Snider International Corporation v. Town of Forest Heights, MD , 739 F.3d 140 ( 2014 )

PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-2490
SNIDER INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, trading as Eastover Auto
Supply; MARK CRANFORD; STAN DERWIN BROWN; AL GOYBURU,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
TOWN OF FOREST HEIGHTS, MARYLAND; TOWN OF RIVERDALE PARK,
MARYLAND,
Defendants – Appellees,
and
MAYOR AND COUNCIL OF THE TOWN OF RIVERDALE PARK, MARYLAND,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. J. Frederick Motz, Senior District
Judge. (8:12-cv-01248-JFM)
Argued: October 29, 2013 Decided: January 7, 2014
Before KING, GREGORY, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Gregory wrote the opinion,
in which Judge King and Judge Agee joined.
ARGUED: James S. Liskow, DECARO, DORAN, SICILIANO, GALLAGHER &
DEBLASIS, LLP, Bowie, Maryland, for Appellants. Kevin Bock
Karpinski, KARPINSKI, COLARESI & KARP, PA, Baltimore, Maryland,
for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Stephen H. Ring, Gaithersburg,
Maryland; Christopher R. Dunn, DECARO, DORAN, SICILIANO,
GALLAGHER & DEBLASIS, LLP, Bowie, Maryland, for Appellants.
Sandra D. Lee, KARPINSKI, COLARESI & KARP, Baltimore, Maryland,
for Appellees.
2
GREGORY, Circuit Judge:
Maryland permits localities to employ “speed monitoring
systems,” better known as speed cameras, for enforcing traffic
laws. Maryland’s speed camera program imposes civil penalties
for exceeding the speed limit by twelve miles per hour. During
several years, two Maryland towns issued a number of
electronically-signed speeding citations by first-class mail.
The issues on appeal are whether the use of first-class mail or
the use of the citations as evidence at trial violate due
process. Finding that they do not, we affirm.
I.
Snider International Corporation, Mark Cranford, Stan
Brown, and Al Goyburu (“Appellants”) filed a putative class
action challenging the constitutionality of the issuance and
form of automated speeding citations. 1 Appellants received
citations from the Town of Forest Heights, Maryland and the Town
of Riverdale Park, Maryland (“Appellees”). The citations were
issued under Maryland’s speed camera program.
1
The putative class action never challenged the
constitutionality of the speed camera program.
3
A.
Since 2006, the Maryland General Assembly has permitted the
use of “speed monitoring systems” throughout designated areas
within the state. See Md. Code Ann., Transp. § 21-809. After a
pilot run in Montgomery County, the speed camera program
expanded statewide in October 2009. Under Maryland
Transportation Article § 21-809, speed cameras may be placed in
school zones, in certain residential areas in Montgomery County,
and near certain colleges in Prince George’s County. 2 § 21-
809(b)(1). Speed cameras produce electronically-recorded images
of vehicles traveling in excess of the speed limit by at least
twelve miles per hour. § 21-809(a)(5). The automated citations
carry a civil penalty no greater than forty dollars. § 21-
809(c)(2). Nonpayment of the penalty and failure to contest the
citation amounts to an admission of civil liability and may
result in suspension or nonrenewal of the recorded vehicle’s
registration. § 21-809(g).
The General Assembly further prescribed the form and
contents of these automated citations. The appropriate agency
mails the citation to the registered owner of the recorded
2
Speed cameras are also authorized in highway work zones,
but a different statute governs such use. See, Md. Code Ann.,
Transp. § 21-810. All citations pertinent to this appeal issued
from cameras authorized by Section 21-809.
4
vehicle. § 21-809(d)(1). An “agency” is either the local
police force or, where a locality lacks its own police force,
the entity charged with administering the automated citations.
§ 21-809(a)(2). The citation must contain the registered
owner’s information; the time, date, and location of the
violation; the recorded image; the penalty amount; and “a signed
statement by a duly authorized law enforcement officer employed
by or under contract with an agency” that the vehicle was driven
in an unlawful manner. § 21-809(d)(1).
