Lakshmi Injeti v. United States Citizenship , 737 F.3d 311 ( 2013 )

PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-1167
LAKSHMI INJETI,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES,
Defendant – Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, District Judge. (8:11-
cv-00584-RWT)
Argued: September 18, 2013 Decided: December 11, 2013
Before DAVIS, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part and vacated in part by published opinion.
Judge Diaz wrote the opinion, in which Judge Davis and Judge
Wynn joined.
ARGUED: Jeffrey Brian O'Toole, O'TOOLE, ROTHWELL, NASSAU &
STEINBACH, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Erez Reuveni,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for
Appellee. ON BRIEF: Karen Burke, O'TOOLE, ROTHWELL, NASSAU &
STEINBACH, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Stuart Delery,
Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Samuel P. Go,
Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for
Appellee.
DIAZ, Circuit Judge:
Lakshmi Injeti, a native and citizen of India, entered the
United States on a nonimmigrant visa in 1991. In 2001, she was
granted an adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident
(“LPR”). Injeti applied for naturalization in 2006, and in the
course of reviewing her application, U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services (“USCIS”) discovered that her prior
application for LPR status contained a misrepresentation.
Although Injeti had in fact been married twice, the application
stated that she had no former husbands. USCIS also discovered
that, in connection with a separate immigration proceeding,
Injeti had submitted a fraudulent death certificate for her
first husband. On the basis of this information, it denied her
application for naturalization.
Injeti sought review of USCIS’s decision in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Maryland. Finding that
Injeti was ineligible for naturalization because she (1) had not
been lawfully admitted for permanent residence, and (2) failed
to demonstrate good moral character, the district court granted
summary judgment for USCIS. Injeti appeals the district court’s
order, arguing that she satisfied both conditions. As we
explain below, we affirm the district court’s judgment in part,
and vacate it in part.
2
I.
A.
Injeti was born in Andhra Pradesh, India in 1960. She
married her first husband, Rajurao Injeti (“Mr. Injeti”),
sometime between 1974 and 1977. The two lived together in India
with Mr. Injeti’s parents until 1981, when Injeti moved to
Qatar, without her husband, to seek employment. Though living
apart, they remained in intermittent contact until 1987. Injeti
alleges that, in 1988, she received a letter from Mr. Injeti’s
parents informing her that he had died. Injeti claims she has
neither seen nor heard from Mr. Injeti since.
In June 1991, Injeti married Mohammed Farook Shaikh, an
Indian citizen whom she met in 1988 while living in Qatar.
According to Injeti, she did not obtain a divorce prior to
marrying Shaikh because she believed Mr. Injeti was dead.
Shaikh had also been previously married, but Injeti claims
Shaikh informed her that he was a widower.
Injeti entered the United States on a nonimmigrant visa in
November 1991 to work as an employee of a Qatari diplomat.
Sometime thereafter, she began working as a housekeeper for an
American couple, Stewart and Sharon Karr. Stewart Karr filed an
employment-based visa petition on Injeti’s behalf, which was
approved in December 1993.
3
On the basis of the approved petition, Injeti filed an
application for adjustment to LPR status. Injeti’s application
indicated that her husband, Shaikh, was applying with her, and
also listed the names of three children from her first marriage.
However, in response to a question about the identity of “former
husbands or wives,” Injeti’s application incorrectly stated
“none.” J.A. 117. According to Injeti’s then attorney, this
inaccuracy arose from his own inadvertent error: although Injeti
informed him that she was a widow, he “mistakenly entered ‘none’
in the box where the name of a former spouse should be entered.”
J.A. 261. Nevertheless, Injeti signed the application,
certifying “under penalty of perjury” that the information it
contained was “true and correct.” J.A. 137.
Injeti was granted LPR status on January 19, 2001. Shaikh
was accorded LPR status as a derivative beneficiary, as were two
of Injeti’s children. Sometime thereafter, Injeti and Shaikh
filed an application for derivative LPR status for Shaikh’s son.
During the application process, immigration officials discovered
that Shaikh, in applying for LPR status, had submitted a
fraudulent death certificate for his first wife. In fact,
Shaikh’s first wife was alive. Based on this information, the
government initiated removal proceedings against Shaikh, Injeti,
and Injeti's two children in June 2005.
