United States v. Makum McCollum , 602 F. App'x 573 ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4612
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
MAKUM LAMONT MCCOLLUM,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge.
(4:13-cr-01012-RBH-1)
Submitted: February 12, 2015 Decided: February 25, 2015
Before KEENAN, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
William F. Nettles, IV, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
Florence, South Carolina, for Appellant. Alfred William Walker
Bethea, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Makum Lamont McCollum appeals from his conviction and
151-month sentence imposed pursuant to his guilty plea to
distribution of crack cocaine. On appeal, counsel has filed a
brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
stating that he had found no meritorious grounds for appeal but
questioning whether the district court complied with Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11 and whether the district court’s sentence was
reasonable. Although advised of his right to do so, McCollum
did not file a supplemental pro se brief. The Government also
declined to file a brief. After a thorough review of the
record, we affirm.
Prior to accepting a guilty plea, the trial court must
conduct a plea colloquy in which it informs the defendant of,
and determines that the defendant understands, the nature of the
charge to which he is pleading guilty, any mandatory minimum
penalty, the maximum possible penalty he faces, and the various
rights he is relinquishing by pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P.
11(b)(1); United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir.
1991). The district court also must ensure that the defendant’s
plea is voluntary, was supported by a sufficient factual basis,
and did not result from force, threats, or promises not
contained in the plea agreement. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2),
(3); DeFusco, 949 F.2d at 119-20.
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Because McCollum did not move to withdraw his guilty plea
in the district court or otherwise preserve any allegation of
Rule 11 error, the plea colloquy is reviewed for plain error.
United States v. General, 278 F.3d 389, 393 (4th Cir. 2002).
Our review of the record reveals that the district court fully
complied with Rule 11 in accepting McCollum’s guilty plea during
a thorough hearing. Accordingly, his plea was knowing and
voluntary, and, consequently, final and binding. See United
States v. Lambey, 974 F.2d 1389, 1394 (4th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
We review McCollum’s sentence for reasonableness, applying
a deferential abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007). We first ensure that the
district court committed no “‘significant procedural error,’”
including improper calculation of the Sentencing Guidelines
range, insufficient consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2012) factors, or inadequate explanation of the sentence
imposed. United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575 (4th Cir.
2010) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). During the district
court’s explanation of a selected sentence, while it must
consider the statutory factors and explain the sentence, it need
not “robotically tick” through every § 3353(a) factor on the
record, particularly when imposing a sentence within the
properly calculated Guidelines range. United States v. Johnson,
445 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006). At the same time, the
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district court “must make an individualized assessment based on
the facts presented.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. “This
individualized assessment need not be elaborate or lengthy, but
it must provide a rationale tailored to the particular case at
hand and adequate to permit meaningful appellate review.”
United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the parties agreed that the Guidelines were
appropriately calculated. Further, the district court provided
adequate explanation of its sentence. The court noted the
seriousness of McCollum’s conduct, his past criminal history,
and the need for deterrence. The court explicitly stated that
it considered both the statutory factors and McCollum’s
arguments for a variance and concluded that a sentence at the
bottom of the Guidelines range was appropriate. We therefore
conclude that the sentence is procedurally reasonable.
When we find a sentence procedurally reasonable, we then
must examine its substantive reasonableness, considering “the
totality of the circumstances.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. The
sentence imposed must be “sufficient, but not greater than
necessary” to satisfy the purposes of sentencing. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a). A within-Guidelines sentence is presumed reasonable
on appeal, and the defendant bears the burden to “rebut the
presumption by demonstrating that the sentence is unreasonable
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when measured against the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v.
Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Here, McCollum’s sentence was within his Guidelines range.
While the court did not grant McCollum’s request for a variance,
the court reasonably explained that McCollum’s conduct was
serious and that a longer sentence was advisable to deter any
further criminal conduct. The record does not provide any basis
to overcome the presumption of reasonableness. Thus, we find
that the court’s sentence was substantively reasonable.
Our review pursuant to Anders has revealed no meritorious
issues for review. Accordingly, we affirm McCollum’s conviction
and sentence. This Court requires that counsel inform McCollum
in writing of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If McCollum requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, then counsel may move this Court for leave
to withdraw from representation. Counsel's motion must state
that a copy thereof was served on McCollum. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this Court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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