United States v. Craig Singleton , 547 F. App'x 356 ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4291
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CRAIG WAYNE SINGLETON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Clarksburg. Irene M. Keeley,
District Judge. (1:06-cr-00089-IMK-3)
Submitted: November 19, 2013 Decided: December 9, 2013
Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Kristen Leddy, Research and Writing Specialist, L. Richard
Walker, Senior Litigator, FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICE,
Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellant. William J. Ihlenfeld,
II, United States Attorney, Shawn Angus Morgan, Assistant United
States Attorney, Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
In 2007, Craig Wayne Singleton pleaded guilty to
distribution of cocaine base within 1000 feet of a protected
location, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 860 (2012). The district
court ultimately imposed a sentence of forty-one months’
imprisonment, followed by six years of supervised release. In
2010, Singleton was released from incarceration. In March 2013,
his probation officer filed a petition for his arrest, alleging
five violations of the conditions of supervised release.
Following a hearing, the district court found that Singleton had
violated all five conditions. The court revoked release and
imposed a five-month sentence of imprisonment, followed by a new
sixty-seven month term of supervised release. Singleton now
appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support
revocation. We affirm.
On appeal, Singleton contends that the evidence was
insufficient to establish that his alleged misconduct was
intentional. He argues that the district court failed to
consider the lack of evidence of his intent and instead took a
strict liability approach to determining if he committed the
charged violations. Finally, he asserts that he could not have
committed two of the violations—failing to obey his probation
officer’s orders and failing to attend substance abuse
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treatment—because the probation officer never ordered Singleton
to begin or complete the treatment by a certain date.
On October 4, 2013, while this appeal was pending,
Singleton was released from incarceration and began serving his
new term of supervised release. We may address sua sponte
whether an issue on appeal presents “a live case or controversy
. . . since mootness goes to the heart of the Article III
jurisdiction of the courts.” Friedman’s, Inc. v. Dunlap, 290
F.3d 191, 197 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Because Singleton has already served his term of
imprisonment, there is no longer a live controversy regarding
the district court’s decision to impose an active prison
sentence, and any challenge to that sentence is therefore moot.
See United States v. Hardy, 545 F.3d 280, 283-84 (4th Cir.
2008). But because Singleton is serving a new term of
supervised release, we retain jurisdiction to review the
district court’s revocation decision, the issue raised in this
appeal.
We review a district court’s decision to revoke
supervised release for abuse of discretion. United States v.
Pregent, 190 F.3d 279, 282 (4th Cir. 1999). To revoke release,
the district court must find a violation of a condition of
release by a preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e)(3) (2012). We review for clear error factual findings
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underlying the conclusion that a violation of the terms of
supervised release occurred. See United States v. Carothers,
337 F.3d 1017, 1019 (8th Cir. 2003).
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in finding that Singleton committed at least four
charged violations of the conditions of supervised release. *
Viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, United
States v. Green, 599 F.3d 360, 367 (4th Cir. 2010), the
probation officer’s testimony established each of these
offenses, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in
so finding. Further, the record reveals no reason to conclude
that the district court’s sentencing determination might have
been different had it found that Singleton had committed only
four violations of the conditions of his supervised release.
Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the material before this court and argument will
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
*
We need not resolve whether sufficient evidence supported
the district court’s finding that Singleton knowingly failed to
appear for a scheduled drug test, as we are persuaded that
sufficient evidence sustains the other four charged violations.
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