Perini/Tompkins Joint Venture v. ACE American Insurance Company , 738 F.3d 95 ( 2013 )


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  •                               PUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 12-2415
    PERINI/TOMPKINS JOINT VENTURE,
    Plaintiff – Appellant,
    v.
    ACE AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY,
    Defendant – Appellee.
    -------------------------------
    ASSOCIATED GENERAL CONTRACTORS OF AMERICA; MARYLAND CHAPTER
    OF THE ASSOCIATED GENERAL CONTRACTORS OF AMERICA,
    Amici Supporting Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
    Maryland, at Greenbelt.     Peter J. Messitte, Senior District
    Judge. (8:10-cv-03494-PJM)
    Argued:   October 30, 2013                 Decided:   December 16, 2013
    Before SHEDD and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
    Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Thacker wrote the opinion,
    in which Judge Shedd and Senior Judge Hamilton joined.
    ARGUED: Gregory David Podolak, SAXE DOERNBERGER & VITA, P.C.,
    Hamden, Connecticut, for Appellant.   Joseph K. Powers, SEDGWICK
    LLP, New York, New York, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Tracy A. Saxe,
    SAXE DOERNBERGER & VITA, P.C., Hamden, Connecticut, for
    Appellant. Timothy D. Kevane, SEDGWICK LLP, New York, New York,
    for Appellee. Joseph C. Kovars, OBER, KALER, GRIMES & SHRIVER,
    Baltimore, Maryland; Patrick J. Wielinski, COKINOS, BOSIEN &
    YOUNG, Irving, Texas, for Amici Supporting Appellant.
    2
    THACKER, Circuit Judge:
    Perini/Tompkins Joint Venture (“PTJV” or “Appellant”)
    appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor
    of ACE American Insurance Co. (“ACE” or “Appellee”).                          PTJV filed
    suit,    claiming     coverage    under           primary    and     excess      insurance
    policies with regard to a large-scale construction project in
    Oxon    Hill,    Maryland.      The    district        court    determined         ACE   was
    entitled to summary judgment because PTJV did not obtain ACE’s
    consent     before     settling        the        underlying       dispute       regarding
    property damage at the construction site and, pursuant to the
    insurance contract, PTJV was required to do so at the risk of
    relinquishing       coverage.          We    hold     that     under       Maryland      and
    Tennessee law, PTJV violated the terms of both the primary and
    excess     policies     by      not     obtaining           ACE’s        consent    before
    settlement, and as such, cannot now claim reimbursement under
    those policies.       We thus affirm the district court.
    I.
    A.
    The Project
    In 2005, Gaylord National LLC (“Gaylord”) hired PTJV,
    a joint venture between the Perini Building Company and Turner
    Construction Company, to serve as manager in connection with the
    construction of a $900 million hotel and convention center in
    Oxon     Hill,    Maryland      (the        “Project”).             As    part     of    the
    3
    construction contract between PTJV and Gaylord (the “Contract”),
    Gaylord    agreed     to    purchase    and    maintain      an    Owner   Controlled
    Insurance Program (“OCIP”), which was a program crafted and sold
    by ACE to insure only the Project and its participants.
    Gaylord        then   purchased    from    ACE    an    OCIP   Commercial
    General    Liability        Insurance      Policy     (the    “Primary        Policy”),
    providing a limit of $2 million per occurrence, and an OCIP
    Excess Liability Policy (the “Excess Policy”), providing a limit
    of $25 million per occurrence (collectively, the “Policies”).
    The Policies provided coverage for the period from May 23, 2005,
    to August 30, 2008.           By endorsement, PTJV was added as a named
    insured    on   the   Policies.      The    Project    was     also    insured    by   a
    Builders Risk Policy through Factory Mutual Insurance Company
    (“FM Global”).
    During construction of the signature feature of the
    building        --    an      18-story,        2,400         ton      glass      atrium
    -- serious property damage occurred.                The damage is described in
    the Complaint as follows:
    10. A significant portion of the Project involved the
    construction of a glass roof atrium.    The atrium was
    composed of numerous subsections, called trusses, that
    were preassembled on the ground and lifted via crane
    into place.   Each truss contained several components,
    including supportive tension rods that were connected
    by rod/clevis junctures.
    11. The atrium was under construction on or about
    August 28, 2007 while Truss H4 was lifted into
    position and, on or about August 31, 2007, certain
    4
    components were added to the atrium                  that placed
    additional pressure and tension on Truss             H4, causing,
    unbeknownst to either Gaylord or PTJV,                one of the
    rod/clevis junctures on Truss H4 to slowly           erode.
