United States v. Ketae Robbins , 502 F. App'x 335 ( 2013 )


Menu:
  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 12-4478
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    KETAE JEMEL ROBBINS,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
    District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles,
    District Judge. (1:11-cr-00339-CCE-2)
    Submitted:   December 17, 2012            Decided:   January 3, 2013
    Before MOTZ, SHEDD, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Milton Bays Shoaf, Jr., ADDISON & SHOAF, Salisbury, North
    Carolina, for Appellant. Sandra Jane Hairston, Assistant United
    States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Ketae      Jemel       Robbins         appeals         his      conviction      and
    sentence at the low end of his Guidelines range after pleading
    guilty to conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine
    hydrochloride.            Robbins’s attorney has filed a brief pursuant
    to Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967), asserting, in his
    opinion, that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but
    raising       the    issue     of    whether         the    district         court    “erred    by
    sentencing          defendant        to    188       months          based     upon    all     the
    circumstances of the case, including his motion for a [four]
    point reduction in sentencing level and departure, and whether
    the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 would operate to reduce his
    sentence.”           Robbins        has   filed       a    pro       se    supplemental      brief
    raising the issues of whether the district court erred or abused
    its    discretion         in   sentencing        him       as    a    career    offender,      and
    whether his counsel was ineffective at sentencing.                               We affirm.
    We    review     a    sentence        under       a    deferential      abuse-of-
    discretion standard.                Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 51
    (2007).        The first step in this review requires us to ensure
    that    the    district        court      committed         no       significant      procedural
    error,    such       as    improperly      calculating               the    Guidelines    range,
    failing to consider the 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) (2006) factors, or
    failing to adequately explain the sentence.                                  United States v.
    Carter, 
    564 F.3d 325
    , 328 (4th Cir. 2009).                                 If the sentence is
    2
    procedurally        reasonable,      we       then    consider        the     substantive
    reasonableness of the sentence imposed, taking into account the
    totality    of   the    circumstances.              Gall,    
    552 U.S. at 51
    .      We
    presume that a sentence within or below a properly calculated
    Guidelines range is substantively reasonable.                        United States v.
    Susi, 
    674 F.3d 278
    , 289 (4th Cir. 2012).
    In      sentencing,      the          district     court       should       first
    calculate     the      Guidelines       range        and     give    the     parties      an
    opportunity      to     argue     for         whatever        sentence        they      deem
    appropriate.        United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 
    597 F.3d 212
    ,
    216 (4th Cir. 2010).            The district court should then consider
    the   §   3553(a)     factors   to   determine            whether    they    support     the
    sentence    requested     by    either     party.           Id.      When    rendering      a
    sentence, the district court must make and place on the record
    an individualized assessment based on the particular facts of
    the case.    Carter, 
    564 F.3d at 328, 330
    .
    In   explaining       the     chosen      sentence,        the    “sentencing
    judge should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court
    that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned
    basis      for       exercising         his         own      legal      decisionmaking
    authority.”      Rita v. United States, 
    551 U.S. 338
    , 356 (2007).
    While a district court must consider the statutory factors and
    explain its sentence, it need not discuss every factor on the
    3
    record.       United States v. Johnson, 
    445 F.3d 339
    , 345 (4th Cir.
    2006).
    We     have     reviewed      the      record     and       conclude      that
    Robbins’s sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable,
    and the district court did not err or abuse its discretion in
    sentencing him.           To the extent that he challenges the district
    court’s denial of a downward departure, we lack authority to
    review the denial.             See United States v. Brewer, 
    520 F.3d 367
    ,
    371    (4th    Cir.    2008).       Finally,       because      the    record     does    not
    conclusively show ineffective assistance of counsel, this issue
    may    not    be    raised     on   direct    appeal.          See    United     States    v.
    Baptiste, 
    596 F.3d 214
    , 216-17 n.1 (4th Cir. 2010).
    In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
    record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
    appeal.        We    therefore      affirm      the    district       court’s    judgment.
    This court requires that counsel inform his or her client, in
    writing, of his or her right to petition the Supreme Court of
    the United States for further review.                      If the client requests
    that    a    petition     be   filed,     but    counsel       believes      that   such    a
    petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court
    for leave to withdraw from representation.                             Counsel’s motion
    must state that a copy thereof was served on the client.
    We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
    legal       contentions      are    adequately        presented       in   the   materials
    4
    before   the   court   and   argument   would   not   aid   the   decisional
    process.
    AFFIRMED
    5