Nelson v. Strawn ( 1996 )


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  • UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    JIMMIE NELSON,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    No. 95-7444
    TIM STRAWN, Officer; THE CITY OF
    MONCKS CORNER,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of South Carolina, at Charleston.
    David C. Norton, District Judge.
    (CA-93-66-2-18AJ)
    Submitted: December 26, 1995
    Decided: February 28, 1996
    Before HALL, MURNAGHAN, and WILKINS, Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished per
    curiam opinion.
    _________________________________________________________________
    COUNSEL
    Jimmie Nelson, Appellant Pro Se. Sandra J. Senn, STUCKEY &
    KOBROVSKY, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellees.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Jimmie Nelson appeals from a district court order granting sum-
    mary judgment in favor of Defendants, entered on recommendation
    of a magistrate judge acting pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 636(b) (1988).
    We affirm the order in part, vacate in part, and remand for further
    proceedings.
    Nelson filed a complaint under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     (1988), alleging
    that Defendant Strawn, a police officer, violated Nelson's civil rights
    by effecting an unlawful detention, using excessive force in effecting
    the detention, and denying him medical attention for serious medical
    needs arising from Strawn's acts. Nelson also alleged that the City of
    Moncks Corner, South Carolina (City), violated Nelson's civil rights
    by failing to train or supervise Strawn adequately.
    The district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of
    the City. First, the City cannot be liable under the theory of
    respondeat superior. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 
    436 U.S. 658
    , 694 (1978). Second, Nelson's allegations of municipal wrongdo-
    ing through failure to train or supervise were unsupported by any
    objective evidence that the City was deliberately indifferent to any of
    Nelson's rights in its training and supervision of its police officers.
    City of Canton v. Harris, 
    489 U.S. 378
    , 389 (1989). Nelson submitted
    nothing showing the city had a "policy" not to train officers or that
    there existed a pattern of unconstitutional behavior by police officers
    that would have necessitated action on the part of the City to cure the
    improprieties. See 
    id.
     Thus, there was no genuine issue of material
    fact regarding the City's right to judgment in its favor, and the district
    court properly granted summary judgment in its favor.
    The same is true of Nelson's claim against Strawn for seizure with-
    out probable cause. At the time this claim came before the district
    court, Nelson had admitted that he had set two fires in his jail cell.
    He alleged that Strawn was called by jail officials to help remove Nel-
    son to another cell. This is the improper seizure Nelson alleged as his
    initial Fourth Amendment claim. We assume for purposes of the sum-
    mary judgment motion that Strawn did help move Nelson. It is clear
    2
    that Strawn had a sound basis for effecting Nelson's seizure and mov-
    ing him to another cell: he was acting on information from jail offi-
    cials that Nelson had engaged in a criminal act, arson; he properly
    seized Nelson on a charge of arson and moved him to another cell.
    Thus, this claim was properly denied by summary judgment in favor
    of Strawn, and we affirm the order on this basis.
    With regard to Nelson's claims that Strawn used excessive force in
    moving him to another cell and that Strawn improperly denied Nel-
    son's requests for medical attention, we vacate the district court order
    and remand the claims. The district court improperly found that the
    complaint alleged causes of action against Strawn only in his official
    capacity. First, even had the complaint expressly stated that the claims
    were so intended, the body of the complaint revealed to the contrary,
    and the district court should have construed the claims to present
    claims against Strawn in his individual capacity. Biggs v. Meadows,
    
    66 F.3d 56
    , 58, 61 (4th Cir. 1995). Second, a document filed by Nel-
    son during the litigation and prior to the grant of summary judgment
    revealed that Nelson was attempting to make claims against Strawn
    in his individual capacity. The district court's error meant that it never
    reached the substance of Nelson's claims. We may do so on de novo
    review of the summary judgment order. See Anderson v. Liberty
    Lobby, Inc., 
    477 U.S. 242
    , 248-49 (1986).
    The district court was confronted, as are we, with conflicting,
    sworn allegations regarding the transfer of Nelson to another cell.
    Nelson swore that, during his pre-trial detention, Strawn used "chuck
    sticks" (sticks connected by a short chain) to move Nelson, resulting
    in bleeding, swelling, and pain, when such force was unnecessary.
    Nelson also alleged that Strawn kicked and beat him during the move.
    These allegations state Fourth Amendment claims, Graham v.
    Connor, 
    490 U.S. 386
    , 394 (1989), and the sworn complaint was suf-
    ficient to confront Defendant's affidavits to the contrary, Williams v.
    Griffin, 
    952 F.2d 820
    , 823 (4th Cir. 1991). Further, Nelson's allega-
    tions that he was in need of medical attention, requested such atten-
    tion, and that Strawn denied the request, are sworn, are in direct
    contravention of the Defendant's affidavits, and state a Fourteenth
    Amendment claim, Martin v. Gentile, 
    849 F.2d 863
    , 870 (4th Cir.
    1988.)* The record will not support Defendants' motion for summary
    judgment.
    _________________________________________________________________
    *We assume for purposes of this appeal that Nelson was, with regard
    to the arson charges that precipitated the action here, a pretrial detainee,
    so that the claims are not evaluated under the Eighth Amendment.
    3
    Thus, we affirm the district court order, albeit on somewhat differ-
    ent grounds, McMahan v. International Assoc. of Bridge, Structural
    & Ornamental Iron Workers, 
    964 F.2d 1462
    , 1467 (4th Cir. 1992)
    (court may affirm for any reason appearing on the record), with
    regard to the grant of summary judgment in favor of the City and with
    regard to the claim against Strawn that he seized Nelson without
    probable cause. We vacate the order with respect to Nelson's claims
    of excessive use of force and denial of medical needs. We express no
    opinion on the merits of those claims but remand them for further pro-
    ceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. We dispense with oral
    argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately pres-
    ented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
    decisional process.
    AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED
    4