    12. On September 5, 2007, the rod/clevis juncture on
    Truss H4, which began eroding no later than August 31,
    2007, failed.   That failure caused a loss of tension
    that substantially impaired the structural integrity
    of the atrium (the “Collapse”).
    13. The Collapse caused damage to various components
    of the Project and required a temporary suspension of
    the Project and such damages were neither expected nor
    intended from the standpoint of PTJV.
    J.A. 21. 1    A representative from ACE was on site at the Project
    at the time of the Collapse and thereafter.                 The Project was
    scheduled to be completed in December 2007, but due to various
    delays (including the Collapse), the completion date was pushed
    to March 2008.
    B.
    The Underlying Litigation
    After   the    Project   was    completed,   litigation    ensued.
    On September 18, 2008, PTJV filed a complaint against Gaylord
    for establishment and enforcement of a mechanic’s lien, breach
    of   contract,   quantum      meruit,   and    violation   of   the    Maryland
    Prompt Payment Act.          See Perini/Tompkins Joint Venture, et al.
    v. Gaylord Nat’l, LLC, No. CAE08-24316 (Cir. Ct. Md. Sept. 18,
    1
    Citations to the “J.A.” refer to the Joint Appendix filed
    by the parties in this appeal.
    5
    2008) (the      “PTJV   action”).        PTJV    alleged    Gaylord         still    owed
    $79,656,098     under     the    Contract     and   asked       for    damages       plus
    interest, costs, and fees.              The claims were based on the costs
    allegedly incurred due to Gaylord’s late delivery of the Project
    designs and its alleged changes to the original scope of the
    work.
    Subsequently,           on     October         10,     2008,        Gaylord
    countersued,     filing    a     complaint      against    PTJV       for   breach    of
    contract and breach of fiduciary duty.                See Gaylord Nat’l, LLC
    v. Perini/Tompkins Joint Venture, No. CAE08-27201 (Cir. Ct. Md.
    Oct. 10, 2008) (the “Gaylord action”).                     Gaylord claimed PTJV
    failed to properly manage scheduling, costs, and budgets, and
    failed to build a high-quality project at the agreed-upon price.
    Specifically, Gaylord alleged it paid PTJV $802,085,712, when it
    should   have    only     paid    $737,091,338.           Thus,   Gaylord       sought
    reimbursement of approximately $65 million in damages resulting
    from the alleged overpayment.             Notably, PTJV did not notify ACE
    of the Gaylord action.
    Gaylord      and      PTJV    settled    the     Gaylord         action    on
    November 26, 2008. 2       Gaylord paid an additional $42,301,875 (for
    2
    Gaylord filed a motion to consolidate the PTJV action and
    the Gaylord action in circuit court on November 6, 2008, but it
    does not appear the motion was ever ruled upon. The PTJV action
    was dismissed by stipulation on January 23, 2009.
    6
    a total of almost $845 million) and PTJV credited $26,157,912
    back to Gaylord.       Crucial to this appeal, PTJV never sought to
    obtain ACE’s consent prior to entering into this settlement.
    C.
    The Coverage Litigation
    On May 6, 2009, almost six months after the settlement
    and nearly two years after the Collapse, PTJV sent a letter to
    ACE advising that, to the extent FM Global did not pay the claim
    related to the Collapse, PTJV intended to seek reimbursement
    from ACE.     This letter was the first formal, written notice of a
    claim   to   ACE,    although    ACE   concedes    its    representative   was
    present on the site when the Collapse occurred.                 However, this
    letter did not mention the settlement or the Gaylord action at
    all.    Over ten months later, on February 23, 2010, ACE issued a
    reservation     of    rights     letter,    citing       “[b]usiness    [r]isk”
    exclusions,    late    notice,   and   voluntary     payments    made   without
    ACE’s consent as potential grounds for denial of coverage.                   On
    April 29, 2010, FM Global denied PTJV’s claims.
    After    several    additional   months       of   back-and-forth
    between PTJV and ACE, on December 13, 2010, PTJV filed suit
    against ACE in the United States District Court for the District
    of Maryland, alleging
    (1)    Count   One:   breach    of   contract/bad
    faith/implied covenant of good faith and fair
    dealing (ACE “refused and/or neglected to pay any
    7
    portion of the [c]laims [regarding the Collapse]
    pursuant to the Primary Policy or the Excess
    Policy and is in breach of its contractual
    obligations to PTJV.”);
    (2)   Count  Two:  a  declaratory judgment  “to
    determine the rights and duties of PTJV and ACE
    pursuant to the Primary Policy and the Excess
    Policy”; and
    (3) Count Three: bad faith under Tennessee law
    based on, inter alia, ACE “intentionally and/or
    recklessly t[aking] direction from another named
    insured to deny PTJV’s claim,” and “engag[ing] in
    unwarranted delay tactics.”
