless of
. . . whether [a plaintiff] proceeds under a mixed-motive or
single-motive theory, ‘[t]he ultimate question in every
1
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
3
employment discrimination case involving a claim of disparate
treatment is whether the plaintiff was the victim of intentional
discrimination.’” Id. at 286 (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 153 (2000)).
Although the district court did not examine Fisher’s
claim under the mixed-motive framework, it did not commit
reversible error. In deciding to terminate Fisher, Appellees
credited four consistent reports that Fisher, with only minor
provocation, violently assaulted a fellow correctional officer.
Even assuming Fisher’s account of the incident is accurate, she
cannot succeed on a mixed-motive framework, as she failed to
produce any evidence that Appellees’ decision was based on race.
We thus affirm the district court’s order. 2 We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
2
We may affirm for any grounds apparent from the record.
See MM ex rel. DM v. Sch. Dist. of Greenville Cnty., 303 F.3d
523, 536 (4th Cir. 2002).
4