United States v. Maurice Melvin ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4857
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MAURICE LASHAWN MELVIN, a/k/a Maurice Leshawn Melvin,
Defendant - Appellant.
On Remand from the Supreme Court of the United States.
(S. Ct. No. 14-6510)
Submitted: October 20, 2015 Decided: October 26, 2015
Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Eric J. Brignac,
OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North Carolina,
for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney,
Jennifer P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United
States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Maurice Lashawn Melvin pled guilty, pursuant to a written
plea agreement, to possessing a firearm after being convicted of
a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924 (2012).
He was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) to
159 months in prison. On appeal, Melvin argued that the
sentencing court erred in determining that his two prior North
Carolina convictions for conspiracy to commit robbery with a
dangerous weapon constituted predicate offenses under the ACCA.
We rejected the argument because it was foreclosed by this
court’s decision in United States v. White, 571 F.3d 365, 371
(4th Cir. 2009) (holding North Carolina conviction for
conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon constitutes
a predicate violent felony under ACCA). Accordingly, we
affirmed Melvin’s sentence. See United States v. Melvin, 577
F. App’x 179 (4th Cir. 2014) (No. 13-4857).
On June 30, 2015, the Supreme Court granted Melvin’s
petition for a writ of certiorari, vacated the judgment, and
remanded to this court for further consideration in light of
Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). In Johnson,
the Supreme Court held that the residual clause of the ACCA—the
final clause of § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2012)—is unconstitutionally
vague. 135 S. Ct. at 2557 (“[T]he indeterminacy of the wide-
ranging inquiry required by the residual clause both denies fair
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notice to defendants and invites arbitrary enforcement by
judges. Increasing a defendant’s sentence under the clause
denies due process of law.”).
Melvin now argues, and the Government concedes, that under
Johnson Melvin’s conspiracy convictions no longer support his
ACCA sentence. Without these convictions, Melvin does not have
three predicate offenses to qualify him as an armed career
criminal. Accordingly, we grant the Government’s unopposed
motion to vacate the judgment and remand the case to the
district court for resentencing. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before this court and argument would not aid in
the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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