Elmira Wheatley v. Edward Cohn ( 2015 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 14-1862
    ELMIRA WHEATLEY; BRETT LEWIS WHEATLEY,
    Plaintiffs – Appellants,
    v.
    EDWARD S. COHN; STEPHEN N. GOLDBERG; RICHARD E. SOLOMON;
    RICHARD J. ROGERS; RANDALL J. ROLLS; FLAGSTAR BANK;
    MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, (MERS); ST. FIN
    CORP., d/b/a Star Financial, a California Corporation,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
    Maryland, at Baltimore. George L. Russell, III, District Judge.
    (1:13-cv-03850-GLR)
    Submitted:   February 19, 2015             Decided:   March 5, 2015
    Before SHEDD, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
    Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Elmira Wheatley, Brett Lewis Wheatley, Appellants Pro Se.
    Michael J. McKeefery, Richard J. Rogers, COHN, GOLDBERG &
    DEUTSCH,   LLC,  Towson, Maryland;   Christine  Marie  Debevec,
    STRADLEY RONON STEVENS & YOUNG LLP, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania;
    John Alexander Nader, STRADLEY RONON STEVENS & YOUNG LLP,
    Washington, D.C.; Michael Lichtenstein, Benjamin Powell Smith,
    SHULMAN, ROGERS, GANDAL, PORDY & ECKER, PA, Potomac, Maryland,
    for Appellees.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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    PER CURIAM:
    Elmira       Wheatley         and         Brett      Lewis        Wheatley
    (“Appellants”)       seek   to    appeal       the    district        court’s   order
    dismissing    this    action     raising     numerous      claims     related   to    a
    foreclosure action.         Appellees move to dismiss the appeal as
    untimely, and the Wheatleys have replied to the motion.                              We
    grant   Appellees’     motion     and    dismiss     the     appeal    for   lack    of
    jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was not timely filed.
    “[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil
    case is a jurisdictional requirement.”                  Bowles v. Russell, 
    551 U.S. 205
    , 214 (2007).          Generally, a party has 30 days after the
    entry of the district court’s final judgment or order to notice
    an appeal.     See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A).                  The notice period
    may be extended or reopened by the district court.                      See Fed. R.
    App. P. 4(a)(5), (6).
    The   district        court       entered       an   order     dismissing
    granting Appellees’ motion to dismiss on May 30, 2014; so the
    notice period ended on June 30, 2014.                  Because Appellants filed
    their notice of appeal of this order on July 25, 2014, their
    notice of appeal was untimely.
    Additionally, the district court did not extend the
    notice period and the district court could not have reopened the
    notice period.       First, a district court may extend the notice
    period if two requirements are satisfied: (1) the party seeking
    3
    an extension moves for the extension “no later than 30 days”
    after the close of the notice period and (2) “that party shows
    excusable    neglect       or     good        cause.”         Fed.      R.     App.    P.
    4(a)(5)(A)(i)–(ii).             Here,     Appellants         satisfied       the   first
    requirement.      Their motion for an extension was due on July 30,
    2014; and they filed this motion on July 23, 2014.                       However, the
    district    court      determined        Appellants       did     not        demonstrate
    excusable neglect or good cause for an extension. Appellants
    have not appealed the district court’s denial of this motion, so
    we   decline      to      review        the       district      court’s        decision.
    Accordingly, the notice period was not extended.
    Second, we may construe an untimely notice of appeal
    as a motion to reopen the time to notice an appeal if an excuse
    for the untimeliness is offered.                  See United States v. Akinkoye,
    16 F. App’x 179 (4th Cir. 2001) (per curiam).                    Regardless of any
    excuse offered by Appellants, the district court could not have
    reopened    the   notice    period.           The   notice    period     may    only   be
    reopened    if    three    conditions         are    satisfied:      (1)     the   party
    seeking to reopen the period did not receive notice “of the
    entry of the judgment or order sought to be appealed within 21
    days after entry”; (2) “the motion is filed within 180 days
    after the judgment or order is entered or within 14 days after
    the moving party receives notice . . . of the entry, whichever
    is earlier”; and (3) “the court finds that no party would be
    4
    prejudiced.”     Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6)(A)–(C).            It is clear that
    Appellants cannot satisfy the second condition.
    At     the    latest,   Appellants     received     notice    of    the
    district court’s order on June 24, 2014 -- the date on the
    certificate    of      service    accompanying     their     motion     seeking
    clarification of the order, which indicates Appellants’ receipt
    of the order.        So at the latest, Appellants were required to
    move to reopen by July 8, 2014.            Neither their motion nor their
    untimely notice were filed before this deadline.                 Accordingly,
    the district court could not have reopened the notice period.
    Because      Appellants    failed    to   file   a   timely   notice    of
    appeal or to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal
    period, we dismiss the appeal.             We dispense with oral argument
    because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
    in the materials before this court and argument would not aid
    the decisional process.
    DISMISSED
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Document Info

Docket Number: 14-1862

Judges: Floyd, Per Curiam, Shedd, Thacker

Filed Date: 3/5/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024