A citation recipient may elect a trial in the District
Court of Maryland in lieu of paying the penalty. § 21-
809(d)(5). The recipient may present for consideration any
defenses to liability that the district court deems pertinent.
§ 21-809(f)(1). The court determines liability using a
preponderance of the evidence standard. § 21-809(e)(3). At
trial, the agency may introduce the citation as evidence without
any corroborating evidence or authentication by the systems
operator. § 21-809(e)(1). To do so, the agency must submit a
certificate affirming both a violation and satisfaction of
certain requirements under § 21-809(b). § 21-809(e)(1). Under
Subsection (b), the following documents must be kept on file and
admitted into evidence at trial: the systems operator’s
certificate of training, a daily log showing that the systems
operator successfully completed a self-test prior to the
5
recording of the image, and a signed certificate of calibration
issued by an independent calibration laboratory. § 21-
809(b)(2)-(4). The citation recipient may request the presence
and testimony of the systems operator at trial. § 21-809(e)(2).
The speed camera statute references mail in two contexts.
First, the statute requires all citations be mailed no later
than two weeks after the alleged violation where the recipient
is a Maryland resident. 3 §§ 21-809(d)(4), (f)(4). In this
context, the statute does not specify the use of any particular
mail service or delivery method. The second reference to mail
arises when describing procedures for a defense that the
registered owner was not driving the vehicle at the time of the
alleged violation. The citation recipient must send a sworn
statement of such facts by certified mail. § 21-809(f)(3).
B.
Between May 2010 and January 2012, Appellees issued fifty-
five citations via first-class mail to Appellants. 4 Appellants
paid some of these citations immediately. Other times,
Appellants defaulted by neither paying the citations nor
3
Citations to nonresidents must issue within thirty days of
the alleged violation. § 21-809(4). Appellants are Maryland
residents.
4
The parties agree that first-class mail was the form of
service authorized by ordinances enacted pursuant to § 21-809.
6
electing trial. In yet other instances, Appellants elected
trial in the District Court of Maryland, received an adverse
verdict, and still refused to pay. As to all fifty-five
citations, the record lacks any indication that Appellants never
received any of the mailed citations.
Appellants filed a putative class action in the United
States District Court for the District of Maryland. Appellants
identified four classes of individuals: (1) anyone who received
and immediately paid citations issued by the Town of Forest
Heights, (2) anyone who received and immediately paid citations
issued by the Town of Riverdale Park, (3) anyone issued
citations by the Town of Forest Heights and suffered a default
due to nonpayment, and (4) anyone suffering default due to
nonpayment of the Riverdale Park citations. Appellants sought
relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and Article 24 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights.
Without ruling on the class certification motion, the
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the towns. 5
5
Appellees filed a motion for dismissal or, in the
alternative, for summary judgment, and the district court
considered the motion as one for summary judgment. The
plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for partial judgment on the
pleadings under Rule 12(c). The district court noted that the
plaintiffs’ Rule 12(c) motion was premature due to the fact that
the pleadings had yet to close. The district court later
(Continued)
7
After rejecting Appellees’ jurisdictional and waiver arguments, 6
the district court held that it could not enforce state
constitutional laws through § 1983 actions, and that res
judicata precluded claims by recipients who suffered default due
to nonpayment. 7 Turning to the merits as to those who paid the
citations, the district court held that the citations’ issuance
and contents did not violate substantive or procedural due
process. Appellants timely appealed, challenging only the
district court’s ruling on the merits as to the “paid” classes.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
II.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo. Glynn v. EDO Corp., 710 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 2013).
explained why, untimeliness notwithstanding, denial on the
merits was appropriate.
6
Appellees unsuccessfully argued that the plaintiffs lacked
standing and that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine required
abstention by the district court. The district court also
rejected Appellees’ argument that those plaintiffs who paid the
citations waived their right to pursue relief under § 1983.
7
The district court held that res judicata did not apply to
the two “paid” classes because those plaintiffs never received a
final judgment on the merits.
8
III.
Appellants maintain that the automated citations violated
both procedural and substantive due process in three ways.
