United States v. Damion Roscoe ( 2014 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4345
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DAMION ROSCOE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Richard D. Bennett, District Judge.
(1:06-cr-00534-RDB-1)
Submitted: January 30, 2014 Decided: February 20, 2014
Before DUNCAN, KEENAN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, LaKeytria Felder, Assistant
Federal Public Defender, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant.
Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Justin S. Herring,
Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Damion Roscoe admitted to violating the terms of his
supervised release by absconding from supervision. He appeals
from the twenty-four-month revocation sentence imposed by the
district court. He contends that this sentence was plainly
unreasonable. We affirm.
We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of
supervised release if it is within the prescribed statutory
range and not plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup,
461 F.3d 433, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). First we consider whether
the sentence imposed is procedurally or substantively
unreasonable. Id. at 438. In this initial inquiry, we take a
more deferential posture concerning issues of fact and the
exercise of discretion than that undertaken for the
reasonableness review for Guidelines sentences. United States
v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007). If we find the
sentence procedurally or substantively unreasonable, we must
then decide whether it is “plainly” so. Id. at 657.
Here, the district court correctly calculated and
considered the advisory policy statement range, considered the
relevant factors, and gave the parties an opportunity to present
argument. The sentence was procedurally reasonable. See United
States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). The
court also sufficiently explained its reasons for imposing a
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sentence outside the policy statement range. See Crudup, 461
F.3d at 440.
Roscoe contends that, in determining the sentence, the
district court improperly considered the seriousness of the
offense and the need for the sentence imposed to promote respect
for the law. Because Roscoe did not object in the district
court to the explanation of his sentence, we review for plain
error. United States v. Hargrove, 625 F.3d 170, 183-84 (4th
Cir. 2010); see United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-34
(1993).
The district court’s consideration of the seriousness
of the offense and the need to promote respect for the law was
in conjunction with its consideration of the factors in 18
U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2012). Specifically, Roscoe’s failure to
respect the terms of the court’s supervised release order is
relevant to the nature and circumstances of his offense, his
history and characteristics, and the need to protect the public
from further crimes by Roscoe. “Although § 3583(e) enumerates
the factors a district court should consider when formulating a
revocation sentence, it does not expressly prohibit a court from
referencing other relevant factors omitted from the statute.”
United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 641 (4th Cir. 2013).
Because the district court properly considered the seriousness
of the offense and promoting respect for the law in conjunction
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with the enumerated factors, we find no plain error by the
district court. See id. at 642 (concluding that reference to
non-enumerated factor does not render revocation sentence
procedurally unreasonable when considered in conjunction with
enumerated 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors).
Accordingly, we conclude that the twenty-four-month
revocation sentence is not plainly unreasonable. We therefore
affirm the revocation judgment. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before this court and argument would not aid
the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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