    J.A. 13-15.
    ACE filed a motion to dismiss on February 15, 2011,
    and the district court denied the motion in part on September 1,
    2011, but ordered that limited discovery be conducted on issues
    regarding     late   notice   to   ACE,   including   any   corresponding
    prejudice.     After discovery, ACE filed a summary judgment motion
    on August 17, 2012.       The district court held oral argument on
    October 22, 2012, and orally granted summary judgment in favor
    of ACE.   The district court explained,
    [It]     really    is     not    disputed      that
    . . . the settlement occurred without consent.
    . . .
    What’s clear is that the defendant was not given
    an   opportunity    to  enter    into   settlement
    negotiations in any way to determine whether the
    concessions that were being made by the . . .
    plaintiff   in   this  case   were   in  any   way
    reasonable, whether there was any collusion
    because there were other claims going back and
    8
    forth, and this carrier clearly did not involve
    itself.
    . . .
    [T]he Court is prepared to find that there is a
    reasonable dispute as to notice of the occurrence
    and even arguably as to notice of claim.      The
    problem here is with the notice of settlement.
    Now, the Court feels as a matter of law, the
    defendant . . . w[as] entitled to notice of the
    settlement    negotiations    to  intervene,   to
    investigate, to challenge[.]”
    J.A. 88-89, 92.        A formal order issued the next day, October 23,
    2012, granting summary judgment for the reasons stated on the
    record at the hearing.         This timely appeal followed.
    II.
    Before we proceed to the merits of this appeal, we
    first    decide      the    proper    law        to    apply.        A    federal      court
    exercising diversity jurisdiction must apply the choice of law
    rules of the state in which it sits.                    See Seabulk Offshore, Ltd.
    v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 
    377 F.3d 408
    , 418–19 (4th Cir. 2004).
    In   this diversity        action,    the        district   court        was    correct   in
    applying Maryland’s choice of law rules.                        See CACI Int’l, Inc.
    v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 
    566 F.3d 150
    , 154 (4th
    Cir.    2009)    (“Because    we     have    diversity         jurisdiction       in   this
    case,   we   apply    the    choice    of        law   rules    of   the       forum   state
    . . . .”).
    In insurance contract disputes, Maryland follows the
    principle of lex loci contractus, which applies the law of the
    9
    jurisdiction where the contract was made.     Allstate Ins. Co. v.
    Hart, 
    611 A.2d 100
    , 101 (Md. 1992).    For choice of law purposes,
    a contract is made where “the last act is performed which makes
    the agreement a binding contract.     Typically, this is where the
    policy is delivered and the premiums are paid.”        Sting Sec.,
    Inc. v. First Mercury Syndicate, Inc., 
    791 F. Supp. 555
    , 558 (D.
    Md. 1992) (internal quotation marks, citations, and alteration
    omitted).   In this case, that state is Tennessee. 3
    Under certain circumstances, however, Maryland choice
    of law rules follow the renvoi doctrine, an exception to the lex
    loci contractus rule.     Under this exception, a Maryland court
    may disregard the rule of lex loci contractus and apply Maryland
    law, if
    1) Maryland has the most significant relationship, or,
    at least, a substantial relationship with respect to
    the contract issue presented; and
    2) The state where the contract was entered into would
    not apply its own substantive law, but instead would
    3
    Gaylord, the sponsor of the Policies, has its principal
    place of business in Nashville, Tennessee.    The Policies were
    issued to Gaylord, whose address is listed on the Policies as
    being in Nashville, Tennessee.     The broker who procured the
    Policies is Willis of Tennessee, Inc., with an address in
    Nashville, Tennessee. All of the “services offered by Willis of
    Tennessee in connection with the procurement of the Policies
    were performed out of [the] Nashville, Tennessee office.” J.A.
    51.    Additionally, the policies were delivered to and were
    received by both Gaylord and Willis in Tennessee and Gaylord
    forwarded payment for the Policies’ premiums from its offices in
    Tennessee.
    10
    apply Maryland substantive law to the issue before the
    court.
    See Am. Motorists Ins. Co. v. ARTRA Group, Inc., 
    659 A.2d 1295
    ,
    1304 (Md. 1995).
    We   recognize,         however,       “[c]hoice    of    law    analysis
    becomes    necessary    .   .   .    only     if    the    relevant   laws    of   the
    different states lead to different outcomes” and where the laws
    “do not so conflict, the choice is immaterial, and the law of
    the forum -- Maryland -- governs.”                   Lowry’s Reports, Inc. v.
