United States v. Nakia Keller , 525 F. App'x 243 ( 2013 )


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  •                              UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 12-4753
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    NAKIA HEATH KELLER,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
    District of Virginia, at Harrisonburg.    Glen E. Conrad, Chief
    District Judge. (5:10-cr-00015-GEC-JGW-2)
    Submitted:   May 15, 2013                       Decided:   May 30, 2013
    Before KING and    SHEDD,   Circuit   Judges,   and   HAMILTON,   Senior
    Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam
    opinion.
    Gregory B. English, THE ENGLISH LAW FIRM, PLLC, Alexandria,
    Virginia, for Appellant.   Jeb Thomas Terrien, Assistant United
    States Attorney, Harrisonburg, Virginia, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Nakia Heath Keller was sentenced to three life terms
    plus 120 months’ imprisonment after pleading guilty, pursuant to
    a   plea   agreement,        to   fourteen         counts:          conspiracy        to    commit
    interstate domestic violence, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 371
    (2006), conspiracy to carry and use a firearm in relation to a
    crime of violence, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (o) (2006),
    conspiracy       to     kill      witnesses,           in     violation        of     
    18 U.S.C. § 1512
    (k)     (2006),        conspiracy        to       tamper        with     witnesses,          in
    violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1512
    (k) (2006), conspiracy to tamper
    with   evidence,        in   violation       of        
    18 U.S.C. § 1512
    (k)      (2006),
    conspiracy to use fire to commit a felony, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 844
    (m) (2006), interstate domestic violence resulting
    in death, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 2261
    , 2 (2006), use of a
    firearm in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 924
    (c), 924(j)(1), 2 (2006), murdering a witness, in
    violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 1512
    (a)(1)(C), 2 (2006), use of a
    firearm in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 924
    (c), (j)(1), 2 (2006), tampering with witnesses, in
    violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 1512
    (b)(3), 2 (2006), tampering with
    evidence, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 1512
    (c), 2 (2006), use of
    fire   during     the    commission       of       a    felony,       in     violation      of     
    18 U.S.C. §§ 844
    (h),        2    (2006),      and          felon   in       possession       of   a
    firearm,    in    violation        of   
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1)         (2006).        On
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    appeal, counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California,
    
    386 U.S. 738
       (1967),    stating    that   there   are   no    meritorious
    issues for appeal but questioning whether Keller’s guilty plea
    was invalid and whether his sentence was unreasonable.                    Keller
    was given the opportunity to file a pro se supplemental brief
    but has not done so.          The Government moved to dismiss Keller’s
    appeal, asserting that he waived any and all right to appeal in
    the plea agreement.           We affirm in part, dismiss in part, and
    deny the Government’s motion to dismiss as moot.
    I.
    Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 requires that
    the district court, prior to accepting a guilty plea, conduct a
    plea colloquy in which it informs the defendant of the charges
    to which he is pleading and determines that he comprehends the
    nature   of    those   charges,   any     mandatory   minimum       penalty,   the
    maximum possible penalty, and the rights he is relinquishing by
    pleading guilty.       Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1); United States v.
    DeFusco, 
    949 F.2d 114
    , 116 (4th Cir. 1991).               The district court
    must also ensure that the defendant’s plea is voluntary, and
    that there is a factual basis for the plea.                Fed. R. Crim. P.
    11(b)(2), (3).      In reviewing compliance with Rule 11, this court
    accords deference to the district court’s decision as to how to
    best conduct the mandated colloquy with the defendant.                  DeFusco,
    
    949 F.2d at 116
    .
    3
    Because Keller did not move to withdraw his guilty
    plea in the district court or raise any objections to the Rule
    11 colloquy, we review the colloquy for plain error.                            United
    States v. Martinez, 
    277 F.3d 517
    , 524-26 (4th Cir. 2002).                           To
    demonstrate plain error, a defendant must show:                     (1) there was
    error, (2) the error was plain, and (3) the error affected his
    “substantial rights.”          United States v. Olano, 
    507 U.S. 725
    ,
    732-34 (1992).       To establish that a Rule 11 error has occurred,
    the defendant “must show a reasonable probability that, but for
    the    error,   he    would    not    have    entered    the    plea.”          United
    States v. Dominguez Benitez, 
    542 U.S. 74
    , 83 (2004).
    Upon review of the transcript of the plea hearing, we
    conclude    that     the    district    court    complied      with      Rule    11’s
    requirements.        The court ensured that Keller’s guilty plea was
    knowing and voluntary and supported by a factual basis, and that
    Keller understood the rights he was relinquishing by pleading
    guilty and the sentence he faced.              We therefore affirm Keller’s
    conviction.
    II.
    When      the    parties    have    stipulated      to   a    particular
    sentence under Rule 11(c)(1)(C) and the district court imposes
    that   sentence,      the   defendant    may    appeal    only      if   the    court
    imposed that sentence “in violation of the law” or “as a result
    of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines.”                         18
    
    4 U.S.C. § 3742
    (a)(1)-(2),   (c)(1)      (2006);   United     States    v.
    Sanchez, 
    146 F.3d 796
    , 797 & n.1 (10th Cir. 1998) (concerning
    Rule   11(c)(1)(C)’s    predecessor       provision,   Rule    11(e)(1)(C)).
    Because   the    sentence   imposed   by    the   district    court   neither
    violated the law nor resulted from an incorrect application of
    the Guidelines, United States v. Cieslowski, 
    410 F.3d 353
    , 364
    (7th Cir. 2005) (“A sentence imposed under a Rule 11(c)(1)(C)
    plea arises directly from the agreement itself, not from the
    Guidelines.”), Keller’s Rule 11(c)(1)(C) stipulation precludes
    this court from considering his claims regarding his sentence.
    We therefore dismiss Keller’s appeal of his sentence.
    III.
    In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
    record and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.                      We
    therefore deny the Government’s motion to dismiss as moot.                 This
    court requires that counsel inform Keller, in writing, of his
    right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
    further review.       If Keller requests that a petition be filed,
    but counsel believes such a petition would be frivolous, counsel
    may    move     in   this   court     for    leave     to     withdraw     from
    representation.      Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
    was served on Keller.        We dispense with oral argument because
    the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
    5
    materials   before   this   court   and   argument   would   not   aid   the
    decisional process.
    AFFIRMED IN PART;
    DISMISSED IN PART
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