United States v. Darnell Black , 737 F.3d 280 ( 2013 )


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  •                                PUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 13-6228
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    DARNELL BLACK, a/k/a Chuck,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.   Terrence W. Boyle,
    District Judge. (5:05-cr-00313-BO-1)
    Argued:   October 30, 2013                 Decided:   December 6, 2013
    Before NIEMEYER, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by published opinion.        Judge Niemeyer wrote the
    opinion, in which Judge King and Judge Duncan joined.     Judge
    King wrote a separate concurring opinion.
    ARGUED: G. Alan DuBois, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,
    Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant.         Yvonne Victoria
    Watford-McKinney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh,
    North Carolina, for Appellee.    ON BRIEF:   Thomas P. McNamara,
    Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,
    Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant.       Thomas G. Walker,
    United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United
    States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh,
    North Carolina, for Appellee.
    NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:
    Darnell     Black     was       sentenced       in     January    2007     to     the
    statutory minimum of 120 months’ imprisonment for conspiracy to
    traffic in more than 50 grams of crack cocaine.                           See 21 U.S.C.
    § 841(b)(1).         The    Fair    Sentencing          Act,   which     was    enacted    in
    2010, more than three years after Black was sentenced, reduced
    the statutory minimum sentence applicable to his circumstances
    from 120 months’ imprisonment to 60 months’ imprisonment.                               Black
    filed    a   motion    under       18    U.S.C.     §    3582(c)(2)      to     modify    his
    sentence, contending that the reduced minimum sentences in the
    Fair Sentencing Act should apply to him.                          The district court
    denied his motion, relying on our decision in United States v.
    Bullard, 
    645 F.3d 237
    (4th Cir. 2011), in which we held that the
    Fair Sentencing Act does not apply retroactively.
    For the reasons given herein, we affirm.                       We conclude that
    the statutory minimum sentences in the Fair Sentencing Act do
    not apply to a defendant sentenced before the Act’s effective
    date.     Moreover, we reject Black’s argument that a § 3582(c)(2)
    proceeding        conducted    after       the    effective       date     of    the     Fair
    Sentencing Act provides a vehicle by which to apply the reduced
    minimum sentences in the Fair Sentencing Act to him.
    2
    I
    Black pleaded guilty on September 14, 2006, to conspiracy
    to distribute and possess with intent to distribute more than 50
    grams   of    crack     cocaine,      in     violation     of    21     U.S.C.       §§ 846,
    841(a)(1).        In    the     presentence       report       prepared       for    Black’s
    sentencing, the probation officer recommended that Black be held
    accountable for 84.2 grams of crack cocaine and 26.8 grams of
    powder cocaine, yielding, after other adjustments not relevant
    here,   a    Sentencing         Guidelines       range    of    97     to    121     months’
    imprisonment.          Because the underlying drug trafficking offense
    involved more than 50 grams of crack cocaine, however, Black was
    subject      to   a     statutory         minimum   sentence          of     120     months’
    imprisonment,         
    id. § 841(b)(1)(A)
         (2006),      and        therefore      his
    sentencing range became 120 to 121 months’ imprisonment.                                    On
    January     23,   2007,     the    district      court    sentenced         Black     to   120
    months’ imprisonment, the statutory minimum.
    More     than     three      years    later,   Congress         enacted        the    Fair
    Sentencing Act of 2010 (“FSA”), Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat.
    2372, in response to extensive criticism about the disparity in
    sentences     between       crack    cocaine      offenses       and    powder       cocaine
    offenses.     See Dorsey v. United States, 
    132 S. Ct. 2321
    , 2328-29
    (2012).       Among     other      things,    the   FSA    reduced          the    statutory
    minimum sentences for crack cocaine offenses by increasing the
    quantity of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the minimums --
    3
    raising the amount from 15 grams to 28 grams for the 5-year
    minimum sentence, and from 50 grams to 280 grams for the 10-year
    minimum sentence.           See FSA § (2)(a).           The Act left the statutory
    minimum sentences for powder cocaine in place.                              The effect of
    the changes was to reduce the sentencing disparity between crack
    cocaine offenses and powder cocaine offenses by lowering the
    crack-to-powder ratio from 100-to-1 to 18-to-1.                               The FSA also
    directed     the    Sentencing      Commission         to     conform    the    Sentencing
    Guidelines to the new statutory minimums “as soon practicable.”