    Legg Mason, Inc., 
    271 F. Supp. 2d 737
    , 750 (D. Md. 2003)); see
    also Int’l Adm’rs, Inc. v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 
    753 F.2d 1373
    , 1376 n.4 (7th Cir. 1985) (“Conflicts rules are appealed to
    only when a difference in law will make a difference to the
    outcome.”).      As    explained       below,      under    either    Tennessee     or
    Maryland law, the outcome is the same.
    III.
    We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment
    de novo.     See Francis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
    709 F.3d 362
    , 366
    (4th Cir. 2013).        We also review de novo a district court’s
    decision on an issue of contract interpretation.                       See Seabulk
    Offshore Ltd. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 
    377 F.3d 408
    , 418 (4th
    Cir. 2004).      Summary judgment is appropriate “only if . . .
    ‘there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving
    11
    party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’”                             
    Id. (quoting Fed.
    R. Civ. P. 56(c)).
    A.
    The Policies
    In essence, this is a simple contract interpretation
    case.   See Rouse v. Fed. Ins. Co., 
    991 F. Supp. 460
    , 465 (D. Md.
    1998)   (“It       is     axiomatic    that    an     insurance       contract     is
    interpreted like any other contract.                If the policy’s language
    is   clear   and    unambiguous,      the   Court   will     assume   the   parties
    meant what they said . . . .” (citations omitted)).                    As with any
    contractual        dispute,    we     start    with    the     relevant      policy
    provisions.         See   Prince    George’s   Cnty.    v.    Local    Gov’t     Ins.
    Trust, 
    879 A.2d 81
    , 88 (Md. 2005) (“In interpreting an insurance
    policy, as with any contract, the primary task of the circuit
    court is to apply the terms of the policy itself.”).
    The Primary Policy contains the following provisions:
    (1) Right and duty to defend clause: “We will have the
    right and duty to defend the insured against any
    ‘suit’ seeking [property] damages. . . . We may, at
    our discretion, investigate any ‘occurrence’ and
    settle any claim or ‘suit’ that may result[.] . . .
    Our right and duty to defend end when we have used up
    the applicable limit of insurance in the payment of
    judgment or settlements . . . .” J.A. 305, 310.
    (2) Voluntary payment clause: “No insured will, except
    at that insured’s own cost, voluntarily make a
    payment, assume any obligation, or incur any expense,
    other than for first aid, without our consent.” J.A.
    314.
    12
    (3) No-action clause: “No person or organization has a
    right under this Coverage Part: . . . [t]o sue us on
    this Coverage Part unless all of its terms have been
    fully complied with. A person or organization may sue
    us to recover on an agreed settlement . . . .        An
    agreed settlement means a settlement and release of
    liability signed by us, the insured and the claimant or
    the claimant’s legal representative.” J.A. 314.
    The   Excess   Policy   likewise   contains     similar    duty   to   defend,
    voluntary payment, and no-action clauses.             See J.A. 377-378.
    B.
    Maryland Law
    1.
    Statutory Law
    Section 19-110 of the Maryland Code provides,
    An insurer may disclaim coverage on a liability
    insurance policy on the ground that the insured or a
    person claiming the benefits of the policy through the
    insured has breached the policy by failing to
    cooperate with the insurer or by not giving the
    insurer   required   notice   only  if   the   insurer
    establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that
    the lack of cooperation or notice has resulted in
    actual prejudice to the insurer.
    Md. Code Ann. § 19-110 (emphasis added).              PTJV relies heavily on
    this statute and argues that ACE’s denial of coverage centers on
    PTJV’s   alleged   “lack   of    notice”   of   the    claim   regarding   the
    Collapse and “lack of cooperation” in PTJV’s failure to notify
    ACE of the Gaylord claim and settlement.              As such, it contends,
    ACE must show actual prejudice before denying coverage, which is
    an issue of fact that should survive summary judgment.
    13
    ACE, in contrast, maintains that regardless of whether
    PTJV provided them with timely notice of the claim (or whether
    they    had        constructive         knowledge        through     their    on-site
    representative), there is no dispute that PTJV did not obtain
    ACE’s consent before settlement, in violation of the voluntary
    payment    and       no-action     clauses.         ACE     argues    prejudice      is
    irrelevant in this instance, but even if ACE were required to
    show prejudice, we should infer prejudice as a matter of law
    because “ACE was left in the dark during the pendency of the
    underlying         litigation     and     the    negotiations      leading    to     the
    finalization        of   the    settlement,”      and    otherwise,    ACE    will   be
    “placed in the impossible position of having to prove a negative
    . . . .”      Appellee’s Br. 19.
