United States v. Damon Quick , 556 F. App'x 252 ( 2014 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4522
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
DAMON ANTOINE QUICK,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. James A. Beaty, Jr.,
District Judge. (1:12-cr-00291-JAB-1)
Submitted: February 20, 2014 Decided: February 25, 2014
Before GREGORY, DUNCAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Diana Stavroulakis, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for Appellant.
Randall Stuart Galyon, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Damon Antoine Quick appeals his convictions and
216-month sentence imposed after his guilty plea to seven counts
of interference with commerce by robbery and one count of
brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence. On appeal,
counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious issues
for appeal but questioning whether the court had jurisdiction
over Quick’s crimes, whether Quick’s plea was knowing and
voluntary, and whether the district court imposed a reasonable
sentence. Quick was informed of his right to file a pro se
supplemental brief but has not done so. The Government has
declined to file a response brief. For the reasons that follow,
we affirm.
First, the district court had jurisdiction over the
case pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (2012). Quick pled guilty to
a federal crime, and the district court therefore had original
jurisdiction over this case. Thus, this claim is without merit.
Turning to the guilty plea, because Quick did not move
in the district court to withdraw his guilty plea, the guilty
plea proceeding is reviewed for plain error only. United
States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002). We
conclude that the district court substantially complied with the
requirements of Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 in accepting Quick’s guilty
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plea. The court ensured that the plea was knowing, voluntary,
and supported by a factual basis. We therefore find the plea
valid and enforceable. See United States v. Moussaoui, 591
F.3d 263, 278 (4th Cir. 2010)(“In evaluating the constitutional
validity of a guilty plea, courts look to the totality of the
circumstances surrounding [it], granting the defendant’s solemn
declaration of guilt a presumption of truthfulness.”).
We review Quick’s sentence for reasonableness under a
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). This review entails appellate
consideration of both the procedural and substantive
reasonableness of the sentence. Id. In determining procedural
reasonableness, we consider whether the district court properly
calculated the defendant’s advisory Guidelines range, gave the
parties an opportunity to argue for an appropriate sentence,
considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors, selected a
sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, and sufficiently
explained the selected sentence. Id. at 49-51.
If the sentence is free of significant procedural
error, we review it for substantive reasonableness, “tak[ing]
into account the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 51.
If the sentence is within the properly calculated Guidelines
range, we apply a presumption on appeal that the sentence is
substantively reasonable. United States v. Susi, 674 F.3d 278,
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289 (4th Cir. 2012). Such a presumption is rebutted only if the
defendant shows “that the sentence is unreasonable when measured
against the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Montes-Pineda,
445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in sentencing Quick. We have thoroughly reviewed the
record and discern no error in Quick’s sentence. The court
adopted the undisputed Guidelines range and sentenced Quick
within this range and the statutory sentencing range applicable
to his offense. In addition, the court gave a thorough
explanation for its sentencing, addressing Quick’s argument for
a lower sentence as well as the Government’s arguments for a
longer sentence. Finally, the record fails to rebut the
presumption of reasonableness accorded his within-Guidelines
sentence.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm Quick’s conviction and sentence. This court
requires that counsel inform Quick, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Quick requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel
may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
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representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Quick. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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