    
    Id. § 8.
         The     Sentencing      Commission         thereafter       promulgated
    amendments         to     the     Guidelines,         reducing        the      recommended
    sentencing        ranges    to    levels    consistent         with     the    FSA,     to   be
    applied retroactively.              See U.S.S.G. App. C Amends. 750, 759
    (2011).          Comments    to    the    Guidelines,         however,        explain    that
    retroactive amendments do not alter statutory minimum terms of
    imprisonment.           See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, cmt. n.1(A).
    On October 18, 2012, Black filed a motion to reduce his
    sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), which allows for a
    sentence reduction “in the case of a defendant who has been
    sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range
    that       has    subsequently           been       lowered     by      the     Sentencing
    Commission.”        Black claimed that because the FSA had lowered the
    statutory minimum for the amount of crack cocaine for which he
    was    accountable        from    120    months’      imprisonment       to     60    months’
    4
    imprisonment and the Sentencing Commission had, as required by
    the FSA, reduced its recommended sentencing ranges for crack
    cocaine    to    the   same     extent,   his   sentence   should      be   reduced
    accordingly.
    The district court denied Black’s motion, relying on our
    decision in Bullard to state that “[t]he Fourth Circuit, like
    most others, has held that the FSA mandatory minimums do not
    apply retroactively.”           The court therefore concluded that while
    “application of the retroactive FSA guidelines to this matter
    results in a new guideline range of fifty-one to sixty-three
    months . . . [the] defendant still faces a pre-FSA mandatory
    minimum of 120 months’ imprisonment.”
    Black filed this appeal, arguing primarily that even though
    the Supreme Court’s decision in Dorsey may not have directly
    overruled       Bullard,   it    nonetheless    provides   the       rationale   for
    applying the FSA to his § 3582(c)(2) proceeding and thereby for
    modifying his 120-month sentence, which had been imposed in 2007
    before the effective date of the Act.
    II
    Black contends that the Supreme Court’s decision in Dorsey,
    while     not    holding   that    the    FSA   applies    to    a    § 3582(c)(2)
    proceeding, implies such a result through its reasoning.                         He
    recognizes Dorsey’s narrow holding that persons sentenced after
    5
    the effective date of the FSA for an offense committed before
    the effective date should be sentenced pursuant to the FSA.                              To
    apply that holding, he reasons that a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding is
    a sentencing proceeding, and therefore, because his § 3582(c)(2)
    proceeding took place after the FSA’s effective date, he should
    be   sentenced     under      the   FSA,        which    establishes          a     reduced
    statutory minimum sentence of 60 months’ imprisonment for the
    amount of drugs involved in his crime.
    To   reach   this    conclusion,         he   relies     on    the     reasons    the
    Dorsey Court gave for concluding that a defendant who commits a
    crime before the effective date of the FSA but was sentenced
    after the effective date should have the benefit of the FSA.                            He
    argues that just as Dorsey’s holding did no violence to the
    basic principles governing the retroactivity of legislation, a
    holding    applying    the    FSA   to     §     3582(c)(2)         proceedings      would
    similarly do no such violence.                 This is because, he explains, a
    sentencing court generally applies the Sentencing Guidelines in
    effect on the date of sentencing, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A)(ii),
    and the FSA was enacted against that statutory background.                              He
    contends    that   his     construction          is     confirmed      by     the    FSA’s
    directive to the Sentencing Commission to conform its Guidelines
    to   the   FSA   “as   soon    as   practicable”         and    by     the    Sentencing
    Commission’s response in promulgating reduced Guidelines ranges,
    to be applied retroactively.             Moreover, he argues, as a policy
    6
    consideration, the Supreme Court in Dorsey recognized that the
    FSA was enacted to eliminate disparities and application of the
    FSA through § 3582(c)(2) would eliminate disparities.                    As he
    states:
    It follows from the reasoning of Dorsey that Congress
    intended that the Fair Sentencing Act’s more lenient
    mandatory   minimums also   apply  in   §  3582(c)(2)
    proceedings based on the retroactive FSA guideline
    amendments.