4
Shaikh obtained a divorce from his first wife and remarried
Injeti in April 2006. Around the same time, during the course
of the removal proceedings, Injeti submitted to immigration
officials a document purporting to be a death certificate for
her first husband, Mr. Injeti. According to Injeti, she
received this document by mail sometime between 1999 and 2001
after requesting it from Mr. Injeti’s parents. Although USCIS
would later determine that the death certificate for Mr. Injeti
was also fraudulent, in the interim, an immigration judge
terminated the removal proceedings against Injeti, concluding
that Shaikh’s misrepresentation regarding his first wife “was
only attribut[able] to [his] actions.” J.A. 27.
On May 11, 2006, Injeti filed an application for
naturalization with USCIS. Like her prior adjustment
application, this application omitted her marriage to Mr.
Injeti, answering “1” to a question asking “[h]ow many times
have you been married?” J.A. 195. According to the attorney
who assisted Injeti with completing her application, this error
occurred as a direct result of the prior inaccuracy on her
adjustment application. Injeti’s naturalization application was
prepared, in part, by automated computer software, and the
software simply “transfer[red]” the inaccurate information from
the adjustment application to the naturalization application.
J.A. 371. The attorney stated in an affidavit that he did not
5
become aware of either error until after both forms had been
submitted.
While Injeti’s naturalization application was under review,
USCIS received a letter from an individual named “Anton,” who
claimed to be the boyfriend of Injeti’s daughter Suvarna. The
letter stated that Injeti and Shaikh had each submitted
fraudulent death certificates for their former spouses, and that
Mr. Injeti remained alive in India. The letter further stated
that Injeti and Shaikh had “threatened” Suvarna “not to tell the
truth” to an immigration judge. J.A. 254. Although the letter
did not provide Anton’s last name, it listed two e-mail
addresses and a mailing address in Australia where he could be
reached.
USCIS subsequently interviewed Injeti, who stated that she
had previously been married to Mr. Injeti. USCIS officials then
contacted officials in India, who informed them that Mr.
Injeti’s purported death certificate, which Injeti had
previously submitted, was fraudulent. In fact, the
certificate’s registration number was associated with a valid
death certificate for another individual. USCIS did not
immediately take further action.
Injeti filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Maryland seeking adjudication of her naturalization
application. In connection with these proceedings, she
6
submitted an affidavit from her attorney, David Rothwell,
explaining the inaccuracies in her application forms. She also
submitted her and Shaikh’s original marriage certificate, which
stated that both were widowed at the time of their marriage. 1
The district court remanded the case to USCIS for adjudication.
USCIS denied Injeti’s application for naturalization.
USCIS reasoned that, because Injeti had omitted mention of her
first husband from her adjustment application and had later
submitted a fraudulent death certificate, she failed to meet her
burden of establishing eligibility for naturalization.
Specifically, she had not been “lawfully admitted for permanent
residence” and did not possess “good moral character” as
required for naturalization under 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a). J.A. 275.
In response, Injeti sought a hearing before an immigration
officer. After conducting another interview and considering
additional evidence, USCIS again denied Injeti’s application.
It based its decision on several related considerations. First,
in the absence of proof that Mr. Injeti had died in 1988, USCIS
concluded that Injeti had been “married to more than one person
1
In his affidavit, Rothwell stated that he also submitted
this marriage certificate with Injeti’s original application for
LPR status. J.A. 261. However, the certificate is not attached
to the version of Injeti’s application that appears in the
record, and our review of the record does not otherwise reveal
any indication that immigration officials received it.
7
at the same time.” J.A. 28. She had thus committed bigamy, a
crime of moral turpitude. As a result, negative answers she
gave in her interview to questions regarding whether she had
ever committed a crime or been married to more than one person
at once had in fact been false. This crime and false testimony,
along with Injeti’s submission of a fraudulent death
certificate, all prevented her from establishing good moral
character. Additionally, because Injeti had “procured [her]
lawful permanent residence through misrepresentation,” she had
not been lawfully admitted for permanent residence. J.A. 31.
Finally, USCIS concluded that Injeti had “deliberately engaged
in an ongoing pattern of misrepresentation and deceit.” J.A.
31. Therefore, she was “statutorily and permanently ineligible
for naturalization.” J.A. 32.
B.
Injeti filed a new complaint in the U.S. District Court for
the District of Maryland, seeking review of the denial of her
naturalization application pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c).