    We agree with ACE that “[t]he central issue in this
    appeal is whether the insured . . . can unilaterally settle a
    construction defect case . . . , present the settlement to its
    liability insurer as a fait accompli, and obtain indemnification
    despite    its      blatant     breach     of    clear    and   unambiguous    policy
    provisions.”        Appellee’s Br. 1.
    We     find      Phillips    Way,     Inc.     v.    American    Equity
    Insurance Co. to be particularly instructive in dissecting this
    case.      See 
    795 A.2d 216
    (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002).                         There,
    Phillips Way, a construction company, contracted to design and
    construct a clubhouse for the University of Maryland.                         See 
    id. 14 at
        217.      During     the    course        of    the    construction,           several
    architectural and design defects arose, and Phillips Way decided
    to   settle      complaints       about    these        problems        to    the    tune    of
    $260,000,       without     notifying      its        insurance     carrier,         American
    Equity.       Once the project had been accepted by the University,
    Phillips Way made a claim against American Equity for $260,000.
    See 
    id. at 217-18.
                  The contract between American Equity and
    Phillips       Way   contained     a     no-action       clause     which       stated,      in
    relevant part,
    No action shall be maintained against the Company by
    the Insured to recover for any loss under this
    Insurance Policy unless, as a condition precedent
    thereto, the Insured shall have fully complied with
    all the terms and conditions of this Insurance Policy,
    nor until the amount of such loss has been fixed or
    rendered certain by . . . agreement between the
    parties with the written consent of the Company.
    
    Id. at 216-17.
    Just like PTJV in this case, Phillips Way argued that
    Md. Code. Ann. § 19-110 applied, and as such, American Equity
    was required to show they were prejudiced by its failure to
    obtain    consent     before      settlement.           But   the   Court       of    Special
    Appeals       held   that   section       19-110       should     not    be    read     to    be
    “applicable to any defense raised by the 
    insurer.” 795 A.2d at 219
    .           Specifically,        it      explained         section          19-110        was
    “inapplicable        when   an    insurer    defends         on   the    basis      that     its
    15
    insured failed to meet the condition precedent set forth in a
    no-action clause . . . .”     
    Id. at 221.
         It continued,
    From the perspective of the insurer, one of the main
    purposes of a no action clause is to protect it from
    collusive   or    overly    generous    or  unnecessary
    settlements by the insured at the expense of the
    insurer.   That   last-mentioned    purpose  would   be
    difficult to accomplish if an insured could disregard
    the no-action clause, sue its insurer, and put the
    nearly impossible burden on the latter of showing
    collusion or demonstrating, after the fact, the true
    worth of the settled claim.
    
    Id. at 220-21
    (internal quotation marks omitted).
    Phillips Way is directly applicable to the case at
    hand.   The no-action clause in this case states that the insured
    cannot sue under the Policies “unless all of its terms have been
    fully   complied   with.”    J.A.     314   (emphasis   added).      It   also
    states that PTJV can sue to recover on a settlement only if the
    “settlement and release of liability” is “signed by [ACE].”               
    Id. The voluntary
       payment   clause    requires   ACE’s    consent    before
    “voluntarily mak[ing] a payment, assum[ing] any obligation, or
    incur[ring] any expense,” at the risk of relinquishing coverage.
    J.A. 314.    These are conditions precedent to PTJV’s ability to
    obtain coverage, that is, “fact[s], other than mere lapse of
    time, which, unless executed, must exist or occur before a duty
    of immediate performance of a promise arises.”             Chirichella v.
    Erwin, 
    310 A.2d 555
    , 557 (Md. 1973) (internal quotation marks
    omitted).    “[W]here a contractual duty is subject to a condition
    16
    precedent,     whether       express    or    implied,         there      is    no   duty    of
    performance and there can be no breach by nonperformance until
    the condition precedent is either performed or excused.”                              Laurel
    Race Course, Inc. v. Regal Constr. Co., 
    333 A.2d 319
    , 327 (Md.
    1975).
    ACE advances the same argument as the one in play in
    Phillips Way: because PTJV did not meet the condition precedent
    in the no-action clause (that is, it did not obtain consent
    before   settlement),         it    cannot        now    sue    ACE.           Phillips     Way
    directly vindicates this argument.                        Indeed, it is undisputed
    that   PTJV    did    not    obtain    ACE’s       consent     to    settlement       before
    settling with Gaylord.             Thus, PTJV cannot satisfy the conditions
    precedent of the voluntary payment and no-action clauses, as
    they “attempt[ed] to settle” and “voluntarily ma[d]e a payment”
    “without [ACE’s] consent,” (voluntary payment clause) and did
    not ensure the “settlement and release of liability [was] signed
    by [ACE]” (no-action clause).                  J.A. 314, 378.               The no-action
    clause also states PTJV has no right to sue “unless all of [the
    Policies’]      terms       have    been     fully        complied        with,”     and     as
    explained above, PTJV did not comply with all of the Policies’
    terms.