    While Black’s logical development is neat, it overlooks and
    therefore fails to address legal realities.           First, there is no
    language in the FSA explicitly providing or even suggesting that
    it be applied retroactively.         Second, Dorsey resolved a tension
    between 1 U.S.C. § 109 and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4) with reasoning
    that would not apply to a sentence-modification proceeding under
    § 3582(c)(2).        Third, without precedential support from Dorsey,
    Black is bound by our decision in Bullard, which held that the
    FSA is not retroactive.         And fourth, a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding
    is   not   a   sentencing   proceeding   as   addressed   in   Dorsey,    and,
    moreover,      the   language   of   § 3582(c)(2)    itself     limits     its
    applicability to the situation where the defendant was sentenced
    based on a sentencing range that subsequently was reduced by the
    Sentencing Commission.       We address the second, third, and fourth
    points in further detail.
    7
    A
    In construing the FSA, the Dorsey Court was faced with the
    task of resolving the tension between the principles inherent in
    two   statutes      that    seemed      to        pull     in    opposite    directions.
    Section     109    of    Title    1,        which     is    a     statute    of    general
    applicability, provides, as the Dorsey Court described it, that
    “a new criminal statute that repeals an older criminal statute
    shall not change the penalties incurred under that older statute
    unless the repealing Act shall so expressly provide.”                                  
    Dorsey, 132 S. Ct. at 2330
    (internal quotation marks and alterations
    omitted).     Section 3553(a)(4)(A)(ii) of Title 18, on the other
    hand, provides, again as the Dorsey Court described it, that
    “regardless       of     when    the        offender’s          conduct     occurs,       the
    applicable Guidelines are the ones in effect on the date the
    defendant is sentenced.”            
    Id. at 2331
    (internal quotation marks
    omitted).         The    Court   observed           that    the    language       of    these
    statutes “argues in opposite directions.”                           
    Id. at 2230.
               In
    resolving the tension, the Court concluded that Congress, in
    enacting the FSA, clearly understood and accepted the existing
    principles    of       § 3553(a),      as    it      specifically         instructed      the
    Sentencing Commission to promulgate new Guidelines “as soon as
    practicable.”          Thus, the Court reasoned that Congress intended
    that the FSA apply to all those who had not yet been sentenced
    even though their crimes may have been committed before the Act.
    8
    
    Id. at 2331
    .     Moreover,      it    observed      that       this     conclusion
    eliminated an undesirable disparity, noting that two different
    defendants accountable for the same quantity of crack cocaine
    and sentenced on the same day after the effective date of the
    FSA -- one for a crime committed before the Act’s effective date
    and one for a crime committed after -- should be subject to the
    same law at sentencing.            
    Id. at 2333.
              In essence, the Court
    held    that    the   FSA    should    be      applied    prospectively          to    all
    sentences imposed after the Act’s effective date of August 3,
    2010.       
    Id. at 2335.
    While    the   Court’s    interpretation          of    the     FSA    eliminated
    disparities among all defendants sentenced after the effective
    date, it recognized that its construction would leave in place
    disparities      between     defendants     sentenced         before    the    effective
    date of the FSA and defendants sentenced after.                        Dorsey, 132 S.
    Ct.    at    2335.     The    Court   reasoned       that       some    disparity      is
    inevitable when Congress changes the penalty for a crime.                        
    Id. In this
    case, Black was sentenced in 2007, before the 2010
    effective date of the FSA, and therefore cannot rely on Dorsey’s
    reasoning.       Any efforts by Black to broaden Dorsey’s holding by
    arguing that the FSA applies generally to reduce the sentences
    of all persons having received statutory minimum sentences at
    any time before the effective date of the FSA are not supported
    9
    by any statute or case law.                      Indeed, our decision in Bullard
    precludes such efforts.
    B
    In     Bullard,       we     held      “that           the       FSA   does    not   apply
    retroactively.”          