First, Appellants argue that first-class mail fails to satisfy
due process, and that Appellees must use, at a minimum,
certified mail. Second, Appellants contend that citations
signed electronically cannot serve as sworn testimony admissible
at trial. Third, Appellants claim that the citations’
noncompliance with § 21-809(b) violated the process required
under Maryland law.
A basic requirement of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 violation is “the
depriv[ation] of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of
the United States.” Mantavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310
(4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S.
144, 150 (1970)). Conduct violating state law without violating
federal law will not give rise to a § 1983 claim. United States
v. Van Metre, 150 F.3d 339, 347 (4th Cir. 1998).
We find Appellants’ third challenge, which concerns whether
the citations comply with the Maryland statute, misplaced in a
§ 1983 claim. Even if the citations violated Maryland law, the
noncompliance would not violate federal law and thus cannot give
rise to § 1983 relief. Clark v. Link, 855 F.2d 156, 163 (4th
Cir. 1988); see also Street v. Surdyka, 492 F.2d 368, 371 (4th
Cir. 1974) (officer cannot be liable under § 1983 for violating
9
a Maryland arrest law “unless he also violated the federal
constitutional law governing . . . arrests”). The alleged
noncompliance with the state law is not, as Appellants argue,
“so extreme as to result in denial of a constitutionally fair
proceeding.” See, e.g., Burket v. Angelone, 208 F.3d 172, 186
(4th Cir. 2000). The district court properly found that
Appellants cannot pursue § 1983 relief for acts that allegedly
violate only Maryland law. We similarly limit our consideration
to Appellants’ first two arguments, which allege violations of
the United States Constitution.
IV.
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the States from
“depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV. Due process
contains both substantive and procedural components. Procedural
due process prevents mistaken or unjust deprivation, while
substantive due process prohibits certain actions regardless of
procedural fairness. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125-26
(1990); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978). We consider
each challenge as they relate to procedural due process before
addressing substantive due process.
10
A.
At bottom, procedural due process requires fair notice of
impending state action and an opportunity to be heard. Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1950). Notice and the
hearing are two distinct features of due process, and are thus
governed by different standards. Dusenbery v. United States,
534 U.S. 161, 168 (2002). Proper notice is “an elementary and
fundamental requirement of due process,” and must be reasonably
calculated to convey information concerning a deprivation.
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314; see also Presley v. City of
Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 490 (4th Cir. 2006). Mathews set
forth the familiar three-step inquiry for determining the
adequacy of the opportunity to be heard: a balancing of the
private interest and the public interest, along with “the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional
or substitute procedural safeguards.” 424 U.S. at 335.
1.
Appellants challenge first-class mail as a constitutionally
insufficient means of providing notice. As noted in Dusenbery,
Mullane is the appropriate guidepost for this question.
Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 168. Notice must not be a mere gesture,
but rather an effort reasonably calculated to effect actual
11
notice. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315. Actual notice is not
necessary. Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 170-71. Instead, notice
satisfies due process where it either 1) “is in itself
reasonably certain to inform those affected” or 2) “where
conditions do not reasonably permit such notice, . . . the form
chosen is not substantially less likely to bring home notice
than other of the feasible and customary substitutes.” Mullane,
339 U.S. at 315 (citations omitted). The use of first-class
mail at issue satisfies this inquiry.
The Supreme Court has routinely recognized that the use of
mail satisfies the notice element of due process. Jones v.
Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 226 (2006); Tulsa Prof’l Collection
Servs., Inc v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 490 (1988); see also Mullane,
339 U.S. at 319 (recognizing that “the mails today are
recognized as an efficient and inexpensive means of
communication” that would ordinarily “satisfy a prudent man of
business”); cf. Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 455 (1982)
(finding that “[n]otice by mail . . . would surely go a long way
toward providing the constitutionally required assurance” of
proper notice under due process). Where the identities of
interested parties are known, “a serious effort [must be made]
to inform them personally of the [action], at least by ordinary
mail to the record addresses.” Mullane, 339 U.S. at 316
(emphasis added); see also Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams,
12
462 U.S. 791, 800 (1983) (“Notice by mail or other means as
certain to ensure actual notice is a minimum constitutional
precondition to a proceeding which will adversely affect the
liberty or property interests of any party . . . if its name and
address are reasonably ascertainable.”).
