United States v. Gregory Rawls , 547 F. App'x 336 ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4300
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
GREGORY LAMONT RAWLS, a/k/a G, a/k/a Bobby,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Cameron McGowan Currie, District
Judge. (3:12-cr-00602-CMC-1)
Submitted: November 19, 2013 Decided: December 5, 2013
Before AGEE, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Dismissed in part; affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
Jeremy A. Thompson, LAW OFFICE OF JEREMY A. THOMPSON, LLC,
Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Stacey Denise Haynes,
Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Gregory Rawls pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea
agreement, to possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, 18
U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012), and possession of heroin with intent to
distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), (b) (2012), and was sentenced as
an armed career criminal to 180 months’ imprisonment. In the
plea agreement, Rawls agreed to waive his right to appeal his
conviction and sentence, except for any claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct.
On appeal, Rawls’ attorney has filed a brief pursuant
to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that
there are no meritorious grounds for appeal, but questioning
whether counsel was ineffective for failing to file a
suppression motion prior to Rawls’ guilty plea. Although
informed of his right to file pro se supplemental brief, Rawls
has not done so. The Government has moved to dismiss Rawls’
appeal based on the appellate waiver provision in his plea
agreement. We dismiss in part and affirm in part.
We review a defendant’s waiver of appellate rights de
novo. United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir.
2005). “A defendant may waive his right to appeal if that
waiver is the result of a knowing and intelligent decision to
forgo the right to appeal.” United States v. Amaya–Portillo,
423 F.3d 427, 430 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks
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omitted). Generally, if the district court fully questions the
defendant about the waiver during the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 plea
colloquy, the waiver is valid and enforceable. United States v.
Johnson, 410 F.3d 137, 151 (4th Cir. 2005). We will enforce a
valid waiver so long as “the issue being appealed is within the
scope of the waiver.” Blick, 408 F.3d at 168.
Our review of the record leads us to conclude that
Rawls’ waiver of appellate rights was knowing and intelligent.
Therefore, we grant the Government’s motion to dismiss Rawls’
appeal as to his sentence and dismiss this portion of the
appeal. The waiver provision does not, however, preclude our
review of Rawls’ claim that his attorney was ineffective for
failing to file a suppression motion. Unless an attorney’s
ineffectiveness is conclusively apparent on the face of the
record, ineffective assistance claims are not generally
addressed on direct appeal. United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d
424, 435 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Richardson, 195 F.3d
192, 198 (4th Cir. 1999) (providing standard and noting that
ineffective assistance of counsel claims generally should be
raised by motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255). We find the record in
this case falls short of this exacting standard.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record and have found no meritorious issues that are outside the
scope of the appeal waiver. We therefore affirm the district
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court’s judgment as to all issues not encompassed by Rawls’
valid waiver of his right to appeal. This court requires that
counsel inform Rawls, in writing, of his right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Rawls
requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that
such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in
this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s
motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Rawls. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED IN PART;
AFFIRMED IN PART
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