    Bullard, 645 F.3d at 249
    .                      The defendant there
    committed a crime before the effective date of the FSA and was
    also sentenced before the effective date, just as is the case
    here,     and    we     limited    our       holding             to   those    circumstances.
    Indeed, we specifically noted, “We do not address the issue of
    whether the FSA could be found to apply to defendants whose
    offenses were committed before August 3, 2010, but who have not
    yet been sentenced, as that question is not presented here.”
    
    Id. at 248
    n.5 (emphasis added).                            Likewise, the Dorsey Court
    expressly       noted    that     it       was        not       extending     its   relief   to
    individuals sentenced before the FSA’s effective date:
    We also recognize that application of the new minimums
    to pre-Act offenders sentenced after August 3 will
    create   a  new   set   of   disparities.     But   those
    disparities, reflecting a line-drawing effort, will
    exist whenever Congress enacts a new law changing
    sentences    (unless    Congress    intends    re-opening
    sentencing proceedings concluded prior to a new law's
    effective date). We have explained how in federal
    sentencing the ordinary practice is to apply new
    penalties to defendants not yet sentenced, while
    withholding   that   change   from   defendants   already
    sentenced.    [C]ompare 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A)(ii)
    with § 3582(c).
    *         *          *
    10
    We consequently conclude that this particular new
    disparity (between those pre-Act offenders already
    sentenced and those not yet sentenced as of August 3)
    cannot make a critical difference.
    Dorsey, 132 S. Ct at 2335 (citation omitted).
    Since Dorsey was decided, we have twice concluded that it
    did not overrule our decision in Bullard.                   In United States v.
    Mouzone, 
    687 F.3d 207
    , 222 (4th Cir. 2012), we held, citing both
    Dorsey and Bullard, that the FSA “applies retroactively only to
    ‘offenders whose crimes preceded August 3, 2010, but who are
    sentenced after that date.’”               (Emphasis added).          Likewise, in
    United States v. Allen, 
    716 F.3d 98
    , 107 (4th Cir. 2013), we
    stated that “our holding in Bullard -- that the Fair Sentencing
    Act does not have retroactive effect -- is limited [by Dorsey]
    to the extent that the Fair Sentencing Act does apply to all
    sentences handed down after its enactment.”
    C
    Black   attempts       to       distinguish    our        Bullard    line    of
    precedents by noting that those cases involved direct appeals of
    the defendants’ initial sentences, whereas his case involves a
    motion    under      18   U.S.C.   §    3582(c)(2).         He    argues   that    his
    § 3582(c)(2)      motion    initiated      a   new   sentencing      proceeding     to
    which    the   FSA    would   apply      under   Dorsey,     because       the   “new”
    sentencing proceeding took place after the effective date of the
    FSA.
    11
    In    making        this           argument,       he     acknowledges         that     his
    § 3582(c)(2) proceeding, which allows for limited modifications,
    was not a “plenary resentencing.”                       But he argues:
    A sentence “modification” under § 3582(c) bears many
    of the hallmarks of an initial sentencing:         the
    district court must calculate the advisory guideline
    range in light of the amended guideline provisions, it
    must consider the statutory sentencing factors set out
    at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and it must exercise
    discretion to determine what sentence to impose in
    light of these factors.      See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10,
    § 3582(c)(2).   Especially in cases where a defendant
    received a substantial assistance departure initially,
    the district court enjoys substantial latitude in the
    manner and means of calculating what reduction, if
    any, to grant the defendant.
    This argument overlooks the fact that Black is serving a
    statutory    minimum          sentence       that       was   imposed     on   him     in   2007,
    before     the    2010        effective          date    of   the     FSA,     and     that   the
    reasoning of Dorsey, applying the FSA to sentences imposed after
    its   effective         date,      referred        to    initial      sentencings,       as   the
    Court alluded to the relationship between the criminal act and
    the   sentence,         not     to       subsequent       proceedings        to   modify      the
    sentence.         See, e.g., 
    Dorsey, 132 S. Ct. at 2331-32
    , (referring
    to the imposition of penalties for a crime when discussing the
    tension      between           1      U.S.C.        §     109       and      18      U.S.C.     §
    3553(a)(4)(A)(ii));             see       also    
    id. at 2335
       (referring        to   the
    disparity        left    by        its    decision       as     “between       those    pre-Act
    offenders already sentenced and those not yet sentenced as of
    August 3” (emphasis added)).                      Black’s § 3582(c)(2) motion is an
    12
    effort to modify a preexisting sentence, imposed in 2007, and
    Black fails to explain how his 2007 sentence could be changed
    without a retroactive application of the FSA.