    We     also   note    that,     to    the     extent     PTJV      argues     the
    voluntary     payment       and    no-contest           clauses     are    implicated        by
    section 19-110’s “lack of cooperation and notice” provisions,
    17
    Phillips Way rightly rejected that argument.                           See Phillips 
    Way, 795 A.2d at 218
       (Even     “if   [the       insured]       had   notified      [the
    insurer] of the intended settlement and gave the latter its full
    cooperation,        the    condition       precedent         would     still      have   been
    breached if [the insurer] failed to give its written consent to
    that settlement.”); 
    id. at 220
    (stating, “an insurer must show
    prejudice only if it raises a failure to cooperate defense or a
    defense based on lack of notice,” and distinguishing cooperation
    and notice clauses from no-action clauses because cooperation
    and notice clauses “are contained in separate paragraphs from
    the ‘no-action’ clause,” and in no-action clauses, usually “the
    amount of liability, as well as the issue of liability, must
    both have been determined” (internal quotation marks omitted));
    see   also   J.A.     314    (Primary      Policy,         no-contest      and     voluntary
    payment clauses separate from notice and cooperation clauses),
    378 (Excess Policy, same).
    Therefore, because section 19-110 does not apply here,
    there is no statutory ground requiring ACE to show prejudice.
    Nonetheless,        PTJV    urges     us   to       find   that   ACE      must    yet   show
    prejudice     under        Maryland    common         law.        As    explained        next,
    however,     even    if    this     were   a    correct      statement       of    the   law,
    prejudice can be inferred as a matter of law.
    18
    2.
    Common Law
    PTJV and amici in this case argue that even if there
    is no statutory mandate that ACE show prejudice, ACE is still
    required   to     do   so   under    common    law.        We    disagree    and   read
    Phillips Way broadly as holding that an insured’s failure to
    obtain the insurer’s prior consent to a settlement does not ever
    require prejudice, primarily because -- whether statutory-based
    or   common     law-based       --   an   insurer     would      always     have   “the
    impossible burden . . . of showing collusion or demonstrating,
    after the fact, the true worth of the settled 
    claim.” 795 A.2d at 221
    .
    But even assuming ACE were required to show prejudice
    outside the ambit of section 19-110, we would be obliged to
    conclude ACE was prejudiced as a matter of law.                             In Prince
    George’s County v. Local Gov’t Ins. Trust, the Maryland Court of
    Appeals    held    that     a   trust,    acting      as    an    excess    liability
    insurer, was prejudiced as a matter of law when it was not
    notified of a claim until after its resolution.                     See 
    879 A.2d 81
    (Md. 2005).     The court explained,
    [T]he insured has presented the insurer with a fait
    accompli by delaying notice until after the judgment.
    The delay vitiates the purpose of the contractual
    notice requirement, as the insurer cannot exercise any
    of its rights to investigate, defend, control, or
    settle the suit.   Accordingly, courts have held that
    the insurer is prejudiced as a matter of law. . . .
    19
    By failing to notify the [insurer] of the incident,
    claim, and lawsuit until after the judgment, the
    [insured]   nullified   unilaterally   all   of   the
    [insurer]’s rights and presented the [insurer] with a
    fait accompli. . . .
    [The insured] put the [insurer] in a position of
    proving a negative and speculating about what could
    have been. The [insurer] need not speculate. By
    itself, the abrogation of all of the [insurer’s]
    contractual rights constituted prejudice.    We hold
    that the [insurer] was prejudiced as a matter of law
    when the [insured] failed to notify the [insurer] of
    the incident, claim, and lawsuit until after an
    adverse judgment was entered.
    
    Id. at 98,
    100. 4    We see no reason why this case -- wherein the
    insured   actually   paid   a   settlement,    thereby    cutting   off   the
    insurer’s right to “investigate, defend, control, or settle” a
    suit -- commands a result different from Prince George’s 
    County. 879 A.2d at 98
    .
    We   would   therefore    affirm     the     district   court’s
    decision under Maryland law, regardless of whether prejudice is
    required.
