Dewey Teel v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-2406
DEWEY TEEL; GAY TEEL,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
CHESAPEAKE APPALACHIA, LLC,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Wheeling. Frederick P. Stamp,
Jr., Senior District Judge. (5:11-cv-00005-FPS)
Submitted: September 30, 2013 Decided: October 17, 2013
Before DUNCAN, KEENAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Isak J. Howell, LAW OFFICE OF ISAK HOWELL, Lewisburg, West
Virginia; Joseph M. Lovett, Lewisburg, West Virginia, for
Appellants. Timothy M. Miller, Joseph K. Merical, ROBINSON &
MCELWEE, PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Dewey and Gay Teel (collectively the Teels) appeal the
district court’s order granting summary judgment to Chesapeake
Appalachia, LLC (Chesapeake), on their claim of trespass under
West Virginia common law arising from Chesapeake’s construction
of natural gas wells on a portion of the Teels’ property. ∗ The
issues the Teels raise are indistinguishable from those we
recently considered in Whiteman v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC,
__ F.3d __, 2013 WL 4734969 (4th Cir. Sept. 4, 2013). We
affirm.
Whiteman explained that “a claim for trespass under
West Virginia common law can only lie if one’s entry upon the
land of another—or one’s leaving a thing upon the land of
another—is without lawful authority.” Whiteman, 2013 WL
4734969, at *3 (internal quotation marks omitted). In
situations, like here, where a property’s surface and mineral
estates have been severed, and in the absence of contrary
language in the severance deed, the lawful authority of the
mineral estate owner to enter and burden the surface estate is
implied and limited to activities that are reasonably necessary
for the exploitation of the mineral rights. Id. at *4-*7. The
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The Teels voluntarily dismissed the remainder of their
claims with prejudice.
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reasonable necessity analysis is fact-specific, and “what is
necessary is a fluid concept that must be determined on a case
by case basis.” Id. at *4. Accordingly, when a mineral estate
owner seeks to use the corresponding surface estate to
facilitate mineral extraction, “it must be demonstrated . . .
that the [use] is reasonably necessary for the extraction of the
mineral” and does not substantially burden the surface estate.
Id. at *6 (internal quotation marks omitted). Where, as here,
the surface owner claims trespass based on the mineral estate
owner’s activities, the burden is on the surface owner to show a
lack of reasonable necessity or a substantial burden. Id. at
*7-*8.
As a threshold matter, the Teels argue that the
district court erred by examining Chesapeake’s activities only
for reasonableness. As in Whiteman, however, we conclude that
the district court applied the correct standard and did not err
in looking to relevant case law from courts in other districts.
Id. at *9-*10 & n.17. Similarly, there is no merit in the
Teels’ suggestion that the district court improperly examined
West Virginia statutes and regulations to inform itself
regarding the practices of the state’s oil and gas industry and,
thereby, the reasonable necessity of Chesapeake’s actions. Id.
at *10.
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Turning to the sufficiency of the Teels’ evidence to
survive summary judgment, we conclude that Whiteman controls.
As in Whiteman, the Teels’ generalized evidence regarding
Chesapeake’s mining operations in dissimilar locations and at
times subsequent to the events at issue here does not satisfy
the fact-intensive and case-specific inquiry into the reasonable
necessity of Chesapeake’s actions on the Teels’ property. Id.
at *8-*9. The Teels also have failed to muster evidence
plausibly suggesting that Chesapeake’s operations impose a
substantial burden on their property. Id. at *8.
Accordingly, we affirm the award of summary judgment
to Chesapeake. We deny as moot Chesapeake’s motion to dismiss
the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts
and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this Court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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