    Moreover,       Black’s       ability           to    obtain    modification      under
    § 3582(c)(2)    of    an     earlier       entered         sentence    would    have   been
    available only if his 2007 sentence were “based on a sentencing
    range that ha[d] subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing
    Commission     pursuant       to      28    U.S.C.          § 994(o).”         18   U.S.C.
    § 3582(c)(2) (emphasis added).                       That gate of opportunity was
    thus open only under conditions that Black did not satisfy --
    his sentence was not based on “a sentencing range” that the
    Sentencing Commission subsequently lowered.                           He was originally
    sentenced to a statutory minimum sentence fixed by Congress in
    21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1), and the Sentencing Commission did not
    change, nor purport to change, that statutory minimum sentence.
    Indeed,   it   had    no   authority        to        change   any    statutory     minimum
    fixed by congressional enactment.
    This      is     explicitly            recognized          by     the      Sentencing
    Commission’s        policy     statement              applicable       to     § 3582(c)(2)
    proceedings.        See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (providing that any
    reduction under § 3582(c)(2) must be “consistent with applicable
    policy    statements         issued        by        the    Sentencing       Commission”).
    U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, the applicable policy statement, specifies
    that a defendant is not eligible for § 3582(c)(2) relief where
    13
    his   Guideline      range    has    not     been       lowered       “because      of    the
    operation of another guideline or statutory provision (e.g., a
    statutory mandatory minimum term of imprisonment).”                               U.S.S.G.
    § 1B1.10 cmt. n.1(A) (emphasis added).                     “Together, § 3582(c)(2)
    and   the   Policy    Statement      make       clear     that    a    defendant     whose
    offense of conviction involved crack is eligible for a reduced
    sentence     only     if     [the    amendment]          lowers       the    defendant’s
    applicable guideline range.”               United States v. Munn, 
    595 F.3d 183
    , 187 (4th Cir. 2010).
    The Sentencing Commission also made this point clear when
    issuing     Guideline      Amendment        759,       which      made      the    primary
    Guideline     Amendment       implementing          the     FSA       (Amendment         750)
    retroactive.        The Commission stated that “[t]he Fair Sentencing
    Act of 2010 did not contain a provision making the statutory
    changes retroactive. . . .                 [T]he inclusion of Amendment 750
    (Parts A and C) in § 1B1.10(c) only allows the guideline changes
    to be considered for retroactive application; it does not make
    any of the statutory changes in the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010
    retroactive.”         U.S.S.G.      App.    C    Amend.     750       (2011)      (emphasis
    added).
    In this case, Black’s 120-month sentence was the minimum
    required by statute at the time he was sentenced.                              Since the
    Sentencing     Commission      did    not,       nor    could     not,      reduce       this
    statutorily     mandated       minimum,      Black        was    “ineligible        for     a
    14
    reduction under § 3582(c)(2).”                  
    Munn, 595 F.3d at 187
    ; see also
    United States v. Hood, 
    556 F.3d 226
    , 235-36 (4th Cir. 2009).
    III
    In sum, we conclude, as we did in Bullard, that the reduced
    statutory       minimum      sentences       enacted      in   the   FSA    on    August       3,
    2010,     do    not       apply      retroactively        to     defendants       who      both
    committed       crimes       and   were     sentenced      for     those    crimes       before
    August 3, 2010.             See 
    Bullard, 645 F.3d at 249
    .              We also conclude
    that a proceeding commenced by the filing of a motion under §
    3582(c)(2) is not a sentencing proceeding to which the holding
    of Dorsey applies.              See United States v. Blewett, __ F.3d __,
    No. 12-5226(L), 
    2013 WL 6231727
    , *8-10 (6th Cir. Dec. 3, 2013)
    (en     banc)       (“[A]     mandatory       minimum      subsequently          lowered       by
    Congress is not, as § 3582(c)(2) requires, a ‘sentencing range .