    4
    We have also had occasion to address this issue in the
    recent past.   In Minn. Lawyers Mut. v. Baylor & Jackson PPLC
    (“MLM”), --- F. App’x ----, No. 12-1581, 
    2013 WL 3215246
    (4th
    Cir. June 27, 2013), we concluded that under Maryland law, a
    professional liability insurer was prejudiced when a law firm
    failed to provide timely notice of a claim and MLM had “the
    exclusive right to investigate, negotiate and defend CLAIMS
    seeking DAMAGES against the INSURED.”   
    2013 WL 3215246
    at *7.
    We explained, “[b]y the time MLM received notice of a possible
    claim, the harm supporting the malpractice judgment was
    irreversible.” 
    Id. 20 C.
    Tennessee Law
    We   would    also     affirm       the    district      court’s     judgment
    under Tennessee law.             First and foremost, the Court of Appeals
    of Tennessee has stated, “Contracts of insurance, like other
    contracts,      are   to    be     construed       according          to    the   sense    and
    meaning of the terms which the parties have used, and if they
    are   clear    and    unambiguous,       their      terms       are    to    be   taken    and
    understood in their plain, ordinary, and popular sense.”                                 Jones
    Masonry, Inc. v. W. Am. Ins. Co., 
    768 S.W.2d 686
    , 687 (Tenn. Ct.
    App. 1988).
    In   Anderson        v.   Dudley          Moore    Insurance        Co.,    the
    Tennessee Court of Appeals held that when an insurance agency
    failed to process paperwork for a potential insured and then
    paid a settlement to the insured without notifying their errors
    and omissions (“e&o”) carrier, the agency could not recover from
    the   e&o     carrier      because      it   violated       the       voluntary     payment
    clause.     See 
    640 S.W.2d 556
    (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982).                             The court
    explained, “Although [the e&o carrier] had notice of a potential
    demand, plaintiff never made any formal request that the carrier
    investigate, defend, or pay the claim until long after it had
    made the ex parte payment to [the insured],” and this “was in
    express violation of the [voluntary payment] provision[].”                                
    Id. at 560.
          The court also rejected the notion that the voluntary
    21
    payment     clause     “relate[d]      only    to        disbursements        involving
    expenses of litigation and investigation,” explaining that if
    this were true, “an insured with ‘e&o’ coverage could determine
    what sums to pay when a claim is made and thereafter make demand
    upon the carrier for reimbursement without the carrier having
    any   input    in    the    process.        Such     a    construction        would    be
    extremely     illogical         and   unreasonably            restrictive.”           
    Id. Furthermore, “it
    would require that the express words contained
    in the agreement be ignored.”          
    Id. Similarly, in
    State Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lashlee-Rich,
    the Court of Appeals of Tennessee held an insured that violated
    a voluntary payment clause in an insurance policy was precluded
    from claiming coverage under that policy.                      See No. 02A01-9703-
    CH-71, 
    1997 WL 781896
    (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).                       In that case, a
    construction        company      (Lashlee-Rich)           accidentally         hit     an
    electrical wire while doing construction work, putting a nearby
    ice cream toppings business in peril of losing its inventory.
    Lashlee-Rich      quickly     contracted      with       an   electric   company       to
    perform     the     necessary     repairs     and    then       sought   to    collect
    reimbursement from State Auto, its insurer.                      Although Lashlee-
    Rich notified State Auto of the occurrence the following day, it
    did not mention that it had assumed an obligation to pay the
    electric company.          The insurance contract in that case, like in
    22
    the case at hand, contained a voluntary payment clause and a no-
    action clause.     See 
    id. at *2-3.
    The   court    held,      “Lashlee     attempted     to   bypass    the
    plain,    unambiguous     language      in   the    insurance     contracts     and
    thereby divest State Auto of its rights to oversee the handling
    of any claim.”          Lashlee-Rich, 
    1997 WL 781896
    at *4.                   In so
    doing, “undoubtedly, Lashlee-Rich violated the clear language of
    the policies by assuming an obligation, voluntarily making a
    payment and incurring an expense without State Auto’s consent.
    Lashlee-Rich did all of the foregoing to their own peril.”                       
    Id. at *5.
    This case is similar to both Anderson and Lashlee-
    Rich.     Here, PTJV took matters into its own hands, admittedly
    without obtaining consent from ACE, which divested ACE of its
    rights    under   the    Policies,     and   violated    the     terms   of     such
    Policies.
    As for prejudice, PTJV points to Alcazar v. Hayes, a
    landmark case in which Tennessee adopted the following policy:
    [O]nce it is determined that the insured has failed to
    provide timely notice in accordance with the insurance
    policy, it is presumed that the insurer has been
    prejudiced by the breach.   The insured, however, may
    rebut   this   presumption  by   proffering  competent
    evidence that the insurer was not prejudiced by the
    insured’s delay.