Injeti’s complaint asserted that she met all the requirements
for naturalization and had not committed bigamy. The district
court held a hearing on USCIS’s motion to dismiss or for summary
judgment. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court granted
summary judgment in favor of USCIS. Delivering its decision
from the bench, the district court explained that Injeti was
8
ineligible for naturalization because she had: (1) not been
lawfully admitted for permanent residence; and (2) failed to
establish good moral character.
First, regarding Injeti’s permanent resident status, the
district court held that “she had an absolute duty to inform
[USCIS] of her previous husband.” J.A. 94. Because she omitted
that information from her application for adjustment to LPR
status, “she did not have proper immigration status in the first
place and therefore could not be a proper candidate for
naturalization.” J.A. 95. Second, because she made the
misrepresentation under penalty of perjury, Injeti’s statement
constituted false testimony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6), barring
a finding of good moral character. J.A. 96. Because Injeti was
ineligible for naturalization on either basis, the court held,
USCIS was entitled to summary judgment.
II.
A.
“Courts review a decision denying a naturalization
application de novo.” Dung Phan v. Holder, 667 F.3d 448, 451
(4th Cir. 2012); see 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c). Similarly, we review
the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing
the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Dung Phan, 667 F.3d at 451.
9
To qualify for naturalization, an applicant bears the
burden of establishing, among other prerequisites, that she: (1)
has resided continuously in the United States for at least five
years after being “lawfully admitted for permanent residence,”
and (2) has been, and still is, “a person of good moral
character” during the relevant time periods. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1427(a); 8 C.F.R. § 316.2. Arguing that the district court’s
grant of summary judgment to USCIS was improper, Injeti contends
that the district court erred in finding that she could not
satisfy either of these conditions.
We first consider whether Injeti was lawfully admitted for
permanent residence.
B.
“The term ‘lawfully admitted for permanent residence’
means the status of having been lawfully accorded the privilege
of residing permanently in the United States as an immigrant in
accordance with the immigration laws.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20).
As one of our sister circuits has aptly noted, “[t]his
definition is somewhat circuitous, and where there is ambiguity,
we must give deference to the agency’s interpretation, if it is
reasonable.” Arellano-Garcia v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 1183, 1186
(8th Cir. 2005) (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)).
10
The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) has explained that
the term “lawfully” “denotes compliance with substantive legal
requirements, not mere procedural regularity.” In re
Koloamatangi, 23 I. & N. Dec. 548, 550 (B.I.A. 2003) (internal
quotation marks omitted). According to the BIA, an alien who
has obtained LPR status by fraud--or who was otherwise not
entitled to it--has not been lawfully admitted. See id. In
other words, even in cases where there is no indication of
fraud, an alien has not been “lawfully admitted” if her
admission, at the time it was granted, was “not in substantive
compliance with the immigration laws.” See Shin v. Holder, 607
F.3d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 2010).
The BIA has applied this “non-fraud” doctrine in other
cases, ranging from those where a petitioner has obtained LPR
status through the fraud of third parties to those where a
petitioner has received LPR status due to an administrative
oversight. See, e.g., Walker v. Holder, 589 F.3d 12, 19 (1st
Cir. 2009) (affirming a BIA order concluding that petitioner had
not been lawfully admitted because he had acquired LPR status
“through the fraud or misrepresentation of third parties”);
Arellano-Garcia, 429 F.3d at 1186-87 (agreeing with a BIA order
concluding that petitioner had not been lawfully admitted
because his LPR status “was obtained by a negligent mistake made
by the government”).
11
Every other circuit that has addressed the BIA’s
construction of “lawfully” has deferred to it as reasonable, and
seeing no reason to reach a contrary conclusion, we follow suit. 2
Thus, to establish that she was lawfully admitted for permanent
residence, Injeti must do more than simply show that she was
granted LPR status; she must further demonstrate that the grant
of that status was “in substantive compliance with the
immigration laws.” 3 See Shin, 607 F.3d at 1217.
Injeti concedes that her application for adjustment to LPR
status contained a misrepresentation regarding whether she had
previously been married. Specifically, she inaccurately stated
“none” when asked whether she had any “former husbands.” J.A.