    . . subsequently . . . lowered by the Sentencing Commission
    pursuant       to    28     U.S.C.    §     994(o)’”     (omissions        in    original));
    United States v. Kelly, 
    716 F.3d 180
    , 182 (5th Cir. 2013) (“We
    thus    join        our   sister      circuits      in    declining        to    treat     a   §
    3582(c)(2) modification hearing as the equivalent of an original
    sentencing hearing under Dorsey”); United States v. Hammond, 
    712 F.3d 333
    ,       336     (6th     Cir.    2013)       (same);     United      States        v.
    Augustine, 
    712 F.3d 1290
    , 1295 (9th Cir. 2013) (same); United
    States v. Berry, 
    701 F.3d 374
    , 377 (11th Cir. 2012) (same).
    15
    Finally, we conclude, as we stated in Munn, that a defendant who
    has   been    convicted    of     a   crack     cocaine   offense   and    given   a
    statutory minimum sentence is “ineligible for a reduction under
    § 3582(c)(2).”      
    Munn, 595 F.3d at 187
    ; see also 
    Hood, 556 F.3d at 235-36
    .
    In     reaching     these       conclusions,    we    recognize      that    a
    discrepancy remains between those sentenced to statutory minimum
    sentences under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) before August 3, 2010, the
    effective date of the FSA, and those sentenced after.                     But such
    a   discrepancy,    “reflecting        a   line-drawing    effort,   will     exist
    whenever Congress enacts a new law changing sentences,” 
    Dorsey, 132 S. Ct. at 2335
    , and any unfairness resulting from such a
    discrepancy is “beyond the province of this court to resolve,”
    
    Augustine, 712 F.3d at 1295
    .
    Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is
    AFFIRMED.
    16
    KING, Circuit Judge, concurring:
    Bound   by     our   decision    in   Bullard,     I     join    in   Judge
    Niemeyer’s opinion for the Court.           I write separately to express
    my   regret   that   controlling      precedent    compels     such   an    unfair
    result.     Prior to the FSA, Congress’s insistence on unduly harsh
    mandatory     minimum      sentences     for      nonviolent     crack-cocaine
    offenders — even after such sentences were widely acknowledged
    to be racially discriminatory — was a grim misfire in the war on
    drugs.    Remnants of the injustice thus occasioned will persist
    as the result of our opinion today.
    Fortunately, the Supreme Court’s decision in Dorsey does
    not foreclose the hope that Bullard could one day be abrogated.
    As Judge Niemeyer’s opinion makes clear, Dorsey stopped short of
    deciding whether a defendant sentenced under the old regime may
    avail himself of an FSA-reduced mandatory minimum.                    The Dorsey
    decision therefore left open the possibility that the Court will
    confront that retroactivity issue in a subsequent case.                        The
    Court could yet be persuaded — as am I — by Black’s contention
    that the reasoning underlying Dorsey applies with equal force to
    defendants such as him.         Others have made known their similar
    views.      See United States v. Blewett, ___ F.3d ___, No. 12-
    5226(L), 
    2013 WL 6231727
    , at *36-38 (6th Cir. Dec. 3, 2013) (en
    banc) (Rogers, J., dissenting).
    17
    Otherwise, I join the call for congressional and executive
    action following through on the noble promise of the FSA:                to
    “restore fairness to Federal cocaine sentencing.”              See Pub. L.
    111-220, 124 Stat. 2372, 2372.       There is nothing fair about the
    ongoing plight of thousands of crack-cocaine offenders who yet
    languish in our prison system, serving sentences based largely
    on   race-based   misperceptions,   rather   than   on   the   gravity   of
    their criminal conduct.
    18
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 13-6228

Citation Numbers: 737 F.3d 280, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 24299, 2013 WL 6354142

Judges: Niemeyer, King, Duncan

Filed Date: 12/6/2013

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024