    
    982 S.W.2d 845
    , 856 (Tenn. 1998).                  However, Alcazar did not
    address   situations      of   fait   accompli,     which   we   have    here    and
    23
    which were present in Anderson and Lashlee-Rich.            Thus, those
    holdings   --   which   did   not   even   factor   prejudice   into    the
    equation -- still remain good law.            Therefore, we predict the
    highest court in Tennessee would likewise resolve the case at
    hand under Anderson and Lashlee-Rich, without requiring ACE to
    demonstrate prejudice. 5
    We   would   therefore    affirm    summary   judgment      under
    Tennessee law as well.
    5
    In its reply brief, PTJV cites a 2005 Tennessee case for
    the proposition that Alcazar extends to cases such as the one at
    hand, but that case does not deal with a fait accompli
    situation.   See Appellant's Rep. Br. 20 (citing Smith & Nephew
    v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. 02-2455, 
    2005 WL 3434819
    , at *3 (W. D.
    Tenn. Dec. 12, 2005)).    First of all, the Smith & Nephew case
    PTJV cites (a clarification order regarding fees) explicitly
    states that Alcazar deals with a breach of a “notice provision.”
    Smith & Nephew, 
    2005 WL 3434819
    , at *3.      As explained above,
    this case is about consent to settlement, not notice.         In
    addition, a closer examination of facts set forth in the earlier
    Smith & Nephew opinion reveals that the insured provided notice
    of litigation early on, but the insurer declined to get
    involved. After this notice was given, the insured settled the
    case, and the insurer did not consent to “fees and expenses”
    incurred by the insured.    Smith & Nephew v. Fed. Ins. Co., No.
    02-2455, 
    2005 WL 3134053
    , at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Nov. 23, 2005).
    Thus, in Tennessee, there is a distinct difference between an
    insurer being provided late notice while litigation is ongoing
    or has not yet begun, and being surprised with a claim for
    settlement reimbursement after the matter has already been
    resolved.
    24
    D.
    Waiver
    PTJV     argues    ACE    “waived     [its]      late       notice/voluntary
    payment defense,” or at least, this is an issue of fact that
    should    survive        summary   judgment.          Appellant’s         Br.       56.     It
    contends    “ACE    consistently        turned    a   blind       eye    to    the    Atrium
    Failure, ignored PTJV’s claim for unreasonably long periods of
    time and even went so far as to tell PTJV it would pay the
    claim.”    
    Id. at 57.
    Under Maryland and Tennessee law, a waiver requires
    the “intentional relinquishment of a known right existing for
    the benefit of the insurer.”                 Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Group
    Hosp. Med. Servs., Inc., 
    589 A.2d 464
    , 466 (Md. 1991) (internal
    quotation marks omitted); see also Kentucky Nat. Ins. Co. v.
    Gardner, 
    6 S.W.3d 493
    , 498-99 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (“A waiver
    is   an   intentional       relinquishment       of   a     known    right.”).             PTJV
    bears the burden of showing that ACE’s conduct is “so clearly
    inconsistent” with any intention to enforce the provision at
    issue     “that     the     conduct     constitutes          an     implied         waiver.”
    Kentucky 
    Nat., 6 S.W.3d at 499
    ; see also Springfield Tobacco
    Redryers    Corp.    v.     City   of   Springfield,         
    293 S.W.2d 189
    ,   199
    (Tenn.    Ct.     App.    1956)    (waiver     must    be    proven       by    a    “clear,
    unequivocal and decisive act . . . showing such a purpose, or
    25
    acts   amounting   to   an   estoppel”    (internal     quotation   marks
    omitted)).
    PTJV submits that ACE did the following things, which
    should constitute waiver or at least raise a genuine issue of
    material fact:     (1) ACE “ignored” the atrium failure (i.e., did
    not “take any action” after the Collapse); (2) ACE “failed to
    acknowledge PTJV’s claim for 10 months”; (3) ACE “represented to
    PTJV that it would pay the claim,” without reserving rights; and
    (4) ACE “refused to pay, but not on the basis of late notice.”
    Appellant’s Br. 55-59.
    However, none of these facts shows ACE’s “intentional
    relinquishment” of its right to invoke the provisions of the no-
    action and voluntary payment clauses, which as explained above,
    are the relevant provisions to this appeal.             In fact, in the
    September 8, 2010 letter from ACE offering to pay a certain part
    of the claim, it stated it “is not waiving, nor will it be
    estopped from asserting any other terms, conditions, exclusions
    or provisions of this policy.”         J.A. 2802.     For these reasons,
    PTJV’s waiver argument fails.
    IV.
    For these reasons, the judgment of the district court
    is
    AFFIRMED.
    26