First-class mail was reasonably calculated to confer actual
notice upon Appellants. Through their designated agencies,
Appellees mailed summonses to the addresses registered in
connection with the recorded vehicles. It is difficult to
imagine a more reasonable attempt at effectuating actual notice
of a driving infraction than the use of registration information
collected by the state’s transportation agency, the Maryland
Motor Vehicle Administration (“MVA”). See Md. Code Ann.,
Transp. §§ 13-402, 13-403 (requiring residents to register
vehicles with the MVA). By using these records, the citations
were sent to what was likely to be the most current address for
the registered owner. See Md. Code Ann., Transp. § 13-414(a)
(requiring owners to notify the MVA within thirty days of
address changes). So long as the agency did not have reason to
believe that the citation recipient could not be reached at that
address, the mailed notice would be sufficient. See Robinson v.
Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38, 39-40 (1972) (notice sent to an address
listed with the secretary of state was insufficient because the
13
appellant’s incarceration provided the state knowledge that he
would not receive mail at his residence).
Repeated success of first-class mail delivery suggests the
reasonableness of this method for two reasons. First, an
individual that receives timely actual notice, and thus suffers
no harm from the method of notice, cannot challenge the
constitutionality of said method. See, e.g., Lind v. Midland
Funding, L.L.C., 688 F.3d 402, 406 (8th Cir. 2012). Second, due
to successful delivery, Appellees lacked any indication, e.g.
envelopes returned as undeliverable, that first-class mail could
not reasonably provide actual notice. See Jones, 547 U.S. at
229-30 (notice insufficient where the government proceeded with
a taking after learning the notice was not delivered); cf. Linn
Farms & Timber Ltd. P’ship v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 661 F.3d 354,
358 (8th Cir. 2011) (additional steps beyond the initial notice
attempt were necessary where notice letters were returned as
undeliverable). Appellants offer no facts that would have
suggested to Appellees that sending mail to the addresses of
record would not accomplish actual notice. Appellants’ payment
of the mailed citations plainly suggests both actual notice and
the reasonableness in continuing to use the same notice
procedure.
Appellants spend significant time attacking first-class
mail, arguing it is sufficient only for in rem proceedings where
14
publication already occurred. They contend that these in rem
procedures do not displace the requirements for in personam
actions, which Appellants read as requiring the use of certified
mail or other efforts above and beyond first-class mail. This
position is incorrect. Sufficiency of notice does not turn upon
the sometimes malleable and elusive distinctions of in personam,
in rem, and quasi in rem, thus we employ the “reasonably
calculated to effect actual notice” inquiry regardless of the
nature of the action. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 312-13. As to their
certified mail proposal, Appellants cite Miserandino v. Resort
Properties, Inc., 691 A.2d 208 (Md. 1997), for the position that
first-class mail is insufficient for providing notice in an
action for a money judgment in Maryland. 8 However, Miserandino
did not broadly declare first-class mail insufficient under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 9 See Griffin v. Bierman, 941 A.2d 475,
485-86 (Md. 2008).
8
In Miserandino, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
considered whether certain factors permitted the use of “the
significantly less certain procedure of first-class mail”
instead of ordinary and available methods such as personal
service by officials or service by restricted delivery or
certified mail. 691 A.2d at 219. In finding first-class mail
impermissible, the court based its conclusion on the fact that a
money judgment was at issue and also the Virginia long-arm
service statute relevant to those proceedings. Id.
