United States v. Medrano-Sorto , 405 F. App'x 784 ( 2010 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4089
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JUAN RAMON MEDRANO-SORTO,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Anthony J. Trenga,
District Judge. (1:09-cr-00346-AJT-1)
Submitted: November 17, 2010 Decided: December 20, 2010
Before DUNCAN, AGEE, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Frances H.
Pratt, Kevin R. Brehm, Assistant Federal Public Defenders,
Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United
States Attorney, Michelle C. Brice, Special Assistant United
States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Juan Ramon Medrano-Sorto appeals his conviction after
a bench trial for illegal reentry subsequent to a conviction of
an aggravated felony in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(2)
(2006). On appeal, Medrano-Sorto contends that the district
court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment for
violation of the Speedy Trial Act. We affirm.
We review de novo the district court’s interpretation
of the Speedy Trial Act, and we review the court’s related
factual findings for clear error. United States v. Rodriguez-
Amaya, 521 F.3d 437, 440 (4th Cir. 2008). The Speedy Trial Act
provides that “[a]ny information or indictment charging an
individual with the commission of an offense shall be filed
within thirty days from the date on which such individual was
arrested or served with a summons in connection with such
charges.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) (2006). “Offense” means “any
Federal criminal offense which is in violation of any Act of
Congress and is triable by any court established by Act of
Congress.” 18 U.S.C. § 3172(2) (2006). If the thirty-day time
limit is not met, the charge “shall be dismissed.” 18 U.S.C. §
3162(a)(1) (2006).
Medrano-Sorto was served with the arrest warrant
charging him with the instant criminal offense and taken into
custody by the United States Marshal on July 1, 2009. He was
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indicted twenty-nine days later, on July 30, 2009. Medrano-
Sorto argues, however, that the thirty-day period under the
Speedy Trial Act began on June 11, 2009, while he was detained
in the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
officials who were processing his administrative deportation
back to El Salvador.
We have held that the Speedy Trial Act does not apply
to ICE administrative detention, since the plain language of the
Act limits its coverage to persons detained in connection with a
federal criminal arrest. Rodriguez-Amaya, 521 F.3d at 441.
However, we have also held that the Speedy Trial Act includes a
ruse exception, such that the Act’s time limits are triggered
when the primary or exclusive purpose of the civil detention was
to hold a defendant for future criminal prosecution. Id. at
442. We have further held that civil detainees bear the burden
of proving the exception applies in a given case. Id.In this case, Medrano-Sorto argues that the thirty-day
time limit was triggered on June 11, 2009, when his final order
of removal went into effect, contending that the purpose of his
detention at that point was for future criminal prosecution.
However, as the district court noted, there was no evidence that
work on his administrative deportation ceased on that date. Nor
was there any evidence of collusion between ICE and the
Government for the purpose of bypassing the Act’s requirements.
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We thus conclude that the district court did not clearly err in
finding that Medrano-Sorto failed to meet his burden of proving
that the primary or exclusive purpose of his detention by ICE
was to hold him for future criminal prosecution.
We accordingly affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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