United States v. Quinton McNeil , 547 F. App'x 322 ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4211
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
QUINTON JAMES MCNEIL,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan,
District Judge. (5:12-cr-00212-FL-1)
Submitted: November 26, 2013 Decided: December 4, 2013
Before MOTZ, SHEDD, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, G. Alan DuBois,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer
P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Quinton James McNeil appeals the thirty-month
departure sentence imposed following his guilty plea to
possession of a stolen firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(j), 924(a)(2) (2012). On appeal, McNeil argues that the
district court committed procedural error by failing to address
one of his arguments in favor of a within-Guidelines sentence
and that the extent of the departure rendered his sentence
substantively unreasonable. We affirm.
We review any criminal sentence, “whether inside, just
outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range,” for
reasonableness, “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion
standard.” United States v. King, 673 F.3d 274, 283 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 216 (2012); see Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38, 46, 51 (2007). When the district court imposes a
departure or variant sentence, “we consider whether the
sentencing court acted reasonably both with respect to its
decision to impose such a sentence and with respect to the
extent of the divergence from the sentencing range.” United
States v. Hernandez–Villanueva, 473 F.3d 118, 123 (4th Cir.
2007).
McNeil first argues that his sentence is procedurally
unreasonable because the district court failed to address
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McNeil’s argument that his immediate and significant assistance
to the police warranted a within-Guidelines sentence.
When the defendant presents nonfrivolous reasons for
imposing a particular sentence, the “district judge should
address the party’s arguments and explain why he has rejected
those arguments.” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328
(4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). In
explaining the chosen sentence, the “sentencing judge should set
forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has
considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for
exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.” Rita v.
United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007).
On this record, there is no room to question the
district court’s awareness of McNeil’s cooperation. It was
mentioned by counsel for both sides at sentencing and discussed
in the presentence report, with which the court plainly was
familiar. As such, although McNeil is correct that the court
did not explicitly state why this factor was not controlling as
to the issue of what sentence to impose, we “conclude that the
district court considered and implicitly rejected it as a
sufficient reason to impose a within-Guidelines sentence.”
United States v. Bowens, 527 F. App’x 256, 258 (4th Cir. 2013)
(unpublished).
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The sentencing transcript makes plain the court’s view
that any efforts at cooperation paled in comparison to McNeil’s
high likelihood of recidivating, as evidenced by his commission
of multiple breakings-and-enterings in a relatively short period
of time, and McNeil’s demonstrable lack of respect for the law,
evidenced by McNeil’s persistent refusal to conform his behavior
to the law or to abide by the terms of his probation. The court
also considered the lenient treatment McNeil received for his
past offenses and that McNeil had other dismissed and uncharged
conduct. Finally, the court expressly acknowledged — but
rejected — McNeil’s more robust argument that his youth and
immaturity countenanced a shorter term of imprisonment, opining
that its duty to protect the public would be discharged only if
McNeil were sentenced to a significant term of imprisonment.
“We will not vacate [a] sentence simply because the
court did not spell out what the context of its explanation made
patently obvious: namely, that a shorter prison term was
inappropriate for a defendant who had repeatedly committed a
serious offense and who had already proven immune to other means
of deterrence.” United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375,
381 (4th Cir. 2006). We accordingly reject McNeil’s claim of
procedural error.
Turning, then, to the substantive reasonableness of
the sentence, substantive reasonableness review requires that we
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evaluate “the totality of the circumstances to see whether the
sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding that the
sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth in [18
U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [(2012)].” United States v. Hargrove, 701
F.3d 156, 160-61 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks
omitted), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2403 (2013). Of course,
“district courts have extremely broad discretion when
determining the weight to be given each of the § 3553(a)
factors.” United States v. Jeffery, 631 F.3d 669, 679 (4th Cir.
2011). The Supreme Court mandates that this court “give due
deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a)
factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance. The
fact that the appellate court might reasonably have concluded
that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to
justify reversal of the district court.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
Though McNeil’s sentence is almost double the high end
of his Guidelines range, we discern no abuse of discretion in
the district court’s determination that such a deviation was
justified. The district court’s decision was rooted in McNeil’s
criminal history and the resistance he had previously
demonstrated to conforming his conduct to the mandates of the
law. McNeil’s criminal record was all the more concerning
considering his relatively young age, and the fact that most of
his crimes were committed within a three-year period. Because
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the district court’s decision to depart fourteen months above
the Guidelines range is supported by the record, it does not
constitute an abuse of discretion.
We accordingly hold that McNeil’s departure sentence
is reasonable, both procedurally and substantively, and affirm
the district court’s criminal judgment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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