United States v. Ryan Eaddy , 543 F. App'x 317 ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4174
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
RYAN CHRISTOPHER EADDY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. Terry L. Wooten, Chief District
Judge. (4:10-cr-00604-TLW-1)
Submitted: September 10, 2013 Decided: October 21, 2013
Before KEENAN, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
William F. Nettles, IV, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
Florence, South Carolina, for Appellant. Arthur Bradley Parham,
Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Ryan Eaddy appeals his conviction and 200-month prison
sentence imposed following his guilty plea, pursuant to a plea
agreement, to one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute more than fifty grams of crack cocaine in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006). Eaddy’s counsel has filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
certifying that there are no meritorious issues for appeal but
questioning whether the district court substantially complied
with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 in accepting Eaddy’s guilty plea and
whether Eaddy’s sentence is reasonable. Eaddy, though given the
opportunity to do so, has not filed a pro se supplemental brief.
We affirm.
We first address Eaddy’s guilty plea. Prior to
accepting a guilty plea, a trial court, through colloquy with
the defendant, must inform the defendant of, and determine that
the defendant understands, the nature of the charges to which
the plea is offered, any mandatory minimum penalty, the maximum
possible penalty he faces, and the various rights he is
relinquishing by pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1).
The district court also must ensure that the defendant’s plea
was voluntary, was supported by a sufficient factual basis, and
did not result from force, threats, or promises not contained in
the plea agreement. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2), (3). “In
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reviewing the adequacy of compliance with Rule 11, this Court
should accord deference to the trial court’s decision as to how
best to conduct the mandated colloquy with the defendant.”
United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir. 1991).
Because Eaddy did not move to withdraw his guilty plea
in the district court or raise any objections during the Rule 11
colloquy, the plea colloquy is reviewed for plain error. United
States v. General, 278 F.3d 389, 393 (4th Cir. 2002). To
demonstrate plain error, a defendant must show that: (1) there
was an error; (2) the error was plain; and (3) the error
affected his “substantial rights.” United States v. Olano, 507
U.S. 725, 732 (1993). A defendant’s substantial rights are
affected if the court determines that the error “influenced the
defendant’s decision to plead guilty and impaired his ability to
evaluate with eyes open the direct attendant risks of accepting
criminal responsibility.” United States v. Goins, 51 F.3d 400,
402-03 (4th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 532 (4th Cir.
2002) (holding that defendant must demonstrate that he would not
have pled guilty but for the error).
Our review of the record reveals that the district
court substantially complied with Rule 11. The district court
properly ensured that Johnson’s plea was knowing, voluntary, and
supported by a sufficient factual basis. The district court
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properly informed Eaddy of the maximum possible penalties he
faced and of the advisory nature of the Sentencing Guidelines.
Though the district court did not inform Eaddy of his right to
be protected from compelled self-incrimination, Fed. R. Crim. P.
11(b)(1)(E), we conclude that this error did not affect Eaddy’s
substantial rights because there is no indication that, but for
the error, Eaddy would not have pled guilty.
Next, we address the reasonableness of Eaddy’s
sentence. We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying an
abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 51 (2007); United States v. Layton, 564 F.3d 330, 335 (4th
Cir. 2009). In so doing, we first examine the sentence for
significant procedural error, including failing to calculate (or
improperly calculating) the advisory Sentencing Guidelines
range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider
the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors, selecting a sentence
based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to explain
adequately the chosen sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. When
considering the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, we
take into account the totality of the circumstances. United
States v. Mendoza–Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010).
If the sentence is within the Guidelines range, we presume on
appeal that the sentence is reasonable. United States v. Go,
517 F.3d 216, 218 (4th Cir. 2008); see Rita v. United States,
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551 U.S. 338, 346–56 (2007) (permitting appellate presumption of
reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentence). Upon review of
the record, we conclude that the district court did not commit
procedural error and gave sufficient reasons for Eaddy’s
within-Guidelines sentence. Moreover, Eaddy has not rebutted
the presumption that his sentence is substantively reasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment and deny
Eaddy’s motion to remand. This Court requires that counsel
inform Eaddy, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme
Court of the United States for further review. If Eaddy
requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that
such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in
this Court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s
motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Eaddy.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this Court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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