117. Nevertheless, Injeti contends that she was lawfully
admitted for permanent residence because the misrepresentation--
which she explains resulted from a mistake by her attorney--was
not fraudulent or willful, and was immaterial to her eligibility
2
See, e.g., Gallimore v. Att’y Gen., 619 F.3d 216, 223-25
(3d Cir. 2010); Shin, 607 F.3d at 1217; Walker, 589 F.3d at 19-
21; De La Rosa v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 489 F.3d 551,
554-55 (2d Cir. 2007); Savoury v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 449 F.3d
1307, 1313-17 (11th Cir. 2006); Arellano-Garcia, 429 F.3d at
1186-87.
3
This does not mean that any time a person applies for
naturalization, she must affirmatively come forward with proof
to refute every conceivable basis for concluding that her
admission did not comply with applicable law. Rather, such
proof is required only where there is some articulable reason to
suspect that the applicant’s admission was improper.
12
for LPR status in the sense that she was not “excludable on the
true facts.” See Appellant’s Br. at 34. Therefore, she argues,
her adjustment to LPR status complied with the immigration laws
both procedurally and substantively. We disagree.
First, we reject Injeti’s contention that the
misrepresentation in her application was immaterial to her
eligibility for LPR status. Despite Injeti’s argument to the
contrary, finding that a misrepresentation is material does not
require concluding that it necessarily would have changed the
relevant decision. Rather, in Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S.
759 (1988), the Supreme Court held that a misrepresentation in
an immigration proceeding (there a denaturalization proceeding)
is material if it “ha[s] a natural tendency to influence the
decision[] of [immigration officials].” Id. at 772; see also
United States v. Garcia-Ochoa, 607 F.3d 371, 375-76 (4th Cir.
2010) (noting that the Kungys materiality test “applies in
numerous contexts”). As one circuit court has concluded,
“[t]his is most definitely not a ‘but for’ analysis, . . . that
is, the government need not establish that ‘but for’ the
misrepresentation” the application for LPR status would not have
been granted. Kalejs v. INS, 10 F.3d 441, 446 (7th Cir. 1993).
The BIA considers a misrepresentation material if it “tends
to shut off a line of inquiry which is relevant to the alien’s
eligibility and which might well have resulted in a proper
13
determination that he be excluded.” Matter of Kai Hing Hui, 15
I. & N. Dec. 288, 289 (B.I.A. 1975) (quoting Matter of S-- & B--
C--, 9 I. & N. Dec. 436, 448-49 (A.G. 1961)); see also Cooper v.
Gonzales, 216 F. App’x 294, 297 (4th Cir. 2007) (applying the
BIA’s materiality standard); Gozun v. Att’y Gen., 375 F. App’x
276, 279 (3d Cir. 2010) (deferring to “the BIA’s definition of a
material misrepresentation” as “reasonable”).
To the extent that these materiality standards differ, we
need not determine which of the two applies here because
Injeti’s misrepresentation meets either one. Cf. Solis-Muela v.
INS, 13 F.3d 372, 377 (10th Cir. 1993) (declining to decide
whether the Kungys or BIA materiality standard applied because
“[r]egardless of the standard employed,” the misrepresentation
at issue was material). As USCIS explained in its decision
denying Injeti’s naturalization application:
Had USCIS properly known that [Injeti] w[as]
previously married, they would have inquired deeper
into the matter. The fraudulent death certificate of
[Mr.] Injeti would have been discovered around the
same time as that of the fraudulent death certificate
of . . . Shaikh’s first wife. This would have gone to
the heart of [Injeti’s] eligibility to become a lawful
permanent resident. . . . Had it been known that
[Injeti] w[as] married to two individuals at the same
time, [she] would have been precluded from
establishing eligibility for lawful permanent
residence.
J.A. 30. In other words, because commission of bigamy, a crime
of moral turpitude, renders an alien inadmissible, see 8 U.S.C.
14
§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i), Injeti’s omission of her prior marriage
“had a natural tendency to influence” the evaluation of her
application for LPR status, see Kungys, 485 U.S. at 772, by
“shut[ting] off” inquiry into the propriety of her second
marriage, Matter of Kai Hing Hui, 15 I. & N. Dec. at 289. The
misrepresentation was therefore material, whether or not the
true facts would have actually led to denial of her application. 4
Nor was it necessary for the district court to determine
whether Injeti’s misrepresentation was fraudulent or willful.