9
Even if it meant what Appellants suggest, Misernadino’s
persuasiveness is severely undercut by subsequent explanations
in Jones and Dusenbery that offered further guidance as to what
(Continued)
15
Furthermore, and contrary to Appellants’ position,
certified mail does not necessarily enhance the likelihood of
actual notice; even if it did, such enhancement would not
necessarily compel us to make certified mail the constitutional
threshold. See Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 172 (“[O]ur cases have
never held that improvements in the reliability of new
procedures necessarily demonstrate the infirmity of those that
were replaced.”); cf. Akey v. Clinton Cnty., N.Y., 375 F.3d 231,
235 (2d Cir. 2004) (“As notice by mail is deemed to be
reasonably calculated to reach property owners, the state is not
required to go further, despite the slight risk that notice sent
by ordinary mail might not be received.”). The record before us
fails to demonstrate a correlation between requiring a
recipient’s signature upon delivery and an improvement or
enhancement of delivery procedures. See Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at
172. Put another way, nothing presented to us indicates that
the United States Postal Service delivers certified mail at a
rate so superior to that of first-class mail that we should
declare first-class mail not reasonably calculated to provide
actual notice. See Jones, 547 U.S. at 234-35 (recognizing that
“certified mail is dispatched and handled in transit as ordinary
notice efforts are reasonable under procedural due process. See
Griffin, 941 A.2d at 482-83, 486.
16
mail,” thus certified mail only increases chance of actual
notice so long as someone is present to sign for the letter
(citations omitted)). First-class mail may actually increase
the likelihood of actual notice, as the signature requirement
limits when certified mail may be delivered. Id. at 234.
We also decline Appellants’ invitation to read Jones as
permitting the use of first-class mail only in conjunction with
publication after certified mail has proved unfruitful. Courts
have upheld the sufficiency of dual mailing schemes, involving
the contemporaneous use of first-class and certified mails to
send identical notice, even where the certified notices are
returned unclaimed. See Griffin, 941 A.2d at 483; Crum v. Mo.
Dir. of Revenue, 455 F. Supp. 2d 978, 989 (W.D. Mo. 2006), aff’d
sub nom. Crum v. Vincent, 493 F.3d 988 (8th Cir. 2007). It
follows that an initial failure of certified mail is not a
prerequisite to the sufficiency of first-class mail. Cf.
Griffin, 941 A.2d at 484 (explaining that the dual mailing
scheme was “not constitutionally infirm merely because [it]
d[id] not require the certified mail to be returned as
undeliverable prior to requiring [the use of] first class
mail”). Without an indication that the first-class mailing
attempt could not notify the intended recipient, it is difficult
to see how first-class mail, on its own, is insufficient. See
Jones, 547 U.S. at 227, 234 (requiring the government to take
17
“additional, reasonable steps to notify Jones, if practicable to
do so,” where it received “new information” suggesting that “its
attempt at notice has failed”); cf. Griffin, 941 A.2d at 484
n.11 (“Our holding would be different, however, had the first-
class mail notices been returned undelivered or the certified
mail had been returned as something more revealing than
‘unclaimed.’”). Accordingly, we find that notice via first-
class mail comports with due process.
2.
Appellants’ second argument challenges the validity of
electronic signatures on citations and the admissibility of the
citations as sworn testimony in trial. Appellants contend that
the electronic signatures fail to state whether the testimony is
sworn based on personal knowledge or information and belief, as
required by Maryland law, and thus cannot form testimony under
oath. Without reaching the substance of the state law, we find
no procedural due process violation.
A procedural due process violation arises not upon the
occurrence of a deprivation but rather the failure of due
process in connection with the deprivation. Zinermon, 494 U.S.
at 125. “Therefore, to determine whether a constitutional
violation has occurred, it is necessary to ask what process the
State provided, and whether it was constitutionally adequate.”
Id. Rather than a meticulous examination of the minutiae of the
18
state’s procedural rubric, “procedural due process is simply a
guarantee” that there is notice and an opportunity to be heard.
Mora v. City of Gaithersburg, Md., 519 F.3d 216, 230 (4th Cir.
2008). Having found notice sufficient, only an evaluation of
the opportunity to be heard remains. We now consider 1) the
private interest involved, 2) “the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and
the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards,” and 3) the state interest, including
fiscal and administrative burdens imposed by additional process.
