United States v. David Hallman , 549 F. App'x 147 ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4086
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DAVID MATTHEW HALLMAN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles,
District Judge. (1:12-cr-00010-CCE-1)
Submitted: November 21, 2013 Decided: December 13, 2013
Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Stacey D. Rubain, QUANDER & RUBAIN, P.A., Winston-Salem, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Anand P. Ramaswamy, Assistant United
States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
David Matthew Hallman pled guilty, pursuant to a
written plea agreement, to four counts of using a minor child to
engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of creating
child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), (e)
(2012). Although Hallman’s Guidelines range resulted in a life
sentence, this was limited by the applicable thirty-year
statutory maximum. See 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e). The district court
thus imposed four consecutive thirty-year sentences, resulting
in an aggregate term of 1440 months’ imprisonment. See U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5G1.2(d) (2011).
On appeal, counsel has filed a brief pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), certifying that there
are no nonfrivolous grounds for appeal, but asking us to review
Hallman’s convictions and the reasonableness of the sentence.
Although advised of his right to file a pro se supplemental
brief, Hallman has not done so. The Government has declined to
file a response brief. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Because Hallman did not move in the district court to
withdraw his guilty plea, we review the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11
hearing for plain error. United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d
517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002). To prevail under this standard,
Hallman must establish that an error occurred, that this error
was plain, and that it affected his substantial rights. United
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States v. Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, 342–43 (4th Cir. 2009). Our
review of the record establishes that the district court fully
complied with the mandates of Rule 11, ensuring that Hallman’s
plea was knowing and voluntary, and supported by an independent
basis in fact. We therefore affirm Hallman’s convictions.
We review Hallman’s sentence for reasonableness,
applying an abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 46, 51 (2007). This review requires
consideration of both the procedural and substantive
reasonableness of the sentence. Id. at 51. We first assess
whether the district court properly calculated the advisory
Guidelines range, considered the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2012), analyzed any arguments presented by the
parties, and sufficiently explained the selected sentence. Id.
at 49–51; see United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575–76 (4th
Cir. 2010).
If there is no procedural error, we review the
substantive reasonableness of the sentence, “examin[ing] the
totality of the circumstances to see whether the sentencing
court abused its discretion in concluding that the sentence it
chose satisfied the standards set forth in § 3553(a).” United
States v. Mendoza–Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010).
If the sentence is within the defendant’s properly calculated
Guidelines range, we apply a presumption of substantive
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reasonableness. United States v. Bynum, 604 F.3d 161, 168-69
(4th Cir. 2010); see Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347
(2007) (permitting appellate presumption of reasonableness for
within-Guidelines sentence).
We have thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude
that the sentence is both procedurally and substantively
reasonable. We discern no error in the district court’s
computation of Hallman’s Guidelines range, the opportunities it
provided Hallman and his counsel to speak in mitigation, or its
explanation of the sentence imposed by reference to the relevant
§ 3553(a) factors. In addition to noting its overall
consideration of the relevant sentencing factors, the district
court opined that the aggregate 1440-month sentence was
appropriate given the seriousness of Hallman’s offense conduct,
which included recording the repeated rapes and sexual abuse he
and his co-defendant inflicted on multiple minor children, and
the need to impose a just punishment that would protect the
public from any such future criminal conduct by Hallman.
Finally, we have found no basis in the record to overcome the
presumption of reasonableness accorded the within-Guidelines
sentence the district court imposed.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.
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This court requires that counsel inform Hallman, in writing, of
the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Hallman requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Hallman. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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