As explained previously, and as our sister circuits have
repeatedly observed, “[t]he adverb ‘lawfully’ requires more than
the absence of fraud.” Savoury, 449 F.3d at 1313. Indeed,
“[i]t requires consistency with all applicable law,” id., and an
alien has not been “lawfully admitted” when she was “not legally
entitled” to LPR status for any reason, Gallimore, 619 F.3d at
224. See In re Koloamatangi, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 550.
In arguing that her admission was consistent with
applicable law, and thus that she was legally entitled to LPR
status, Injeti attempts to rely on 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i),
which designates as “inadmissible” any alien who “seek[s] to
4
Injeti contends that she would have been inadmissible only
if she had knowingly been married to two men at once. For
reasons we explain later, we find it unnecessary to determine
whether Injeti committed bigamy.
15
procure” admission “by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a
material fact.” Injeti argues that her admission was not
inconsistent with this provision because her misrepresentation
on her application was neither fraudulent nor willful. Nor,
according to Injeti, was she inadmissible under any of the other
applicable statutory bars. In particular, she contends that she
did not commit bigamy, so as to render her inadmissible under
the bar against aliens who have committed a crime of moral
turpitude, see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i), because she believes
Mr. Injeti died prior to her marriage to Shaikh.
Injeti’s argument incorrectly presumes that admissibility
is the only requirement for being entitled to LPR status. To be
sure, Injeti would not have been entitled to adjust her status
to permanent resident had she been statutorily inadmissible.
Admissibility, however, is a necessary, but not sufficient,
condition for adjustment to LPR status. Indeed, while the
statute governing adjustment of status makes admissibility a
prerequisite for receiving a grant of LPR status, see 8 U.S.C. §
1255, the ultimate determination as to whether an alien will
receive that status is left to the Attorney General “in his
discretion and under such regulations as he may prescribe.” Id.
(emphasis added).
One such regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(2), requires the
applicant to certify that all information contained in the
16
application “is true and correct.” Because Injeti’s application
contained a material misrepresentation, and thus was not “true
and correct,” it did not comply with § 103.2(a)(2). 5 See also
United States v. Sadig, No. 05-4733, 2007 WL 4553963, at *4 (4th
Cir. Dec. 27, 2007) (“[T]he oath at the end of the application
specifically and absolutely requires that the answers be true
and correct.”). It follows that Injeti did not satisfy the
legal requirements for adjusting to LPR status under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1255, regardless of whether the misrepresentation on her
application was willful, and even if she did not commit bigamy.
Cf. In re F---- M----, 7 I & N Dec. 420, 421-22 (B.I.A. 1957)
(concluding that a visa granted on the basis of an application
that contained a material misrepresentation “was not a valid
one,” despite the record “fail[ing] to establish that the
[applicant] made the misrepresentation willfully and
purposefully”).
5
By its terms, 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(2) does not limit the
duty to ensure that an application is “true and correct” to
material facts. However, given that the regulation seems
intended to facilitate USCIS’s assessment of whether the
applicant is eligible for the benefit sought, we read it to
imply such a limitation. That is to say, we do not believe a
mistake or misstatement with no possible bearing on an
applicant’s eligibility, and which is therefore immaterial, see
Kungys, 485 U.S. at 772, necessarily violates the duty imposed
by § 103.2(a)(2).
17
Accordingly, we find that Injeti failed to show that she
was “legally entitled” to the grant of LPR status she received,
and conclude that she was not lawfully admitted for permanent
residence. Injeti is therefore ineligible for naturalization,
and the district court did not err in granting summary judgment
for USCIS on this ground.
C.
In addition to finding that Injeti had not been lawfully
admitted for permanent residence, the district court also held
that Injeti’s “unlawful acts” “bar[red] a finding of good moral
character.” J.A. 96. However, because a failure to satisfy any
one of the statutory prerequisites renders an applicant
ineligible for naturalization, this latter conclusion was not
essential to the district court’s grant of summary judgment.
See Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 506 (1981)
(“[T]here must be strict compliance with all the congressionally
imposed prerequisites to the acquisition of citizenship.”). In
light of the possibility that Injeti might, in the future, seek
immigration benefits to which her character is relevant, we
vacate that portion of the district court’s judgment addressing
Injeti’s good moral character. In doing so, we express no
opinion on the merits of the district court’s analysis.
AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART
18