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
More than twenty years ago, we applied Mathews in
evaluating the MVA’s deprivation procedures with respect to
driver’s license suspensions, which are analogous to the hearing
procedure under the speed camera program. Plumer v. State of
Md., 915 F.2d 927, 931-32 (4th Cir. 1990). The procedure in
Plumer required notice to the licensee of a pre-deprivation
hearing, setting forth the basis for the suspension, and an
opportunity at the hearing to inspect evidence, call witnesses,
and present rebuttal evidence. Id. at 932. We found the MVA’s
procedures not only constitutionally adequate but possibly even
more than due process requires. Id.
We find no reason to reach a different conclusion here.
Appellants received constitutionally sufficient notice of the
19
citation and potential penalty, and they could elect a trial
prior to being assessed the penalty. The notice set forth the
basis for the adverse action. The trial, like the hearing in
Plumer, permitted Appellants to call witnesses and rebut the
state’s evidence with their own. Appellants’ interest is
arguably less than that at stake in Plumer--driving privileges
cannot be affected under the speed camera program and the $40
civil penalty is not subject to additional monetary penalties
for nonpayment. 10 It is difficult to see how additional process
could significantly reduce the chance of erroneous deprivation,
especially given the trial mechanism already in place. The
state’s interest in efficiently enforcing traffic laws would be
greatly burdened were we to require additional procedural
safeguards, exhausting significant fiscal and administrative
resources, that would provide little, if any, additional
protection above and beyond that afforded by a trial in the
state courts.
In fact, the mere availability of a trial in which to
present their grievances undermines Appellants’ argument.
Notwithstanding the fact that Appellants predicate their
10
At oral argument, counsel for Appellees explained that
failure to pay the speeding citations at issue would not impact
an individual’s driving record or driving privileges in general.
Counsel further noted that no late fees are imposed for failure
to pay by the deadline indicated on the citation.
20
challenge on a violation of state law rather than federal law,
“the availability of state procedures [to address Appellants’
arguments] is fatal” to their procedural due process claims.
Mora, 519 F.3d at 230. Appellants had adequate opportunity in
the state courts to argue the sufficiency of electronically-
signed citations as an affidavit or otherwise admissible
evidence. Having forgone the opportunity to object to the use
of electronically-signed citations as evidence, Appellants may
not first cry foul in a federal court on this issue. See Mora,
519 F.3d at 230 (“[Mora] cannot plausibly claim that Maryland’s
procedures are unfair when he has not tried to avail himself of
them.”).
B.
We also find that the automated citation procedures do not
violate substantive due process. “The touchstone of due process
is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of the
government.” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845
(1998). Only “the most egregious official conduct” qualifies as
constitutionally arbitrary. Huggins v. Prince George’s Cnty.,
Md., 683 F.3d 525, 535 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S.
at 846). To give rise to a substantive due process violation,
the arbitrary action must be “unjustified by any circumstance or
governmental interest, as to be literally incapable of avoidance
by any pre-deprivation procedural protections or of adequate
21
rectification by any post-deprivation state remedies.” Rucker
v. Harford Cnty., 946 F.2d 278, 281 (4th Cir. 1991).
Appellants fail to identify any element of the disputed
procedures that equate to egregious official conduct unjustified
by the state interest in traffic enforcement. Furthermore,
assessment of the $40 civil penalty was subject to correction
through trial, presentation of witnesses, and rebuttal evidence.
Thus, “Maryland’s treatment of [Appellants] is hardly arbitrary
when the state has given [them] the means to correct the
[alleged] errors.” Mora, 519 F.3d at 231.
V.
We find that the notice and hearing afforded by Maryland’s
speed camera statute satisfy due process. Notice sent by first-
class mail was reasonably calculated to provide actual notice of
the speeding violation and civil penalties. The availability of
a trial in state court, upon Appellants’ election, provided
adequate opportunity to be heard on any objections prior to
imposition of the statutory penalties. Any flaws in the
citation or enforcement process could have been challenged in
the state courts, and Appellants failed to do so. Accordingly,
the district court’s judgment is
AFFIRMED.
22